Incentives for peaceful behaviour: A literature review

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Abstract. This article accounts for what social science literature tells us about incentives and disincentives for peaceful behaviour. What makes a party to a civil war want peace? What incentives and disincentives exist, and how can they be used to move civil war actors from violent towards more peaceful behaviour? The paper approaches these questions from three angles. It examines what the literature says about (a) how different types of incentives – political, economic, and judicial – impact on the behaviour of conflict actors; (b) how the impact of incentives changes over time – during the peace process, and after a peace deal has been signed; and (c) how incentives impact on different types of actors – government agencies, rebel groups, and civilians. The paper also addresses the limitations of the incentive concept, and discusses conditions under which various kinds of incentives are likely to work.
Introduction

‘If we don’t use violence we find it difficult for the government and the companies to attend to our needs. It works. When you are quiet, nobody cares about you even if you are dying.’

*Earnest Tonye, a militant from the Niger Delta (quoted by McAllester 2006)*

What induces a participant in an armed conflict to a shift from violence to non-violence? Under what conditions do people in a war-torn country opt for a peaceful type of behaviour?

Social science literature on civil wars, war-to-peace transitions and peacebuilding has grown rapidly since the end of the Cold War. We now have considerable knowledge of the causes of civil war, but we know less about the causes of peace.

Some of the causes of peace represent direct opposites of the causes of war. If the conflicts that gave rise to a civil war are resolved, peace is more likely to arrive and endure. Yet any civil war is a process; the dynamics and characteristics of the war change over time. The reasons why a war breaks out will hence differ from the reasons why it endures. Similarly, the reasons why a peace persists relate not only to how the settlement of the war addresses the causes of the war, but also to post-settlement developments in the society at stake. Four sets of causes of peace can thus be identified: those that relate to (i) the pre-war situation, (ii) the war itself, (iii) the way in which the war was settled, and (iv) the post-settlement situation.

Causes of peace and incentives for peaceful behaviour are two sides of the same coin. To stimulate less violence among people in a war-torn country it is, for instance, not likely to be enough to give jobs to unemployed youth or deploy peacekeeping troops after the war is over if the reasons why the war broke out and endured are not adequately addressed in the settlement. Vice versa, it may not suffice to address the causes of the war in the agreement if the peace is not equipped with disincentives against violence in the post-settlement period. So though incentives for peace are played out at the level of agency, structural conditions – not least related to the causes of the conflict – will shape the effects of such incentives. Behaviour of individuals and groups, and the degree of violence in this behaviour, can in other words not be understood in isolation from the context in which the people operate; neither can the incentives that are assumed to influence that behaviour.
This article provides a review of what the social science literature says about incentives for peaceful behaviour in transitions from civil war to peace. The review has four parts. First the literature to be surveyed, its history and characteristics are introduced. Then the incentive concept, a typology of incentives, and examples of incentives within each type are outlined. Our attention will be devoted to the political, economic, and judicial incentives for peace. How the incentives figure in the negotiations and early post-war phases of a war-to-peace transition, and how they might affect government representatives, rebels, and civilians respectively; is the focus of the third part. Finally we assess the extent to which incentives can be expected to apply at all in situations involving considerable violence, and explore conditions under which incentives for peace are likely to work.

1. Literature on civil war-to-peace transitions: Recent and policy-oriented

The academic literature on processes of transition from civil war to some sort of peace, in general, and the political, economic, and judicial dimensions of such transitions in particular, is not as big as might be expected. Most of the knowledge we have about this today has been produced during the last one and a half decade. In the beginning of this period, Licklider noted how the scarcity of knowledge compelled his team, which studied how civil wars end, to break new ground as ‘there were neither applicable theories to test nor case studies which might be used to generate such theory’ (Licklider 1993: 10). How come that the study of peace transitions from civil war to peace advanced so little before the 1990s?

In general, the Cold War induced a pattern of superpower rivalry that led the large powers and their proxies to exploit conflicts in what was then called the Third World. They saw their interest primarily in winning wars, rather than in seeking compromise and building peace after civil wars’ end. When the Cold War ended this incentive structure ended as well, and a new emphasis on negotiating and containing conflict in the South emerged. Out of this grew the interest for civil war settlements and peacebuilding, also in the academic community.

The patterns of civil war termination changed as well as the Cold War ended, which helps explain the increased scholarly attention towards civil war settlements and peacebuilding in our time. Changes have materialised at three levels.
First, during the Cold War the end of civil wars seems to have been more durable than they are today. Small and Singer (1982, quoted in Licklider 1993: 12), the originators of one of the most commonly used datasets on armed conflict (Correlates of War), found in the early 1980s that all but three of the 44 civil wars that occurred since the early 1940s had come to a durable end. More than 90 percent of the civil wars, in other words, did not recur. But more recent studies that integrate post-Cold War civil wars find a higher estimate of recidivism. Walter (2004: 371), for instance, finds that 36 percent of the civil wars that ended between 1945 and 1996 were followed by an additional war (i.e. some time during this 50-year period). This might suggest that settlements are more fragile in the post-Cold War era, yet it also poses some wider questions on how civil war recurrence should be measured.¹

Secondly, if civil wars came to a more durable end during the Cold War than they do today, they also tended to be settled differently. Most of them ended primarily as a result of military victory and defeat. As Walter (1999: 335) notes, ‘[b]etween 1940 and 1990, 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions’.² This does not necessarily mean that the 80 percent of civil wars that were not ‘resolved at the bargaining table’ did not involve negotiations at all, yet it does suggest that negotiations were less decisive as a tool than they are today. World-political circumstances explain this: during the Cold War superpower rivalry blocked the UN from trying to resolve conflicts through negotiations, and single countries were also discouraged from self-appointed mediation through their association with one of the major alliances.

Thirdly, to the extent that there was external involvement to end civil wars, such involvement was most commonly of the military type; intended to help civil-war contenders defeat their enemies rather than to resolve their differences peacefully. As Zartman (1995: 333) remarks, ‘[T]o both sides in the Cold War (and hence to most scholars) insurgency and counterinsurgency were not appropriate subjects for reconciliation and negotiation: rather, they were to be pursued to victory, for one side or the other.’

¹ For an examination of the estimates of civil war recurrence see Suhkre and Samset (2007, forthcoming).
² Looking at the entire century up to the 1990s, including the pre-Cold War, pre-UN period, Stedman (1991, quoted in Wallensteen 2002: 135) finds an even lower proportion: only 15 percent of the civil wars from 1900-1989 ended through negotiations.
During the Cold War peace and conflict studies were hence dominated by investigations of wars between states, analysed largely from a rational actor perspective. It was often assumed that civil wars functioned largely according to the same logic as did international wars, and ‘war’ was consequently studied as one single phenomenon. The few studies that addressed intra-state wars explicitly focused on such wars’ origins, and paid little attention to their termination (Licklider 1993: 7).

The combination of (a) the tendency of civil wars to end, and to end primarily by military means; (b) the lack of opportunities for interested outsiders to intervene to end them by non-military means; and (c) the keen interest of outsiders to enable internal wars to be won militarily; thus led to few studies of how situations of civil war can be transformed into situations of civil peace. The shift in focus came as the Cold War ended, primarily as a result of the new opportunities this implied for policymakers to prevent civil wars from occurring and recurring, either through the UN system or in smaller coalitions. But how would they do that? The military ways of the Cold War were questioned, yet knowledge about efficient non-military resolution of civil wars remained scarce. From the early 1990s it thus started growing, in large part due to the growing demand for this type of knowledge.

Over the course of one and a half decade research on transitions from civil war to peace has thus advanced rapidly; as a result we now know far more about such transitions than we used to. Yet while the massive interest for studies of civil war and peacebuilding has generated important new knowledge, some of it seems to have been produced almost too quickly. Much knowledge production has been geared towards providing ‘quick fixes’ to policymakers who seek measures to use in an increasingly important policy area. Yet in this rush to provide relevant knowledge, key requirements to scientific inquiry have sometimes been sacrificed. While part of the literature is not purporting to be of an academic nature, closer scrutiny of some of it that does reveals that findings may be fragile. Yet while the literature that we will now take a closer look at does contain gaps, it certainly also involves ‘gems’ that may well guide future activities in this field, of both a policy and scholarly nature.

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3 See e.g. Blainey (1973); Gurr (1988); Pillar (1983). Exceptions to this trend, i.e. studies during the Cold War that analysed civil wars more explicitly, include Eckstein (1964); Modelski (1964); Rule (1988).
4 Among the few studies of wars’ end that were produced we find Ikle (1971); Modelski (1964); Pillar (1983).
5 Mack (2002: 516) nevertheless argues that security studies, which focus on inter-state war, and the associated realist paradigm which is ‘largely irrelevant’ to the explanation of civil wars, remains dominant in conflict studies, in spite of the fact that the majority of today’s wars are internal rather than international.
2. **Incentives for peace: An exploration**

2.1 Approaching and defining incentives

The ‘incentive’ concept is closely associated with the tradition of rational choice theory, and is applied to actors that are presumed to act in accordance with some form of rationality. The concept has both potentials and limitations for the study of violence in transitions from civil war. A key advantage of using this concept is that it enables an identification of factors that are likely to influence the degree of violence in behaviour of individuals and groups; factors that will be important to grasp if the goal is to reduce violence levels and to enable a more peaceful dispensation. Yet a limitation of the concept lies in its close association with ‘the rational actor’. In the analysis of violence in war-torn societies both ‘rationality’ and ‘agency’ are problematic if seen in isolation. For to what extent is an actor ‘rational’ when confronted with violence; a phenomenon that involves not only reason but also strong emotions – as well as the possibility of physical suffering and death? And how can we understand the behaviour of the actor if we analyse it only at the level of the actor, divorced from his or her surrounding structures and institutions?

In Part 4 of this review we discuss these questions more thoroughly in view of exploring conditions under which incentives for peace might work. At this point we note however that the incentive concept, despite its limitations, can be a useful tool to explore patterns and degrees of violence in people’s behaviour in transitions from civil war to peace.

Our understanding of the term in question draws on a standard definition, which sees *incentive* as ‘something that encourages you to do something’ (Hornby et al. 2000: 655). A *disincentive* is hence something that discourages you from taking a particular action. Incentive is similar to *motive* – ‘a reason for doing something’ (ibid.: 829) – yet the reasons why a person ends up doing something will relate both to the motives she may have and to the *opportunities* she faces in society for doing what she is motivated to do. In our review we will hence be attentive to both motives and opportunities for peaceful behaviour.

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6 In common parlance incentives and disincentives are often conceptualised as *carrots and sticks*, while writers on international relations tend to use *sanction* as a synonym to disincentive (see e.g. Dorussen 2001).
While an incentive can be understood as a ‘thing’ that encourages – passively, as it were – a person to take a particular action, it may also be actively applied to encourage someone to act in a particular way. Incentives and disincentives can be used as tools to influence other people’s behaviour. In line with this, Cortright (1997) and Rothchild (1997) see incentives as rewards that are offered in the expectation of getting something in return. The incentive is the reward or the offer of a reward, yet it would not have been offered had the ‘sender’ not expected something back from the ‘recipient’, for instance a particular kind of behaviour.

For our purposes, an incentive is hence an instrument that can be used by one actor to generate a particular kind of behaviour by another. Incentives for ‘peaceful’ behaviour are measures used or offered with the intended effect of encouraging less violence in the behaviour of those that receive, or are exposed to, the measure in question.

2.2 Types of incentive for peace

While social science is increasingly rich in studies of civil war and peacebuilding, the incentive term is little used in this literature. Hardly any ready-made typologies of incentives for peace and violence exist. We shall here use three dimensions to establish a typology: two basic analytical ones – incentives versus disincentives, and external versus internal incentives; and a third substantive distinction: between political, economic, and judicial incentives.

Incentives versus disincentives. The purpose of this review is to identify incentives for peaceful behaviour and disincentives against violent behaviour. The review itself will be open-ended as the effects of various measures will be explored, with the ambition of making some concluding suggestions about what effects various measures are found to have on degrees of violence in behaviour.

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7 In line with this logic Cortright (1997: 6), who analyses how incentives are used by states towards other states, defines an incentive as ‘the granting of a political or economic benefit in exchange for a specified policy adjustment by the recipient nation’. Incentive is here seen as the act of granting a benefit, with a clear expectation of receiving something in return. Similarly Rothchild (1997: 19), who looks at how incentives are used to influence behaviour in domestic contexts of conflict, sees incentives as consisting of ‘structural arrangements or distributive or symbolic rewards used by the state to channel individual and group choices along preferred lines and to promote regular patterns of interactions between the state and civil society’.

8 When using the term ‘incentive’ in this paper, in many cases I allude to both incentives and disincentives. Reasons of simplicity and convenience explain why the term ‘incentive’ often stands alone, yet this does not imply that ‘disincentives’ are left out of the analysis.
Internal versus external incentives. Some peace incentives are available to actors within the civil war-torn country itself, others to actors outside of that country. In this study we will focus on the former type, i.e. the internal incentives. External incentives will merely be identified in order to provide a general overview of incentives for peace.9

Political, economic, and judicial incentives. What kind of internal incentives and disincentives will we review? Drawing on generic social science types, I suggest to focus on political, economic, and judicial incentives for peace.10 The logic behind this choice relates closely to the research by Barbara Walter (1997; 1999; 2002). She argues that the key to make parties to a civil war commit to peace lies in providing them with so-called security guarantees, of which she identifies two types that presumably respond to the parties’ chief concerns. First, each party will want to make sure that, once peace talks have started, their opponent does not launch a military attack against it whilst negotiations take place. Therefore, peacekeeping forces are required. Second, the parties will want to make sure that they get a share of the post-settlement political power. Hence, power sharing is required.

In Walter’s view, these security guarantees – or, effectively, military and political incentives – constitute what is most important to move a situation from civil war to peace. My suggestion is however that these two measures in many cases are likely to be insufficient. Parties to a civil war will not only be concerned with not being attacked or with getting political power: they are also likely to have concerns related (i) to financial resources, for themselves and their followers, and (ii) to justice.

On the economic side, civil-war contenders will want to make sure that they get a decisive influence over the management, regulation and distribution of revenues, and of the revenue-generating resources, in the post-war period. While some of this influence might be secured

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9 We focus on internal incentives because we wish (a) to avoid too superficial a treatment of the incentives and therefore favour depth to breadth by selecting one of the two types; (b) to get an idea of what is known about the incentives’ effects and therefore are interested in the least complex dynamics, hence we leave out the transnational and cross-cultural processes involved in external incentives, and finally (c) to contribute to the body of knowledge about how civil war-ridden countries themselves may make their peace self-sustaining, which make internal incentives most relevant to examine.

10 Other incentives that could be identified include military and social incentives. Apart from peacekeeping and peace enforcement, other examples of military incentives include the processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants; and reform of the armed forces, the police and the intelligence services (also called ‘security sector’ reform). In the category of social incentives for peace, key issues would include gender, ethnicity, religion, return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, community development and local reconciliation processes.
via their access to political power, some of the finance in a post-war society – for instance from foreign aid, and from natural resource exploitation – may be channelled outside of the state apparatus. The degree to which it goes via state coffers will vary between post-war societies, and in some cases considerable wealth is accessible outside of the state. Civil-war parties will therefore be interested not only in political power but also in economic power; whether it is within our beyond the state.

Yet, getting a share of the political and economic power will be worth little if the erstwhile belligerents end up in court or in prison. A final major concern of the parties, beyond security, power, and funding, is therefore amnesty. But if parties to a civil war, that is, state armies and rebel movements that both will tend to be known for the use of considerable violence; reap rich political and economic fruits and also get away with alleged crimes committed during the war, will the peace remain legitimate in the eyes of the population? If the previously violent actors reap the prize of peace in terms of power, money and honour; how does this impact on incentives for violence among citizens, who tend to pay the heaviest human price of the war?

While one type of incentive for peace may work for one kind of actor in one phase, the combination of different incentives may hence have counterproductive effects over time. Yet this is remains at the level of a hypothesis, and indeed constitutes a motive for exploring the literature to find out how the three types of incentive interact in transitions from civil war.

We will now explore what is known about the impacts of the three types of incentives for peace, focusing on the measures available to actors based within the civil war-torn country. Yet before we look at a selection of incentives within each category and what is known about their effects, Table 1 (overleaf) provides an overview of peace incentives categorised according to our new typology, which may be useful as a point of departure and as a source of reference for ensuing sections.
Table 1. Incentives assumed to influence violence in transitions from civil war: A typology

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<tr>
<th>Incentive types</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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<td>Political</td>
<td>Political institutions:</td>
<td>Conflict mediation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Reform (e.g. constitutions)</td>
<td>Travel restrictions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Building and strengthening</td>
<td>‘Naming and shaming’</td>
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<td>• Rule of law</td>
<td>Diplomatic exclusion (e.g. black listing)</td>
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<td>Power sharing, in particular:</td>
<td>Transitional administration</td>
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<td>• Between former belligerents</td>
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<td>• Between geographical regions</td>
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<td>Democratisation, elections</td>
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<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic development in general:</td>
<td>Foreign (economic) aid</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Employment</td>
<td>• Peace conditionalities</td>
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<td>• Education and training</td>
<td>Diaspora contributions</td>
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<td>• (Re)construction</td>
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<td>Management of natural resources:</td>
<td>Asset freeze</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Production and trade</td>
<td>Trade boycotts</td>
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<td>• Legal regulation, e.g. reform of rules of access and use</td>
<td>• Of all goods from the country</td>
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<td>• Redistribution of revenues</td>
<td>• Targeted: of certain goods</td>
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<td>Financial issues:</td>
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<td>• Currency reform</td>
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<td>• Bank reform</td>
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<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Amnesty versus prosecution</td>
<td>Amnesty versus prosecution</td>
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<td>Truth commissions</td>
<td>Reparations (to victims)</td>
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<td>Reparations (to victims)</td>
<td>Public apologies</td>
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<td>Judicial reform, justice sector reform</td>
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Note. While the table is constructed by the author; it is inspired by a multitude of studies that are, however, too numerous to enumerate here. Many of them are included in the bibliography to this paper.
2.3 Political incentives for peace

Understanding politics as the realm of power, political incentives are rewards or offers of rewards that include some degree of power. Three types of such political incentives can be identified: constitutional reform, power sharing, and democratisation.\textsuperscript{11} In transitions from civil war to peace the three incentives can be regarded as consecutive steps; one tending to follow the other in a largely chronological order.

A country’s \textit{constitution} can be seen as the most fundamental of its political institutions. The constitution outlines the rules for how decision-making power may be exerted and accessed within the state in question. It is therefore often a bone of contention in peace processes. Peace agreements tend to involve at least some degree of constitutional review, if not a wholesale overhaul of the entire constitution. Constitutional review may hence function as an incentive for peace in a transition from civil war, indeed as a key part of the solution to the war inasmuch as the new constitutions incorporates a resolution to the conflicts that gave rise to the war at the outset. But evidently, the effects of constitutional revisions will depend on the content of the review – and the extent to which the new constitutional rules do respond to the grievances of the various parties to the civil war, whether they had a seat around the negotiating table or not. Moreover, a constitution which is new in full or in part will only have a limited value if the new provisions are not adhered to in practice. Indeed, if the constitutional text is promising but largely fails to be implemented, the gap between promise and practice may function as a disincentive for peace.

\textit{Power sharing}, while analysed as a separate political incentive in the following, can also be seen as one part of constitutional reform inasmuch as a revised constitution lays out the rules for how power is to be shared in the new dispensation, which is set to lay the basis for a less violent society. Power sharing is hence one part of the broader constitutional reform project.

Research on power sharing in war-to-peace transitions has advanced considerably in recent years. A common point of departure is the work by Arend Lijphart (1968; 1977; 1984). Lijphart initially sought to explain how multicultural societies in Western Europe (primarily

\textsuperscript{11} While democratic institutions may be classified as one type of power-sharing institutions, the peace and conflict literature tends to treat power sharing on the one hand and democracy and democratisation on the other as two different phenomena. This is also the interpretation adopted in this review.
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland) had managed to remain stable and peaceful in spite of their pluralism. His explanation centres on a model for democracy that he coined ‘consociational’ (in opposition to the ‘majoritarian’ type of democracy), in which each cultural ‘segment’ of society has privileged access to a share of the political power. Constitutions lay down the rules for how much power each segment is entitled to, as well as rules for transfer and rotation of positions between and within segments. Inclusive government, group self-government, and proportionality are key aims of this kind of power sharing (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a: 8). Lijphart also emphasised that for the model to have its stabilising effect, trust between leaders of each group or segment is essential.

Given the fact that many civil wars in the post-Cold War era have taken place in highly plural societies and that a contest over political power has been central to many of them, Lijphart’s thinking has had an immense appeal. Constitutions in post-war and post-authoritarian societies have been designed in the spirit of his ideas, in spite of the fact that Lijphart did not build his model keeping in mind how a legacy of civil war might affect the effectiveness of consociational democracy as a tool of conflict management.

In recent years more critical perspectives on the desirability of power sharing in civil war-to-peace transitions have thus begun to emerge; shaping a debate where two overall questions feature centrally. In civil war-affected countries, is power sharing an incentive for peace – or for violence? And if power sharing reduces violence, under what conditions does it do so?

The research by Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie (2003) suggests that power sharing in general is good for peace. The more power is shared, they argue, the more lasting the peace: ‘[t]he more extensive the network of power-sharing institutions contending parties agree to create, the less likely they are to return to the use of armed violence’ (ibid.: 330). Using statistical methods Hartzell and Hoddie (HH) analyse data on 38 civil wars that ended in the period between 1945 and 1998, and find that the more types of power that are shared, the better: ‘peace has a greater probability of proving durable if power sharing is also required among former antagonists in terms of the territorial, military, and economic dimensions of state power’, in addition to the dimension of political decision-making (ibid.). Yet in 2005 HH arrive at a different conclusion on the basis of largely the same data and methods. They then find that only territorial and military power sharing enhances durability of post-war peace. The sharing of executive power at the centre and of economic power has little or no
effect, it is found (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005: 102f). Yet the argument remains that power sharing, in some forms at least, contributes to consolidate the peace after civil wars are over.

Other scholars are less optimistic with regard to the merits of power sharing. Philip Roeder (2005), for instance, on the basis of a statistical analysis of ‘all independent countries in the last half of the twentieth century, whether they have experienced civil war or not’ finds that power sharing has no positive effect on peace consolidation. This is based on the distinction he makes between power sharing and ‘power dividing’, a model which involves multiple and cross-cutting majorities as opposed to the Lijphart-inspired model that tends to reinforce the power of each segment. Power dividing, he finds, ‘creates a more robust deterrent of escalation [towards violent conflict] than power sharing’ (Roeder 2005: 53).

If Roeder is correct that power sharing more often than not is an incentive for violence rather than for peace, Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler’s (2005) comparative analysis of civil wars in post-Cold War Africa suggests possible reasons for this. As power sharing has become a standard part of negotiated civil war settlements in our time, Tull and Mehler (TM) argue, this has created a demonstration effect within and across countries emerging from civil war. Since rebels tend to be rewarded with political power as the civil war draws to a close this works as an incentive for others to take up arms in the hope of achieving something similar, the argument goes. Within a civil war-ridden country the power sharing may, for instance, induce violence among rebels who are excluded from the deal, or among civilians who realise that violence can be a ticket to power. The demonstration effect may also, TM hold, be extended to other countries if people feel they have little to lose and much to gain – considerable political power, possibly – by taking up arms. While power sharing may lead to less violence by the rebels and government agents who get a share of the power, it may thus at the same time lead to more violence by others. Differently put, power sharing may induce peaceful behaviour among those who get the power, but violent behaviour among those who do not. In TM’s (2005: 375) own words, it ‘creates an incentive structure would-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgent path as well’.

The work of HH, Roeder and TM raises some questions. First, if power sharing can induce both peaceful and violent behaviour by different groups and in different phases, how does it function on balance? HH find that countries with territorial and military power sharing are less exposed to new civil war after the settlement is concluded. However, if civil war does not
resume this does not exclude the possibility of considerable violence being inflicted in the post-war state, since the violence may be at lower levels or of other types than those required to classify the situation as a civil war. Moreover, HH only look at civil war patterns within the war-ridden state. The demonstration effect that TM highlight, that power sharing – even though it might lead to less violence in one country – may induce actors in other countries to take up arms in the expectation of acquiring power in the future; is not considered.

But if HH and TM represent opposite ends of the spectrum regarding the peace effects of power sharing, most scholars seem to take a position in between the extremes. Barbara Walter, for instance, is more nuanced regarding power sharing’s effects. She takes note of the criticism that has been levelled against the power-sharing tool, for ‘being undemocratic, having “no grass-roots backing”, being the “ultimate form of elite manipulation”, leaving political leaders unaccountable to their communities, “freezing” group boundaries, and excluding important parties that were not major players in the war’ (Walter 1999: 143). She still sees power sharing as a must for countries that embark on the path of negotiations to end civil wars; a view which indeed is shared by most of the researchers in this field. Rothchild and Roeder (2005b: 49), for instance, regard power sharing as ‘the most pragmatic of accommodations in order to initiate a transition from conflict … [as] a necessary compromise that reflects the military capabilities of the adversaries … and the need to secure a quick commitment to a peace agreement’.

Yet while power sharing can be an incentive for government and rebels to reduce violence in the phase of peace talks and their immediate aftermath, another emerging consensus is that it becomes less effective as an incentive for peace over time in countries coming out of war. Walter (1999: 143) is one of those who argue that ‘more liberal, open institutions’ than the power-sharing arrangements are necessary to consolidate peace in the longer haul. Likewise Timothy Sisk (2003: 148f) finds that ‘over time … post-war societies need to move beyond the mutual hostage taking that a guaranteed place at the decision-making table implies, the immobilism it inevitably creates, and the construction of post-war societies around the fixed and unyielding social boundaries of ethnicity’ (emphasis in original).

The question is, however, how to get there – and what kind of power sharing that is most amenable to securing this ‘second transition’ from power sharing to democracy. For as Rothchild and Roeder (RR) remark, this second transition involves major difficulties. If
power sharing is part of the solution in one phase, in the next phase of tentative
democratisation, they argue, it is part of the problem. Power sharing may then hinder not only
democracy but also peace from taking root because it ‘becomes a fixed institutional basis for
future strategic interactions’ (Rothchild and Roeder 2005b: 50). The reason why it gets ‘fixed’
is particularly that those who have attained power through the power-sharing arrangement
will develop an interest in maintaining that arrangement, and to do so they will try to
reinforce the source of the power that has given them a place in the power-sharing institution.
If power sharing is based on ethnicity, those in power will try to accentuate the importance of
their respective ethnic identities, which is most effectively done against those with other
ethnic identities. Escalation of ethnic conflict is then a likely result. For RR, the dilemma of
power sharing is therefore that of ‘ending the war, losing the peace’ (2005a: 12; 2005b: 36).12

If power sharing is less efficient in countering violence over time, presumably processes of
democratisation should thus arise in its wake. While the more policy-oriented parts of the
literature tends to paint a rosy picture of peacebuilding and democratisation as going hand in
hand, academic contributions suggest inherent contradictions between the two processes. Yet
the argument that liberal democracy, in its competitive form including multi-party elections,
‘should wait’ is justified differently. Some scholars draw on statistical findings that suggest
that other factors than democracy are decisive in explaining post-civil war peace. Paul Collier
and associates (2003), for example, suggest that economic growth, peacekeeping, and foreign
aid are most important for peace to last, and that democracy should wait until ‘institutions are
strong enough’ to handle the pressures the democratisation process may cause. Roland Paris
(2004) makes a similar argument yet from a different point of view: criticising what he sees as
the too quick liberalisation and ‘marketisation’ of post-civil war societies, he too advocates
more institution-building before elections take place. A third and related argument is that
elections tend to be conflict-generating, as they, when conducted early after the war’s end, is
likely to pit those who fought one another against one another once again (see e.g. Jarstad and
Sisk 2007, forthcoming). While this implies obvious risks for new violence, in many cases
such violence is however transitory and limited and only in exceptional cases (e.g. Angola
1992, Burundi 1993) have elections contributed to trigger renewed civil war.

12 RR identify seven features of power sharing as reasons why this institution impedes peace and/or democracy.
These are ‘limits on democracy’, ‘institutional weapons’ (in the hands of those empowered by the power-sharing
institutions), ‘focus on interethnic allocation’, ‘the second-generation problem’ (i.e. that the majority group gets
less interested over time in cooperating with minority groups, in spite of the power-sharing arrangements),
‘governmental inefficiency’, ‘governmental rigidity’, and ‘inadequate enforcement’ (Roeder and Rothchild
2005: 36-41).
Three sets of suggestions emerge from the literature on democratisation as an incentive for peace in transitions from civil war. First, democratisation is necessary to reduce violence levels in the longer run, for at least two reasons. In civil wars that include power sharing in their settlement, such power sharing is likely to generate conflicts over time and must therefore give way to more open political institutions. Secondly, institutions of political democracy are needed in order to permit participation and to that extent pre-empt discontent which in a post-war society, more easily than elsewhere, may turn violent.

Second, while democratisation is seen as needed it is also conflictual. Given the legacy of the war, the vivid expressions of conflict generated by democratisation risks spurring new violence. Democracy, at least in its liberal form, normally involves competition between various groups in view of getting power through popular support. People vowing to mobilise such support try to do so in opposition to others, and in a post-war society the lines of division thus produced will often be similar to those that marked the different sides during the war – which risks reigniting old antagonisms. Moreover, in a society marked by the fresh memory of violence as a conflict-resolution mechanism, not only the old but also the new conflicts that tend to emerge in a democratisation process may lead to violent incidents. Democratisation in general and elections in particular can therefore induce violence – at least by some, with the consequent negative effects this may have for society at large.

The third suggestion is that if democratisation and elections can be incentives for both peaceful and violent behaviour, what effects they have will to a large extent depend on contextual factors. What types of behaviour a multi-party election in a war-torn society will stimulate, for instance, will depend on the conditions under which the elections are held. Important contextual factors include the elections’ timing and design (Reilly 2003: 183). Regarding timing, it has been suggested that it is particularly important that processes of return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and of demobilisation of former combatants, have reached an advanced stage before elections are held (Lyons 2002: 230).

In conclusion, while the literature is getting increasingly rich on how power sharing and democratisation affect patterns of violence in transitions from civil wars, it remains inconclusive. A number of questions are debated and the answers are increasingly nuanced and well-founded, still there is little certainty on the extent to which, how, and under what
conditions the incentives of power sharing and democracy work for peace. This should perhaps induce policymakers to adopt a more cautionary approach to political solutions favoured in transitions from civil war. For while both power sharing and democratisation have been included in a number of civil war settlements, the scientific basis for assuming that the net effect of such measures is less violence, remains unstable.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Structure of remaining part of review:}

2.4 Economic incentives for peace
2.5 Judicial incentives for peace

3. Phases and actors: What incentives work when, and for whom
3.1 The phase of negotiations
3.2 The early post-civil war phase

4. Incentives for peace: Can they work?

\textsuperscript{13} One issue which has been the focus of little scholarly attention is the effects of power sharing – or the lack of such – on violence after military settlements of civil war. Here it might be assumed that the victor will set the terms and power sharing therefore will be less relevant, in part because it is less feasible and in part because the dominance of the winner stabilizes the peace. Yet an alternative view could be that power sharing is as, if not more, important in such cases when analysed in a longer time perspective. For even though a victor might quell or expel opposition through repression and hence succeed in reducing violence, such a strategy risks backfiring in the longer term by generating grievances that may turn violent, and which the government may be unwilling or unable to detect due to it being unresponsive to popular demands.
Bibliography


