

Religiosity – Impacts of Globalization and Intrastate Factors¹

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Abstract

Religion was put on the international public agenda following the end of the Cold War. With the clash of civilization thesis put forward by Samuel Huntington, religion and cultural factors in general gain new momentum also in the political science realm, where it had previously been a more or less overlooked factor. In recent years scholars have claimed to see a resurgence of religion taking place in many corners of the world. Religion has historically been regarded as a resource of cultural crisis prevention and management, serving both collective and individual needs. In light of this, the claimed religious surge has been proposed to be a reaction to globalization processes. This paper investigates the relationship between external and internal factors and religiosity in populations. This is done by combining indicators of integration into the global economy such as trade, integration measured by cross-border movement of people in the form of tourist activity, membership in IGOs; and internal factors such as the religious composition of countries (religious polarization), and state religiosity. Religious zeal is measured by religious activity and beliefs. The findings indicate that religious polarization increases religiosity levels in the population. In addition, globalization forces clearly have a strong impact on the levels of religiosity, as increasing globalization decreases religiosity.

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Introduction

Religion came to the forefront of the international public agenda following the end of the Cold War. With the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis put forward by Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996), religion and cultural factors in general gain new momentum also in the political science realm, where it had previously been a more or less overlooked factor. In recent years scholars have claimed to see a resurgence of religion taking place in many corners of the world. The resurgence of religion has also made its way into the public debate and academic writings (see Huntington, 1993, 1996; Appleby, 2001; Marty & Appleby, 1995; Juergensmeyer, 1993, 1995, 1999; Kepel, 1994; Fox, 2000; 2001; Fox & Squires, 2001; Seul, 1999; Haynes, 1997, 1999; Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000, Ellingsen, 2000; Russett, Oneal & Cox, 2000; Henderson & Tucker, 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Thomas, 2003), and after the events of September 11 it is probably safe to say that religion has become one of the (if not *the*) hottest issue(s) in the 21st Century.

This paper speaks to the discussion of a resurgence of religion. Some potential factors influencing religiosity at the individual levels are addressed, notably the forces of globalization, religious competition between groups, and state religiosity. As globalization proceeds, this may have important implications for the future of this claimed resurgence. The central research question is under which circumstances religion becomes important in peoples’ lives. More specifically, what determines the religiosity of individuals, and how do intrastate and globalization processes play a part? In previous works on religion and conflict, I found that religious diversity in countries have little own explanatory force for explaining intrastate conflict (Nordås, 2004a,b). However, in combination with state religiosity religious cleavages become important. Under conditions of religious cleavages, a heightened level of state religiosity can significantly increase the risk of violent conflict. One of the underlying assumptions was that challenges to the religious identity and competition between identity groups could set of processes in which the identity becomes more salient, and religion therefore becomes more important in peoples’ lives.

Other factors than the internal affairs of states may well affect religious salience. In this paper I ask the question of whether globalization forces could have an effect on religious zeal on the individual level. I juxtapose this proposition by measures of internal factors such as religious diversity and state religiosity, in order to capture how these different influences can sharpen or soften religious zeal. The conclusion reached is that

both internal and external forces significantly affect the levels of religiosity in populations. Religious polarization can increase the salience of the religious identity component, whereas globalization counter-acts religious sentiments.

Religion and Modernity: Secularization vs. Desecularization

The theory of secularization has been promoted by numerous founding fathers of the social sciences from Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. This paradigm suggested that the modern world would see a differentiation of the secular and religious spheres, that we would see a decline in religious beliefs and practices, and marginalization of religion to the private sphere. The recent decades have, however, been marked more by de-privatization of religion and a religious resurgence occurring virtually all over the globe, rather than religion becoming an obsolete force in the modern world (Haynes, 2002). Consequently, secularization theory has been strongly contested (see e.g. Berger, 1999; Stark, 1999; Stark & Finke, 2000).

Since the decade starting with the 1979 Iranian revolution, the central propositions of secularization theory have been under renewed scrutiny. Religion reentered the public debate, and ‘thrust itself into the public arena of moral and political contestation’ (Casanova, 1994: 3) through four developments in particular: the Islamic revolution in Iran, the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland, the role of Catholicism in the Sandinista revolution and the rise of liberation theology in Latin America, and the Protestant Evangelical force in American politics. This trend continued at the end of the Cold War, and has had another peak in the ongoing ‘war on terror’.

In public debate and academic writings, from *The Clash of Civilizations* thesis (Huntington, 1993, 1996) to the claim in Inglehart & Baker (2000) that traditional values are persistent, religion is a factor that needs to be accounted for in explaining not only the many faces of globalization, but also terrorism, conflict, economic growth, as well as a number of other processes (see, for example, Barro & McCleary, 2003; Berger, 1999; Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000; Henderson & Tucker, 2001; Juergensmeyer, 1993, 1999; Marty & Appleby, 1995; Reynal–Querol, 2002; Seul, 1999; Thomas, 2000). From being a topic for theology and sociology of religion, this has now acquired cross-disciplinary significance. The scholarly assumption about the liberal optimist scenario of the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1989) and the post Cold War peace divided has been shaken by the

events of September 11, and along with it, religion has become one of the hottest issues in the 21st Century in the glare of public attention (Norris & Inglehart, 2004: xiii).

However, there is also considerable evidence that the secularization thesis should not be dismissed as passé (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). In fact, the publics of virtually all industrialized societies have become more secular in the past half century. However, for the world as a whole the trend is the opposite – there is more people adherent to traditional religions now than ever before and this group constitutes a growing proportion of the world’s population (ibid.: 5). Moreover, religious influence on politics is an important reality in the global public debate, yet academic understanding of the religious factor has been noticeably deficient.

Modernization and globalization may pose problems through a lack of economic development, combined with increased levels of urbanization, and education (Ellingsen, 2005). As people are uprooted from their traditional life, but still do not benefit from development, they may face a crisis of identity. The failure of modernization can cause grievances, that according to Ellingsen (2005: 4) “are evident in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and parts of Latin America, and in most cases modernization is closely associated with Westernization and cultural imperialism”. Also, Huntington (1996) challenges the somewhat naive faith in a “global village” based on the belief that the Western civilization is embracing the whole world and that western culture is becoming universal. Cultural imperialism might lead to homogenization in some areas such as the spread of western commercial products; for the most part it leads to counter-reactions, increasing levels of hostility and dislike towards the West and Western values (Huntington, 1996: 58f).

Religious Identity: Function and Salience

The concept of identity has different usages, theoretical roles and conceptual meanings in different disciplines and even between scholars within the same discipline (Stryker & Burke, 2000). In quantitative research on conflicts the most common usage has been equating identity with culture³. The identity of an individual or group in this sense consists of shared cultural traditions, history, myths, and values. The cultural identity has typically

³ Other usages include references to identification to a social category; or in contemporary works the concept has been used in the research on social movements and the common culture that develops between participants in such movements (Stryker & Burke, 2000: 284). I will use the common definition of identity as religious adherence in this paper.

been operationalized in quantitative studies by religious adherence, ethnicity, or language groups.

The essence of a group identity is the intra-group sense of genuine distinctiveness vis-à-vis other groups. Inherent in this is the evaluation of one's own group compared to other groups, and an inter-group competitive dynamic (Taifel & Turner, 1986). Identities determine the belonging of individuals to a more or less defined community of some shared characteristics. These characteristics can be varied, and multiple identity sets normally exist for the same person at any give point in time. One can define oneself according to gender in one context, occupation the next, geographical belonging, or an ethnic or religious identity in yet another. Or, as Henderson (1997: 656) puts it: "People have multiple, often crisscrossing identities".

According to some scholars (e.g. Breakwell, 1986: 19; Kelman, 1998) individual identity is "fluid, dynamic, and responsive to its social context", but with a certain core. This implies that although the core identity is stable, identities *can* change over time, and are responsive to current events or circumstances. The salience of a group's identity, and thus the level of involvement in the group's purposes will therefore differ – over time as well as between different members. Depending on changing dynamics in group status, inter-group competition, and the symbolic meanings assigned to the particular identity, the identity-groups can generate tensions at one point in time and less in another.

The salience of an identity can thus be understood also as a function of a number of integrated factors: the degree to which identity difference is visible, whether it plays a vital role in daily life of the individuals in the identity group, how central the group membership is to the individual identity, the level of interaction in the group, and external pressures of threats to the group identity. Thus, strong cohesion of an identity group such as a religious minority is the result of high and sustained levels of interaction among group members, visible delineating of in-group versus out-group, and the importance of the identity for security and well-being (Gurr, 2000).

Religious affiliation or identity is usually a highly personal and often non-negotiable part of individual identity – who you consider yourself to *be*. However, the salience of the religious identity may change over time in response to external threats and changing situations. Often in times of crisis people cling to religions for consolation, stability, and belonging; whereas in other times the religious identity is less vital in people's daily lives. How important is the religious identity for the people, can hence affect the strength and salience of the religious identity component.

In most religions, the ideals, principles, morality and values given by the laws are absolutes, as they are believed to be given by a divine authority. The directions given by religious authorities or scriptures are laws that shall be complied with. Abiding by these religious laws is for many (in principle) not a question of whether or not your opinions and values are in line with the laws, although through processes of socialization they may well be. Contrary to a pure rational actor view of human behaviour, individuals are largely shaped by their surroundings and take decisions based on feelings, emotions, and habit – perhaps just as often as based on rational calculations of costs and benefits.

Historically, religion has given a stronger response to the individual need to develop a secure identity, compared to other containers of cultural meaning. Religion means an organizing principle for their lives by some sort of transcendent set of symbols and experiences of the sacred. Religion guides traditions, rites, morals and values, and identifies ‘right’ from ‘wrong’; and has been regarded as central social cement, binding individuals and social groups together in an integrative value system.

Religions help people create “a world more real than the real world” (Marty, 1997: 12). Religion provides assurance of the existence of an ultimately dependable other, and provides non-relativistic answers to the complexity of life and ever changing situations⁴. The ultimate dependable other⁵ anchors the individual not only to the group, but provides affirmation independently of the group. Thus, it can be stable or slow-changing characteristics of a group, affording individuals and groups “secure anchors for self-reference” (Seul, 1999: 558).

Religions can respond to the psychological impulse of finding peace and consolation. However, as Grew (1997: 20) put it “religious beliefs have always been those that people were most willing to sacrifice, fight, and die – and live – for”; and religious history is complete with tales of martyrs, and the assurance of this “world more real than the real world” ascertains the individuals of the reality of their immediate transit to paradise upon their death. Despite the significant diversity which exists among and within religions, most religions provide their adherents with “a world-view that assures their place in a meaningful and orderly universe, thereby partially satisfying the individual’s need for psychological stability” (Seul, 1999: 559). In general, groups that face a situation of negatively evaluated social identity, face choices of reactions ranging from assimilation

⁴ This is also a factor that could explain the apparent resurgence of religion in political mobilization. The claimed resurgence of religion as an important political motivator has been claimed to stem from a crisis of legitimacy for the secular ideologies, especially in the Third World. (Shupe, 1990)

into the out-group, to direct challenge of the same (Seul, 1999). In situations when assimilation is not perceived as a favourable or even acceptable option, the possible responses all include a strengthening of the intra-group identity and possibly outright conflict with the out-group. The non-negotiable character of religious identity purports assimilation to be an unfavourable strategy (see Seul, 1999; Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000), as religions can, in general, run counter to compromise and adaptation. Religions can therefore be the most decisive identity component – more important and less negotiable than other cultural and identity factors.

Friedland (2001: 141) emphasizes also that religion is also an institutional space, a network of sacred sites and ritual spaces, as well as community centres, associations, schools, hospitals, courts, and charities. Religious adherents have rituals and meeting places, church boards, and places of worship that are attended at a regular basis, and in most important cycles of life, such as births (baptisms), coming of age and rites of passage (such as Bar Mitzvahs, Confirmations et cetera), marriages, and burials, and through the cycles of the seasons, with Christmas, Ramadan, and other religious holidays. This system of meeting places and organizational structures could be *particularly* important in times of crises and insecurity, such as under rapid globalization and in case of discrimination and grievances. Religions could therefore have a particularly important function in such situations.

Religious Identities: Stability and Change

The degree to which identities are seen as given or constructed, and the perceived rate of change in identities has implications for the role identities are believed to play. For instance, Horowitz (1985) argues that religious differences are more important than language differences as a social cleavage that can develop into a conflict. Seul (1999) also argues that religion frequently appears as the primary cultural marker distinguishing groups in conflict. Likewise, Reynal-Querol (2002: 29) claims that religiously divided societies are more prone to intense conflicts than countries with conflicting claims based on interest groups or language division, based on the characteristic of religious identities as “fixed and nonnegotiable. “More than ethnicity, religion discriminates and differentiates humans in a sharp and exclusive way, even more than belonging to a country would do” (ibid: 31). The backdrop of this line of arguing is the assumption that religion becomes

5 This is especially true for the monotheistic religions (Seul, 1999).

more salient when there is competition between religious groups, e.g. when two groups of approximately the same size coexist in a country, so called polarization. The group dynamics in combination with the nonnegotiable character of religious identity could then increase the propensity of inter-group conflicts to mount to violent clashes, more so than negotiable and changing characteristics.

Two main perspectives have traditionally dominated the understanding of identity in political science: *primordialism* and *instrumentalism*. A third, *constructivism*, is more recent, and offers a middle position. Primordialists argue that the identity differentials are vital, and therefore cultural conflict is also ‘endemic’ and ‘everywhere on the rise’ (Kaplan 1994)⁶. Cultural factors such as religion are seen as real, important, and stable frames of reference; and as fixed characteristics of individuals and groups (see Smith, 1996; Vanhanen, 2000). Therefore differences in religious traditions should be viewed as one of the most important independent variables to explain violent interactions in and between nations (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000: 641).

Huntington (1993, 1996) embraces the primordial perspective, and sees cultural demarcations as relatively fixed, primordial, unreflective, and immutable. He presumes that the belonging of nations to different civilizations (defined largely by religious cosmologies) will be a key determinant of world politics in the twenty-first century. States and groups with similar religious traditions and culture will form alliances directed against those who belong to other civilizations with which they have little in common. The most common criticism of primordialists is that they fail to account for variations in conflict over time and place. It simply lacks a theoretical explanation of why some situations with differing identities are associated with conflicts and some not (Smith, 1996). For instance, there is often a long history of inter-cultural cooperation and peaceful relations between cultural groups, followed by turmoil, such as the Balkan case (Pfaff, 1993).

Contrary to primordialists, *instrumentalists* see identities as being used instrumentally by political entrepreneurs to achieve political or economic goals. Identities are created or maintained as a basis for collective action when there are clear competitive advantages attached to an identity (Carment, 1993: 138). In this perspective, the basis of an identity is, in the most extreme interpretation “plastic and malleable” (Smith, 1996: 46).

The fluidity of an identity is a function of situational constraints and strategic utility (Carment, 1993). In the instrumentalist perspective therefore, religious identity gains significance only if religious symbols are invoked and manipulated by political entrepreneurs for their own aggrandisement (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000; Smith, 1996).

The bridging of primordial and instrumental theories has led to the *constructivist* perspective. Constructivists offer a middle position, where the salience and relative stability of different identities are kept as central factors, but changing political and societal settings are considered as catalysts of group identity salience and consequently action. The constructivist line of thinking is in the process of gaining academic consensus, as scholars neither see identities as immutable nor completely malleable.

Identities are to constructivists (as to the primordialists) considered enduring social constructions. However, they are subject to change in response to changes in the group's social and political environment. Social and political context changes the significance of the common identity, and the criteria by which people are judged to be group members⁷ (Gurr, 2000). Religiosity in a population should therefore be object to change in response to differing contexts. Religion is salient as an identity marker; but although religion has by many been seen as relatively stable over time, religious zeal could fluctuate in response to internal and external dynamics.

The contexts which have been suggested in previous literature includes challenges to a group identity, for instance by competition between groups and discrimination of religious minorities (Gurr, 2000). Gurr poses the question of when ethnic identity leads to political action. He argues that the answer to this in essence is that when ethnicity has collective consequences for its relationship with other groups and with states, the identity is highlighted in the group members' perception of themselves. More accurately, the salience of a specific identity (be it ethnic or religious) can be seen as a function of the degree to which that identity is a major determinant of the groups security, status, material well-being and access to political power. To put the same notion to use in a religious context this means that in situations when a religious minority is treated differently in

⁶ The most common criticism of primordialists is that they fail to account for variations in conflict over time and place, and lack a theoretical explanation of why some situations with differing identities are associated with conflicts while others are not (Smith, 1996). There is often a long history of inter-cultural cooperation and peaceful relations between conflict antagonists, as in the Balkan case (Pfaff, 1993) and peaceful and cooperative relations are far more common than large-scale inter-group violence, even in ethnically diverse regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Fearon & Laitin 1996).

⁷ This last type of change primarily occurs around the margins of the group.

terms of privileges and power, such as situations where religious identities have different statuses, the group members are more inclined to define themselves according to their religious affiliation. Thereby the religious identity is strengthened. Consequently, this implies that institutions or policies that eliminate inequality and favour equality should put cultural cleavages to the backstage, and decrease the religious zeal in the population.

Examples from the literature on conflicts show that identities can become salient and mobilized to violent political action in situations of collective insecurity (Gurr, 2000). Such examples are the origins of the American sense of nationhood, which appeared most strongly in the war of independence, the development of the strong Zionist identity as a response to the persecution of Jewish communities in the 19th century. Further, the Palestinian self-consciousness can be seen as a response to the establishment of the state of Israel, and the following sense of victimization and *ressentiment*, as a central element of the Palestinian identity.

Other factors which could be considered a challenge to a cultural group are forces such as globalization and global integration. On the one hand one could argue that assimilation would follow from exposure to other cultures, or on the other hand one could argue that when this exposure is considered a threat the response would be a strengthening of your proper culture, as a counter-reaction to globalization or modernization factors, the so-called 'jihad' reaction in the dichotomy of 'jihad' versus 'McWorld' in the conceptualization of Barber (1996). Geertz (1966) argues that religious belief systems define one's understanding of reality and, threats to the belief system will provoke a reaction. Religious discrimination is therefore likely, just like non-religious discrimination, to lead to grievances and frustration, and sharpened religious identities.

Two broad contexts are proposed to counteract the shrinking of religion's social significance: cultural defence and cultural transition (Haynes, 1997). Cultural defence is the response to a negatively valued challenge to one's own religion or culture by an alien religion or by secularism. Increased religious significance could be the outcome, therefore, not only of competition between religious groups inhabiting a country. Cultural transition constitutes another threat to identity that could spur a counter-reaction. The most significant cultural transition today is most probably the forces of globalization bringing with it secular values. Resorting to religion to cope with this transition is a possible outcome. The impacts of globalization and modernization could be societal destabilization and a perception of a general crisis (Sahliyah, 1990), which could lead to erosion of traditional morality and values, and thus spur a reaction back to the traditional religion.

Furthermore, globalization, with increased communication and international influences, has made the differences more visible between traditional values and modern forces.

Pluralism and the ‘Religious Market’

Scholars have argued for a ‘religious market’ model to explain religiosity in populations. This line of arguing borrows ideas from economic theories of supply and demand. If the supply of religion is high, the level of religiosity in the population will increase. Increased supply in this reasoning occurs when there are few if any regulations or restrictions on religious life, and hence when there is competition between religious groups or congregations on the ‘religious free market’ (e.g. Chaves & Cann, 1992; Chaves & Gorski, 2001; Finke & Stark, 1989, 1998).

The basic theoretical argument by Finke & Stark (1998: 762) is that “effort is rewarded”, and based on a comparison between the logic of firms and religious “economies” they therefore argue that other things being equal, competition results in more energetic and efficient religious groups or churches. Their proposition is therefore that: “to the degree that religious economies are unregulated and competitive, overall levels of religious commitment will be higher” (ibid.), and that monopolies on the other hand tend to be indolent, and thus decrease religious zeal.

From their studies, Finke and Stark (1988) have shown that religious practice is strongly and positively associated with religious pluralism, and strongly and negatively associated with regulation. The studies have been based mostly on historical cases, and qualitative studies. Barro & McCleary (2003) have tested this in quantitative studies, and found that religious pluralism raised church attendance, but that religiousness and beliefs were unrelated to pluralism. Chaves and Cann (1992) extended the focus on the supply-side argument by quantitatively investigating the role of the state, and their involvement in religious regulation and interference with church activities, although using quite crude measures.

This theoretical runs somewhat counter to the idea behind the theoretical argument that restrictions or challenges to religious groups may lead to counter-reactions, and thereby increase religious zeal and strengthen the salience of the religious identity, as presented above. However, the two theoretical approaches meet at a certain point, when it comes to the religious make-up of countries, or religious heterogeneity. Based on both theoretical approaches one could assume that religiosity increases with competition –

either from the somewhat more negative note in the theory arguing that reactions and challenges produce counter-reactions, or through the more positive note of the religious free-market.

Religiosity in Populations: Internal and External Factors

In the next section I discuss ways in which the role of religion in states, religious heterogeneity, and globalization forces can affect religiosity in populations. I present the hypotheses relating to internal and external factors theoretically important for understanding religiosity. These are based on the factors of religious diversity, state religiosity, and globalization, recognized in the theoretical arguments presented above.

Intrastate Effects

The factor I will consider important internal factors include the religious diversity of countries, and the role played by the state with respect to religious policies. Being a divided state when it comes to religion, for instance being religiously polarized should make religion a more salient factor and religion a more important part of individual identity, as religion then becomes a more relevant distinction between in-group and out-group than in homogenous countries. As Montalvio and Reynal-Querol (2003; 2005) also suggest, being religiously polarized increases the conflict potential and the competition between groups. Therefore I expect religion to be more politicized and more salient in cases where countries are religiously divided between two groups of some size. The hypothesis that follows from this is that:

H1: Individual religiosity is higher in states with a religious polarization than in religiously homogenous states.

According to the religious market argument, one could expect state religiosity to tamper with the free religious market, and thus produce lower supply of religion to the population, and thereby decreased religious activity and beliefs. The hypothesis that follows from the religious market model is therefore that:

H2: Individual religiosity decreases as state religiosity increases

On the other hand it has been argued that challenges to a religious identity may lead to a defensive response, and thereby strengthen the salience of the religious identity. Being a religious minority in a country governed by a set of religious rules and regulations alien to one's own religious beliefs, is a challenge to the minority group and can cause

considerable frustration. Therefore, religious sentiments and identities could be sharpened as the state develops more close links to one religion over others, or outright adopt and enforce religious regulations and practices that go against the religious orientation of minority groups. This leads to two alternative hypotheses regarding state religiosity and religiosity in the population:

H2_{alt1}: Individual religiosity increases with state religiosity

If one assumes that this response is stronger when the minority has strength in numbers, and can to a larger extent defend their ways, the hypothesis that follows is that:

H2_{alt2}: Individual religiosity is higher in states with a religious polarization when the state is religious than in religiously homogenous states or polarized but secular states.

Globalization Effects

External forces could also influence the religiosity in countries. Assimilation to other cultures and religions, and thus a softening of religious sentiments could be the outcome of increased contact with other religious groups. Such contact could take place either through trade and being connected through international agreements or join membership in NGO's, and through movement of people, such as through tourism. Such interaction could create new and other senses of belonging, and decrease suspicion between groups of people, as one is accustomed to cooperating and compromising, and so the level of trust could be elevated. Based on this one could hypothesize that:

H3: Globalization decreases the individual religiosity in countries.

On the other hand, it has been argued that in many countries where people are thrown onto the globalized stage, and where the processes of globalization and strong exposure to other, maybe dominant, cultural expressions, could create a counter-reaction. People are increasingly tied together in networks by technology, communication, and commerce. However, Barber (1996) sees the planet also as falling apart, as 're-tribalization' driven by parochial hatreds, and resurgence of religion. This counter-reaction to the modernization or globalization forces is expected to be most pronounced when the changes are rapid, as people feel the changes as unsettling and threatening.

Globalization and modernization has resulted in increased contact between people of different cultures and religion. While some argue that this should lead to greater understanding and tolerance towards people of different cultural background, Huntington (1996) argues that such contact increases the awareness of cultural differences, and hence

also reinforces such differences. Based on these assumptions one could hypothesize the opposite relationship, namely that:

H3alt.: Globalization increases the individual religiosity in countries.

To test these hypotheses, several data sources have been used, and a quantitative method applied. In the next part I discuss the data and methods used to test the hypotheses discussed here.

Data, Methods, and Operationalization of Variables

A time-series cross national approach is data set is used for the analyses. The unit of analysis is the country-year. The dependent variable, a measure of religiosity in the population is gathered from Ellingsen (2005). The original data is from the World Values Survey⁸. The main dependent variable (RELIGIOSITY) is a composite index of the following variables measuring the importance of religion:

- 1) Whether people believe in God or not (0 = “No”, 1 = “Yes”)
- 2) Whether people find comfort in religion or not (0 = “No”, 1 = “Yes”)
- 3) The importance of religion to people (on a scale from 1-4, where 4 is “very important”)
- 4) The importance of God to people (on a scale from 1-10, where 10 is “very important”)
- 5) The level of church-attendance (on a scale from 1-7, where 7 is “more than once a week”)

The higher the score on the religiosity variable, therefore, the more religious is the person. Based on the answers from representative selections of the population in the countries included in the surveys, aggregate measures of religiosity is calculated for each country for each wave of the WVS.⁹

The number of countries in the analyses and the time period is restricted by the available data in the WVS. This is a shortcoming from which many studies of individual values suffer. Especially problematic is the fact that the WVS has a weaker coverage of developing countries than developed countries.

⁸ The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. It builds on the European Values Surveys, first carried out in 1981 when it included 22 independent countries. A second wave of surveys was completed in 1990-1991 (43 countries), a third wave was carried out in 1995-1997 (53 countries) and a fourth wave took place in 1999-2001 (65 countries). The data for the first three waves is included. For more information on each of the variables see <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

⁹ Additionally, some separate analyses have been run with the variables of which the composite index is made up, to ascertain the reliability of the findings. These re-runs of the models are not reported in the tables in the paper, but they are in line with the findings presented here on the composite measure.

The explanatory variables are gathered from different sources. Firstly, I use a polarization measure gathered from Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005). The degree of religious polarization increases when there are few (equally large) groups in a country. The maximum degree of polarization is a situation where a country consists of two religious groups that each consist of 50% of the total population. Reynal-Querol (2002) presented the following formula for polarization in a previous version of their article:

$$RQ_i = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{\frac{1-p_i}{2}}{\frac{1}{2}} \right)^2 p_i^2$$

The population shares of religious groups in a country are denoted $p_1, p_2, p_3 \dots p_n$. The polarization scale goes from 0 to 1, and a case with 50–50 distribution is assigned the value 1, whereas a distribution 100–0 gets a value 0. As for the fractionalization variable, country specific values of religious polarization are calculated for each country based on this formula.

Data on state-religion relations (state religiosity) are from the RAS database by Fox & Sandler (2003). Two measures of state religiosity are used. Firstly, a dummy variable indicating whether the state has an official state religion (=1) or not (=0) is coded (OFFSREL). Secondly, an index of restrictions on religious practice for minorities is used. This is a composite of restrictions (RELRESTRICT) on the following: public observance, access to places of worship and building/maintaining such places of worship, restrictions on formal organizations, conversions, and proselytizing. The higher the score on this variable, the more restrictive the policies imposed by the state, and the more people are affected. I also construct interaction variables between religious polarization and the two measures of state religiosity in order to capture if the effects of state religiosity on religiosity in populations is dependent on the religious composition of the population in terms of group sizes.

To measure the integration or globalization of countries, the external factors, I use a measure of the number of tourist received by the country, taken from Neumayer (2004). I also use a measure of trade to GDP from the *World Bank*. The third indicator of globalization is collected from Wiik (2002). This is a measure of memberships in IGOs. The data was collected from the *Union of International Organizations*, and the *Yearbook of International Organizations*. The measure included is the number of IGO membership of a country per 100,000 persons. The data on this is available for the time period 1960–2001.

A number of control variables are included in the empirical analyses. To find out if the variation on the dependent variable is nothing more than differences between different regions or cultures, I include dummy variables for the percent of the following major religious denominations in each country: Islam, Hindu, Animist, and Buddhist. Also, I include dummies for regions: Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. The RAS database by Fox & Sandler (2003) also provides a measure of population size of which the log is included as a control variable. Both the trade to GDP and the number of IGO memberships could be affected by the population size (or country size, which is highly correlated with population). Smaller countries are usually more dependent on international cooperation and trade than larger countries which can be more self-supplied. The measures of globalization may also be affected by simple GDP per capita and regime type. GDP data are collected from the World Bank (World Bank, 2003); whereas regime type and regime type squared are from the POLITY IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2003). The regime variable is a scale going from autocracy (-10) to democracy (+10), and the variable regime (sq.) is the squared term of the regime variable.

Empirical Analyses and Discussion

In the following I present the empirical analyses, and discuss their implications. Table 1 tests Hypothesis 1, that *individual religiosity is higher in states with a religiously divided than in religiously homogenous states*. The findings indicate that religiosity is higher in states that are religiously polarized, i.e. in states where there are two (equally) large groups. This finding supports the hypothesis, and is in line with the underlying argument that the increased religiosity is a result of competition between religious groups. The competition is thought to be higher in cases of polarization than in any other constellation of religious heterogeneity (Montalvio & Reynal-Querol, 2003; 2005).

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Table 1 also shows that this effect is not a result of regional impact, as Model 1 is tested with dummies for the regions Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Africa, and Latin America. Furthermore, Model 2 is run with dummies for the major religions Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Animism. The inclusion of these dummies also point to the type of religion in majority not being and underlying explanation of the variation in religiosity.

In accordance with findings in previous literature, the levels of religiosity are decreasing with level of development, measured by GDP per capita. Regime type (democracy–autocracy scale) does not seem to have an effect on individual religiosity, as the coefficients for regime type are not significant in Table 1.

Table 2 shows how state religiosity correlates with individual religiosity. The measures for state religiosity (having an official state religion and religious restrictions on minorities) are believed to decrease the level of religiosity in the population due to limitations to the so-called ‘religious market’ (Hypothesis 2); or alternatively to lead to increased religiosity if the enforcement of restrictions by the state or favoritism of one religion over others leads to a counter-reaction in the minority population, and therefore increases the salience of the religious identity (Hypothesis 2_{alt1}) as the population responds to the threat by religious zeal. This latter possible connection is theoretically though to be more pronounced in cases where there is relatively equal strength between different religious groups in a country, notably in contexts of religious polarization (Hypothesis 2_{alt. 2}).

Table 2 also shows that having an official state religion has no significant impact on the religiosity of the population. This may be explained by the relative crudity of the measure, and the fact that many states that do have an official state religion (i.e. the Scandinavian countries) do not really enforce discriminatory policies that could rightfully provoke a defensive response, and the state religion in many countries is merely a symbolic artifact with few practical implications for peoples’ daily lives. The sample of countries for which we have religiosity data may also have an effect.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

Having religious restrictions on minorities may on the other hand have an effect on religiosity in the population. This may be a better measure on the actual impact of state religiosity that can affect the daily lives of people. Table 2 shows a significant relationship between restrictions and religiosity. With increasing levels of religious restrictions, the reported aggregate levels of religiosity in the population decreases.

In Model 4 in Table 2 interaction terms between state religiosity and religious polarization are included, to see if the impact of state religiosity on religious zeal in the populations is dependent of the relative strength of religious groups in terms of number of adherents. The interaction between religious polarization and religious restrictions is

negative but not significant. The interaction between religious polarization and having an official state religion is also negative, and this variable is significant at the 5% level. In states with an official state religion, therefore, increasing levels of religious polarization is associated with lower levels of religiosity. As having an official state religion in and of itself had no significant effect, and the variable can be questioned on validity, this is a somewhat curious finding. This finding is significant although measures of development levels, region, and regime type are included in the model.

The findings for the controls are the same as for the previous table: regime does not seem to matter for religiosity among the population, but development levels measured by GDP per Capita is negative and highly significant in both model 4 and 5.

Table 3 shows the models testing the alternative hypotheses 3 and 3 alt., that either globalization is associated with decreased or increased religiosity in societies. The three indicators of globalization (trade, tourist inflow, and membership in IGOs) are for the most part negative and significant in Table 3, indicating that the higher the trade, the inflow of tourists, and membership in IGOs, the lower the religiosity in the populations. This gives support to Hypothesis 3 that globalization decreases religiosity, and henceforth does not accord with hypothesis 3alt. that globalization increases religiosity.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Table 3 also shows that although controlling for the effect of globalization forces, religiosity is still significantly higher in polarized states. Regime type does not seem to matter for religiosity; whereas yet again, GDP per capita is negatively and significantly associated with religiosity. As the globalization variables may be affected by country size, a control for this is added by a measure of the log of population size. This variable turns out to be positively and significantly associated with religiosity – more populous states have higher religiosity in their population.

It has been argued that sudden influxes of globalization forces through trade, tourism or other factors could create instability in populations, and that they will then seek the religion for consolation or comfort. This has not been sufficiently tested in Table 3, as the measures used are static. These models should therefore be further elaborated upon by adding dynamic elements with respect to the influence of globalization; by including in the empirical analyses the rates of change in globalization. One way of getting at this is through modeling the change that occurs in trade and tourist inflows from one year to the

next. Although this is a crude measure, it offers an opening at the question of the impact of globalization change rates and subsequent consequences. Table 4 includes measures not only of trade and tourist inflows, but also the change in these factors from the previous year. Including these measures, however, does little to add to the explanatory power of the model. Both change variables are positive but insignificant.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

Another way to going about testing this would be to include also the squared term of the changes, to capture possible curvilinear effects. One could expect that large changes (whether positive or negative) over time may alter religiosity, whereas smaller changes may have less effect. However, including even these measures is stretching the possibilities due to insufficient data. Furthermore, aggregate measures of religiosity may not provide the accuracy required to get at this issue. Changes in religiosity may occur on the margins of the religiosity scale, such as among fundamentalist groups, and this may be undisclosed by the data material available. Aggregate measures of religiosity are in general also quite stable over time, so one might question the validity of the measures. Other data could potentially be used to test this relationship, such as indicators of fundamentalist religious groups. Another data problem discussed previously is of course the lack of data from many countries around the world; particularly in the Third World. These are unfortunately the countries to which the theoretical arguments of the religious resurgence and religious zeal are often attached. Getting good survey data from these countries is not easy. However, this is a general problem which applies to many similar studies.

Conclusion

As a result of globalization people increasingly interact or are exposed to different cultures and religions. One trend has been a renewed academic attention to the effects of globalization on people's lives, values, and notably religion. While some argue that globalization, interaction, and social mobility will diminish the socio-political position of religion, others argue that the globalization processes created insecurity and alienation, increasing importance of traditional values; and that we are therefore witnessing a resurgence of religion in opposition to the globalization forces, and even fear imminent religious clashes (Kepel, 1994; Huntington, 1996).

This paper has investigated the religiosity of people with the aim of contributing to increased understanding of the intrastate and global factors that influence religiosity, and also contributing to the debate on religion and globalization. The findings show that religiously polarized states generally have higher levels of religiosity in their populations. This may be attributed to identity competition increasing the salience of religion in society.

Considering the role of the state policies towards religious minorities, and the interconnectedness of state and religion the findings indicate that the religious market model has better explanatory power than the idea of counter-reactions to threats increasing religious zeal. State restrictions on religious minorities seem to decrease the religiosity in populations as wholes. However, one may argue that counter-reaction are taking place, but if they do they are not significant enough in sheer numbers of people to affect the aggregate measures of religiosity. A counter-reaction and religious surge neither seems to matter when the state is religiously polarized.

Globalization clearly plays an important role for religiosity. Globalization forces, namely trade, IGO membership, and tourism, decrease religiosity. Interaction between people therefore does seem to play a role in secularization. The resurgence of religion may well be an important source of identity to people, but then perhaps more so outside the more globalized parts of the world.

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Table 1 Religiosity and Religious Polarization

	(1) Religiosity	(2) Religiosity
Religious Polarization	0.186*** (3.64)	0.204*** (4.44)
Regime Type	0.005 (0.38)	0.007 (0.51)
Regime Type (sq)	-0.001 (0.49)	-0.001 (0.77)
Log GDP per Capita	-0.057*** (4.05)	-0.060*** (4.47)
Constant	1.147*** (8.90)	1.195*** (10.35)
Observations	112	112
R-squared	0.54	0.53

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Model 1 run with dummies for regions: Asia, Latin America, Middle East & Nth Africa, and Africa. Model 2 run with dummies for majority religions: Islam, Animist, Buddhist, and Hindu.

Table 2 State Religiosity and Religiosity in Populations

	(3) Religiosity	(4) Religiosity
Religious Polarization	0.204*** (4.64)	0.264*** (4.02)
Official State Religion	-0.043 (1.11)	0.023 (0.38)
Religious Restrictions	-0.033*** (3.62)	-0.024* (1.83)
Rel.Pol.* Rel. Restrictions		-0.065 (0.79)
Rel.Pol.*Official State Rel.		-0.262** (2.04)
Regime	0.021 (1.32)	0.021 (1.22)
Regime (sq.)	-0.002 (1.55)	-0.002 (1.37)
Log GDP/Cap.	-0.047*** (3.50)	-0.049*** (3.30)
Constant	1.088*** (9.43)	1.085*** (7.70)
Observations	112	112
R-squared	0.59	0.61

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Models are run with controls for region.

Table 3 Globalization (Trade, IGO Membership and Tourism) and Religiosity

	(5) Religiosity	(6) Religiosity	(7) Religiosity	(8) Religiosity
Trade	-0.107*** (6.76)	-0.075*** (5.21)	-0.104*** (5.36)	-0.060*** (3.16)
Tourists	-0.004 (0.58)	-0.016** (2.22)	-0.020* (1.67)	-0.045*** (3.88)
IGOs	-0.002*** (2.84)	-0.007*** (11.85)	-0.004*** (4.09)	-0.005*** (5.82)
Rel. Polarization		0.137*** (3.27)	0.134*** (2.94)	0.085** (2.05)
Regime Type			-0.013 (1.02)	-0.005 (0.41)
Regime (sq.)			0.000 (0.26)	0.000 (0.00)
Log of GDP/Cap.			-0.034** (2.37)	-0.028** (2.22)
Population				0.053*** (5.05)
Constant	1.177*** (10.69)	1.548*** (13.02)	1.916*** (7.86)	1.437*** (6.09)
Observations	247	216	100	100
R-squared	0.35	0.60	0.69	0.76

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All models run with control for region.

Table 4 Globalization Change (Trade and Tourism) and Religiosity

	(9) Religiosity	(10) Religiosity	(11) Religiosity
Trade	-0.074*** (3.17)		-0.083*** (3.45)
Trade change	0.048 (0.49)		0.089 (0.93)
Tourists		-0.011 (0.78)	-0.029** (2.00)
Tourists change		0.065 (1.13)	0.073 (1.33)
Rel. Polarization	0.128** (2.53)	0.141*** (2.75)	0.091* (1.79)
Regime	-0.003 (0.22)	0.001 (0.07)	-0.016 (1.15)
Regime (sq.)	0.000 (0.06)	0.000 (0.30)	0.001 (1.00)
Log GDP/Cap.	-0.063*** (4.45)	-0.062*** (4.27)	-0.065*** (4.66)
Log Population	-0.001 (0.10)	0.036*** (3.29)	0.017 (1.43)
Constant	1.532*** (6.10)	0.891*** (4.49)	1.707*** (5.64)
Observations	112	104	104
R-squared	0.60	0.60	0.65

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All models run with controls for region.