

Regulating Religious Minorities: For Better or Worse?*

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Abstract:

Religion has become one of the (if not the) hottest issue(s) in the 21st Century. Captured by the ‘spirit of our time’, this paper investigates the impact of religion on civil war; more specifically, the relationship between religious heterogeneity, religious regulations, and intrastate armed conflict from 1990–2002. The main contribution of this paper is not only the investigation of religion in particular, whereas the bulk of the literature on civil war has focused on ethnicity, but that I consider the interaction of religious heterogeneity and religious state regulations. I find that religious cleavages do not by themselves explain civil war. However, for countries with a religious cleavage, increasing regulation of religious minorities for the sake of stability can have the quite opposite effect – increasing the risk of intrastate armed conflict.

Paper prepared for the 45th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 17–20 March, 2004; Friday 19 March, 01:45–3:30pm, Panel FC32: ‘Religion and International Relations II: Empirical and Cross-National Studies’

* I would like to thank Tanja Ellingsen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and the rest of the VIP seminar at NTNU for helpful comments along the way of writing this paper. Remaining errors are solely my responsibility.

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Introduction

The idea that the modern world on a global scale is going through a process of secularization seems increasingly erroneous. Religious organizations and leaders remain or are becoming increasingly active in political and social life (Gill & Keshavarzian, 1999), and religious leaders articulate grievances about discrimination, raise claims as to how state and society should be organised, and mobilise the faithful into action, often accompanied by violent clashes in and between nations. Indeed, religious factors have clearly played a role in some of the most repeated conflict zones of the world – i.e. the bloody conflicts in Algeria, Chechnya, East-Timor, Kashmir, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Israel–Palestine, Sudan and Sri Lanka, and the recent case of the civil war in Afghanistan (Hasenklever & Rittberger, 2000; Fox, 2003; Seul, 1999). The role of religion in the war on the Balkans and in Bosnia–Herzegovina has in one respect also been obvious, in that both perpetrators and victims of organized atrocities were identified by their religious tradition (Sells, 2003; Seul, 1999). Although one cannot claim that either of the above mentioned conflicts are *religious* conflicts exclusively or even predominantly, they all serve as examples of numerous conflicts in which religion has played a part.

The resurgence of religion has also made its way into the public debate and academic writings (see Huntington, 1993, 1996; Appleby, 2001; Marty & Appleby, 1995; Juergensmeyer, 1993, 1995, 1999; Kepel, 1994; Fox, 1997, 2000a,b, 2001; Fox & Squires, 2001; Seul, 1999; Haynes, 1997, 1999; Hasenklever & Rittberger, 2000, Ellingsen, 2000; Russett, Oneal & Cox, 2000; Henderson & Tucker, 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Thomas, 2003), and after the events of September 11 it is probably safe to say that religion has become one of the (if not *the*) hottest issue(s) in the 21st Century.

Captured by the ‘spirit of our time’, this paper investigates the impact of religion on the incidence of intrastate armed conflict. More specifically, I focus on how religious composition and the way states act to control religion may increase the risk of intrastate armed conflict. I propose that, in certain circumstances, namely when the state is religiously divided, state regulation of religion for the sake of stability can have quite the opposite effect – increasing the risk of instability and thus violence within a country. My main hypothesis is therefore that: *Heterogeneous religious states have a higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than non-religious heterogeneous states and homogenous states – religious or not.*

The specific influence of religion on intrastate armed conflict has not been tested extensively in cross-sectional quantitative studies. In fact much of the literature on intrastate

armed conflict focuses on ethnicity rather than religion (i.e. Gurr, 2000; Horowitz, 2000). Previous research that have measured the role of religion, have been using measures of affiliation (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Ellingsen, 2000; Reynal-Querol 2002), or individual aspects of religious influence (Campbell & Curtis, 1994; Johnston et al., 1991; Ellison et al., 1999)¹.

My indicators of state religiosity focus on laws, policies and behaviours of the state actors that can negatively affect religious minorities. Is the state conducting religious favouritism, restrictions on religious freedom, or religious persecution of some kind? And if so, how does this translate into intrastate armed conflict? Based on an analysis of the period 1990–2002, the main finding is that, in and of themselves neither religious heterogeneity *nor* state religiosity can predict intrastate conflict incidence. However, in accordance with my assumption, the *combination* of religious cleavages and state religiosity significantly increase intrastate armed conflict incidence.

In the proceeding pages I start off by a theoretical discussion of three preconditions for group mobilization previously emphasized in the literature on political violence: a common group *identity*, minority *frustration*, and *opportunity* (e.g. Ellingsen, 2000). Next, I describe my data and variables, before presenting the empirical analyses. Finally, I draw conclusions based on the empirical evidence, and make some suggestions for policy implications and future research.

Theoretical Perspectives on Religion and Conflict

Religious Identity

Identity is central to any theoretical discussion of group formation and mobilization. For a group to mobilize it needs a common identity or unifying structure, be it ethnic, religious, or linguistic (Gurr, 1993; Gurr & Harff, 1994; Tilly, 1978). The identity serves as a delineating principle, separating between in-group and out-group, and raising intra-group coherence. Identity can generate conflict lines; mobilize groups to conflict, as well as having an escalating effect on existing conflicts. If the identities fail to coincide with territorial borders, intrastate conflicts may arise (Ellingsen, 2000).

¹ One exception is Fearon & Latin (2003) who use measures of state discrimination of religious minorities: whether or not the state has an official state religion, resource and benefit distribution between groups, regulation of missionary activity, procedures for government approval of religious organizations, and harassment of religious minorities. However, Fearon and Laitin do not consider the interaction between heterogeneity and these factors.

In many studies of civil war, the focus has been on ethnic identity, and the research has been based on comparing different ethnic demographic settings across countries to determine the group-structure which could increase conflict risk (e.g. Ellingsen, 2000). In some studies differing religious identities have also been investigated (e.g. Reynal-Querol, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). None the less, little discussion has evolved around *comparing* and *contrasting* different identities, and investigations of different mechanisms embedded in different types of identities are rare².

Which identities are the most salient, the most unchanging, and the closest to the individual's core? Are the workings of ethnic, religious and/or for instance language identities the same? I believe there to be basic similarities, but also distinctions. In fact, scholars have long struggled with the definition and distinctions of different cultural factors. Despite the substantial literature on ethnic groups, many scholars fail to define the concept at hand in a clear-cut manner. Ethnic and religious identities cannot easily be untangled, as there is no consensual definition of 'ethnicity'. Ethnic criteria can include any combination of shared culture, nationality, language, religion, and race (Henderson, 1997), and ethnic conflicts comprise "threats to values" (Carment, 1993: 147), which might just as well be applied to any conflict involving a religious dimension.

The salience and cohesion of an identity group can be understood also as a function of a number of factors: the degree to which identity difference is visible, whether it plays a vital role in daily life of the individuals in the identity group, how central the group membership is to the individual identity, the level of interaction in the group, and external pressures or threats to the group identity.

Most religions address both the public and the private identity formation³, and are therefore simultaneously important for the group and the individuals in it. Friedland (2001: 141) emphasizes that religion for group mobilization is important as religion is an institutional space, a network of sacred sites and ritual spaces, as well as community centres, associations, schools, hospitals, courts, and charities. These are attended at a regular basis, and in most important cycles of life, such as births (baptisms), coming of age and rites of passage (such as Bar Mitzvahs, Confirmations et cetera), marriages, and burials, and through the cycles of the seasons, with Christmas, Ramadan, and other religious holidays. In times of crises and

² This is especially true for the political science branch of conflict studies.

³ The degree to which religion is considered a private and personal matter varies between religions, and the potential role of religion in society might also vary between different religions.

insecurity this system of meeting places and organizational structures becomes particularly important.

For the individual, religious identity may differ from other identities on several aspects. Historically, religion has given a stronger response to the individual need to develop a secure identity, compared to other containers of cultural meaning. Religion means an organizing principle for their lives by some sort of transcendent set of symbols and experiences of the sacred. Religions guide traditions, rites, morals and values, identify ‘right’ from ‘wrong’, and help people create “a world more real than the real world” (Marty, 1997: 12). The existence of an ultimate dependable other⁴ anchors the individual not only to the group, but provides affirmation independently of the group. Religion is therefore argued to foster a stronger loyalty and private commitment than other “ideologies of order” (Juergensmeyer, 1993), and be “secure anchors for self-reference” (Seul, 1999: 558). As Grew (1997: 20) puts it “religious beliefs have always been those that people were most willing to sacrifice, fight, and die – and live – for”.

The salience of religion in conflict is based on two primary aspects. Firstly, the exclusivity of religion can partly explain why religious differences can generate more violent conflicts than other social cleavages. You can only have *one* religion⁵. The religion can thus serve as a sign of identity stronger than for example language, because inherent in the appurtenance to one religion lies a separation and exclusion from other religions. Furthermore, your religious affiliation is usually a highly personal and often non-negotiable part of your identity – who you consider yourself to *be*. Secondly, religious differences imply different ways of understanding the world, social relationships and structures of authority. Most religions provide their adherents with “a world-view that assures their place in a meaningful and orderly universe” (Seul, 1999: 559).

Several scholars have claimed that religious differences can increase the risk of conflicts, and intensify existing conflicts. Horowitz (1985) argues that religious differences are more important than language differences as a social cleavage that can develop into a conflict. Seul (1999) also argues that religion frequently appears as the primary cultural marker distinguishing groups in conflict. Likewise, Reynal-Querol (2002:31) claims that religiously divided societies are more prone to intense conflicts than countries with

⁴ This is especially true for the monotheistic religions (Seul, 1999).

⁵ There are certain exceptions, such as the mixture of animist and other religions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Children with parents of different religions might also in a sense have dual religious affiliations, but can only officially have one religion, or chose to not have a religious affiliation at all.

conflicting claims based on interest groups or language division, because “more than ethnicity, religion discriminates and differentiates humans in a sharp and exclusive way”.

From Identity to Conflict

How does identity translate into conflict? Researchers have presented highly divergent theoretical viewpoints in this regard; from identity being the central explanatory factor, to identity being virtually insignificant. The two main perspectives that have traditionally dominated the understanding of identity in the study of conflict are *primordialism* and *instrumentalism*. A third, *constructivism*, is more recent, and offers a middle position. Below I briefly outline these perspectives and the postulations one can make based on them.

Conflict is for primordialists rooted in differences of identity and culture in and of themselves. Primordialists take cultural factors such as ethnicity and religion as fixed characteristics of individuals and groups (see Smith, 1996; Vanhanen, 2000). According to Hasenklever & Rittberger (2000: 641) “primordialists argue that differences in religious traditions should be viewed as one of the most important independent variables to explain violent interactions in and between nations”. In this is implied that the differences between groups are important and *sufficient* explanations of conflict.

Based on a primordialistic perspective one should therefore expect conflict between different religious groups – in other words, in states that are religiously heterogeneous. This suggests the following general hypothesis:

H1: Religiously heterogeneous states have a higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than religiously homogenous states.

Contrary to primordialists, *instrumentalists* see identities as being used instrumentally by political entrepreneurs to achieve political or economic goals. Identities are created or maintained as a basis for collective action when there are clear competitive advantages attached to an identity (Carment, 1993: 138). Consequently, conflicts that occur on the basis of religion could have occurred for other reasons, such as political and socio-economic differences. In this perspective, conflicts are therefore political, and basically motivated by ‘greed’ or material or territorial interests, rather than ‘cultural’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’.⁶ From the instrumentalist perspective, cultural differences in and of themselves, should not be

⁶ Instrumentalists also argue that there are too many wars fought in religiously or ethnically *homogenous* countries to give credit to the primordialist expectations, and that interethnic cooperation is common even in ethnically diverse places such as sub-Saharan Africa (Fearon & Laitin, 1996) To sustain their line of arguing, examples of communities being created on a very weak basis of claims to different ethnic backgrounds are brought to the limelight, most notably the case of Somalia and Rwanda.

associated with conflict. This leads to an alternative hypothesis regarding religious heterogeneity and conflict:

H_{alt.}: There is no significant relationship between religious heterogeneity and intrastate armed conflict.

Constructivists offer a middle position between primordialists and instrumentalists. Smith (1996: 446) argues that instrumentalists see cultural factors⁷ as “an instrument for other ends”, whereas primordialists see them as perpetual “givens of the human condition”, and that neither standpoint is plausible or adequate. Wendt (1994), in discussing collective identity formation in states, argues that interests (the focus of instrumentalists) are dependent on identities (focus of primordialists), and that they both have roles to play in explaining action⁸. The salience and relative stability of different identities are kept as central explanatory factors, but the political entrepreneur and the changing political and societal settings are considered catalysts of group action. Constructivists argue that the combination of both pre-existing group demarcations and sinister political entrepreneurs can mobilize groups to violent conflict. However, identities can not be sustained without a material or substantial basis upon which they can reverberate and be enforced as social facts in the minds of people (Hasenklever & Rittberger, 2000). In other words, the identity must thus be perceived as salient, and contrasting identities are assumed to be a *necessary* but *not sufficient* factor for mobilisation.

Frustration and Relative Deprivation

If one believes that identities can become salient given specific circumstances or contexts – what characterizes such circumstances, and what are the implications for intrastate conflict? Discontent and grievances of some form is commonly taken to be the root cause of political violence. Grievance refers to widely shared dissatisfaction among group members about their standing vis-à-vis dominant groups (Gurr & Moore, 1997).⁹ Relative deprivation means a discrepancy between people’s ‘value expectations’ (the goods and services people feel entitled to) and the ‘value capabilities’ (the goods and services they believe they are capable

⁷ In his research he looks specifically at ethnicity.

⁸ Interests and identities are according to Wendt (ibid: 385), “not competing causal mechanisms, but distinct phenomena”, where identities is a cognitive and structural explanatory factor, whereas interests are motivational.

⁹ The most prominent advocates of the frustration–aggression hypothesis in modern writings were Dollard et al. (1939). They proposed simply that aggression will always follow frustration, and that all aggressive behaviour presupposes some form of frustration. In the years following, the hypothesis was applied and developed in other writings, most prominently by Davies (1962), Gurr (1969, 1970), and Feierabend & Feierabend (1966).

of obtaining) (Gurr, 1970). The notion of grievances and the theory of *relative deprivation* thus provide a causal explanation for why religious policies at the state-level in religiously heterogeneous states can be assumed to heighten conflict risk, as state policies towards minority groups can be assumed to increase grievances.

Two main kinds of measures have typically been applied to measure relative deprivation. One set of indicators is measures of inequality, such as Gini scores and/or income inequality. Another is discrimination measures. Whereas Gini scores can be valuable for assessing economic factors, Ellina & Moore (1997: 269) argue that the more qualitative measures of discrimination provide a stricter test of the relative deprivation theory, as one can better determine deprivation towards specific groups, and one can better measure other sources of deprivation than just economic inequality¹⁰.

Gurr (2000) argues that the salience of a specific identity (be it ethnic or religious) is function of the degree to which that identity is a major determinant of the groups security, status, material well-being and access to political power. Henceforth, in situations when a religious minority is treated differently in terms of privileges and power, such as situations with religious discrimination, the religious identity is strengthened as a unifying principle, and groups are more easily mobilized along religious cleavages.

State Religiosity in Religiously Heterogeneous Countries

Whether or not a state is religious can be viewed on a continuum from complete separation of religion and state and neutrality in all religious matters, to religion being the sole guideline for the state and the state having an aggressive approach to other religions and worldviews. Close connections between the state and religion, and policies of favouritism of the majority, should be expected to cause frustration and grievances in religious minorities. Even more so, states that fail to observe freedom of religion, engaging in discrimination and repression should foster grievances.¹¹ Incentives to rebel should therefore be sharpened as the state develops more close links or outright adopt and enforce religious laws and discriminatory practices that go against the religious orientation of the minority group. This leads to the following hypothesis regarding state religiosity and intrastate conflict:

¹⁰ Furthermore, Gini measures of economic inequality have largely captured vertical inequality (between individuals) as opposed to (possibly more fruitful) measures of horizontal inequality (between groups). For an excellent Master thesis on this topic see Østby (2003).

¹¹ This is especially true in light of the previous discussion of the nature and function of religion as often being at the core of individual as well as group identity, and its non-negotiable nature (Seul, 1999).

H2: Heterogeneous religious states have a higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than non-religious heterogeneous states and homogenous states – religious or not.

The most parsimonious indicator of whether or not a state can be considered a religious state is if the country has an official state religion. Having an official religion sends out a strong symbolic signal both externally and internally. Such a formal link to one religion signals a placement in a religious culture and tradition, and, in the terminology of Huntington (1993), into a civilisation. It also indicates preponderance of one religion over others, and a disparity between religious groups, and could therefore lead to minority frustration. Thus, having an official state religion in a religiously heterogeneous country could therefore increase the risk of violent intrastate conflict:

H3: Religiously heterogeneous states with an official state religion have a higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than similar states that do not have an official state religion and religiously homogenous states – having an official state religion or not.

According to the US Department of State (1998) the right to freedom of religion is under assault in many countries around the world. Among the many forms of restrictions on religious freedom are regulation of public dress, important life decisions such as marriage and burial, laws of inheritance defined by religious laws, or other laws of individual behaviour. Minorities are likely to react towards practises which have a direct bearing on the way they lead their lives, practice their religion, and the position they can achieve in society. A natural assumption is therefore that *restrictions on religious freedom* should be closely associated with minority frustration and grievances, and that restrictions such as the ones mentioned above could mobilize them to action. Henceforth, religiously divided states that impose restrictions on minority religions are more likely to experience conflict than states without such restrictions. This assumption is based on two mechanisms: for one, the restrictions create severe frustration in the minority, and this frustration leads to a violent response; and secondly, the commonly felt grievances may further unite the believers, and a coherent and effective rebellion is facilitated. These assumptions lead to the following hypothesis:

H4: Religiously heterogeneous states with restrictions on religious freedom have a higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than similar states that do not have restrictions, as well as than religiously homogenous states – restrictions or not.

Outright persecution of religious believers or communities, and the use of force to compel the citizens to abiding by religious laws in their personal and inter-personal modes of

living which are alien to their personal convictions, constitutes severe repression. If one assumes the basic postulate of frustration-aggression theory that the more frustration the more aggression, one should assume also that such strict state policies as outright persecution should lead to increased risk of conflict, even more so than restrictions for at least two reasons: first, the severity of the discriminatory state policies are such that if frustration increases as discrimination increases, the most severe form should create the most frustration. Second, as there are individual differences, severe persecution is likely to push more people over the threshold of frustration needed to respond with aggression. Assuming that religious persecution causes strong minority grievances I propose the following hypothesis:

H5: Religiously heterogeneous states with religious persecution have a higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than similar states that do not have persecution and religiously homogenous states – persecution or not.

Comparing and Contrasting Forms of State Religiosity

State religiosity exists on a continuum, and I argue there to be qualitative differences between having an official state religion, restrictions on religious freedom, and religious persecution. Having an official state religion can imply a likelihood of the state also having other policies that produce grievances in religious minorities. However, there is no necessary connection. Viewed isolated, having an official state religion can be merely symbolic, and should thus be viewed as a relatively low-scale frustration inducer¹².

Restrictions and persecution go beyond being symbolic artefacts of the state. They can be actively or not so actively enforced by the state, but none the less imply concrete limitations for religious minorities. Restrictions put boundaries on individual and groups' behaviour and rights, such as wearing specific types of clothes; openly declare ones religion et cetera. Contrasted to persecution, restrictions are more passive forms of state religiosity than persecution. Adopting policies of persecution means that the state takes active part in minority harassment, and implies the use of force.¹³

¹² E.g. the state affirms the preferred religion (and cultural values in a religious tradition), but leaves it at that. Examples of this can be the basically symbolic role of the official state religion in the Scandinavian countries. The implications for religious minorities are few, and the states respect religious minorities and even have accommodative measures in place, such as funding for religious minority communities.

¹³ In this paper I focus only on *religious* restrictions of religious minorities, in other words restrictions on forms of religious practice, religious activities, and the organization of religious groups. One could also choose to investigate discrimination that typically harms a religious minority in particular or religious minorities in general, be it political, social or economic; i.e. the Bahai minority in Iran express grievances about political and economic restrictions. Although political and economic in nature, these restrictions are probably religiously

States with an official state religion but no restrictions or persecution therefore should be considered to have low levels of state religiosity, whereas adding restrictions and (even more importantly) adding religious persecution increases the state religiosity. I suggested above that religious heterogeneous states could be more inclined to experience conflict. Furthermore, I propose that the effect of increasing levels of state religiosity could add to the conflict risk in such states. Based on the discussion above I therefore propose the following hypothesis:

H6: In religiously heterogeneous states, increasing state religiosity increases the risk of intrastate armed conflict.

Opportunity for Mobilization

It has been argued that identities, even highly *salient* identities, grievances and frustration may be *necessary* but *not sufficient* explanations for conflict. In light of resource mobilization theory, a common identity and frustration might not come into the equation at all (see for example Tilly, 1978), as a lack of resources on part of the potential rebel groups or the strength of repressive capabilities of the state could effectively counteract any rebel mobilization. Even advocates of the deprivation theory such as Gurr (1970) admitted that frustration is not a *sufficient* predictor of conflict.

Resource mobilization theories are rooted in rational-actor models of political violence. The theoretical proposition is that action is motivated by expected utilities, not affect, fear or frustration (Weede & Muller, 1998). Indeed, the frustration explanations of conflict is rejected as discontent and frustration are more or less always present in virtually all societies. According to the resource mobilization theories, the most valuable explanatory factor should therefore not be discontent or frustration *per se*, but the organization of such discontent, or the setting in which the discontent is pronounced¹⁴.

Opportunity can be divided into internal and external (Gurr, 1993: 130). Considering minority groups' external opportunity structure, the factors that bring about grievance and frustration (such as restrictions and persecution) can be same factors that make it harder for

guided by the theocratic government of Iran (Fox, 1999: 295). Investigating the impact of such discrimination should be an interesting venture for future research.

¹⁴ The apparent competition between rational actor and deprived actor models have been tested by scholars, most notably by Collier & Hoeffler (2002), who contrast the root causes of conflict as either 'greed' (rational actor) of 'grievance' (deprived actor).

the minority group to rebel¹⁵. One could therefore assume the direct *opposite* effect of restrictions and persecution of religious minorities on intrastate armed conflict – namely that the external opportunity structure for a religious minority is so repressive that staging a rebellion is impossible. Based purely on the opportunity aspect one would therefore expect lower conflict risk in situations with higher levels of state religiosity. Likewise, the same assumption can also be made regarding each of the components of state religiosity: official state religion, restrictions, and persecution. If these types of state behaviour and policy deter violent uprisings, they should also separately decrease conflict risk. I leave it up to the empirical analysis to determine whether this is indeed so.

One of the most basic opportunity factors for mobilization is strength in numbers. The calculated chance of success should in part be a function of the relative group size to other groups. As there are numerous examples of heterogeneous societies where groups coexist peacefully side by side, the primordialist concept of group differences creating an environment for conflict might seem too simplistic. However, when considering the relative size of groups, the idea seems more plausible.

Based on an opportunity argument, the rebel group should be of a certain size to have the possibility of staging an uprising. The opportunity structure of a small group implies that it has little or no basis for rebellion (Ellingsen, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Indeed, if a group is relatively weak in numbers, the state would face fewer problems crushing any uprising. This leads to the last hypothesis:

H7: States with a large religious minority have higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than states with only small religious minorities.

Summing Up the Theoretical Expectations

I anticipate in line with Gurr & Moore (1997: 1083) that mobilization is a function of group coherence, the level of grievances among group members, and the severity of state repression. These three factors are signified in the theoretical argument as identity, frustration and opportunity. Conflict will not occur in absence of inter-group identity competition. In religiously homogenous states therefore, the religious dimension cannot serve as an explanation of intrastate armed conflict. However, in religiously heterogeneous states the religious dimension can be invoked and causes tensions that possibly even mount to civil war.

¹⁵ This is the case as I use the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, where conflict is only coded if the government of a state is one of the conflict actors. However, there could also be conflicts between different rebel groups.

Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical argument in two stages. The first stage is the relationship between the concepts of religious heterogeneity and state religiosity, both separately and combined influences the identity-, frustration- and opportunity dimensions. The second is that identity, frustration and opportunity all affect the risk of conflict.

Figure 1: Theoretical Expectation Model of the Effects of Religious Heterogeneity and State Religiosity on Intrastate Armed Conflict¹⁶




Figure 1 shows that religious heterogeneity could have an impact on the identity, frustration, as well as the opportunity dimension. Heterogeneity means that there will be contrasting identities, and based on the primordialist line of arguing, such difference can also imply frustration. Furthermore, the religious make up of the country involve different opportunity structures based on the groups strength in numbers.

If the state is religiously homogenous, state religiosity cannot invoke contrasting identities (as there are no innate religious differences) nor cause frustration (as the inhabitants should not feel threatened by such policies)¹⁷. However, state religiosity has a bearing on the potential opportunity structure for rebellion, as strictly religious states could be more repressive than states that do not have strict regulations.

The *combination* of religious heterogeneity and state religiosity (represented by the dotted line) should have an impact on identity, frustration, as well as opportunity. Identities in religiously heterogeneous states could be sharpened if the state is religious, as the minority groups feel threatened by state policies. Evidently also, state religiosity is likely to augment minority frustration. Lastly, if the state is strongly religious and enforces severe repression of

¹⁶ Figure 1 is inspired by the model of domestic conflict presented by Ellingsen (2000: 239).

¹⁷ One could of course claim that although one belongs to the same religion thee might be differences in opinion over state policies regarding religion. Such disagreement will exist in almost all societies, as there are individual differences in degree of personal religiosity, and different ideological and practical arguments for why the politics of the state should be organized in one way or the other.

religious minorities, these groups can be unable to stage an uprising, and the opportunity dimension is thus also affected.¹⁸

The second stage of the theoretical expectations model shows the theoretical impact of identity, frustration, and opportunity on intrastate armed conflict. The primordialist rendering is that identity or cultural differences in and of themselves can lead to conflict – thus the arrow from identity to conflict (e.g. Huntington, 1993, 1996). The theory of frustration and relative deprivation states that frustration leads to aggression (e.g. Dollard et al., 1939; Gurr, 1970), and therefore also potentially to civil war. Lastly, resource mobilization theories claim that opportunity is the key determinant of conflict, as the decision to rebel is based on rational calculations of likelihood of gains (e.g. Tilly, 1978), or ‘greed’ rather than ‘grievance’ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Lastly, the frustration parameter and identity can reinforce one another. Frustration makes the identity stronger and more salient, and the minority group more coherent, and this therefore influences the opportunity parameter¹⁹.

Research Design and Data

This study takes the form of a large-N quantitative survey. The unit of analysis is the country-year and the dependent variable is intrastate armed conflict incidence in the period 1990–2002, from the PRIO/ Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset which is assembled by researchers at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Uppsala and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (Gleditsch et al., 2002). The PRIO/Uppsala dataset defines armed conflict as a ‘contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state’ (Gleditsch et al., 2002: 618–619).

As mentioned previously, research on the specific effect of the role of religion in states is scarce. One reason for this is the limited data available for quantitative analysis. In my search of relevant data I first came in contact with Dr. Jonathan Fox and Dr. Shmuel Sandler of Bar Ilan University who are collecting a database on this: The *Religion and State database* (RAS) (forthcoming)²⁰. The *RAS database* answers to the limited data availability on the role of religion at a state level, as it includes an *extensive* number of variables measuring this relationship in the period 1990–2002. When finished, the database will include coding for all

¹⁸ The effect however might be the opposite in cases when the minority is relatively large, as the state could be unable to suppress the minority.

¹⁹ However, this relationship is not explicitly tested in the empirical analysis.

²⁰ Dr. Jonathan Fox and Dr. Shmuel Sandler were gracious enough to make the data available for me.

countries²¹. However, currently two regions are completed: The Middle East/North Africa and Western democracies, in addition to a list of other countries from other parts of the world. The selection of countries in the RAS database completed at this time implies a selection bias on the dependent (conflict) variable. I therefore investigated other sources of data on the role of religion in states, with the aim of having a larger sample of countries. In doing this I came across the *Religious Freedom Reports* (RFR) by the US Department of State²². The RFR have been issued annually by the US Department of State, but however only for the (limited) time period 1999–2002. This lack of extensive data for a global sample over time and space posed a problem for the analysis regarding the sample to use.²³

I ended up coding variables on the role of religion in states from the US Department of State's *Religious Freedom Reports* (RFR)²⁴ and the CIA *World Factbook* (CIA, annual)²⁵, and extrapolate the values for the year 1999 to also apply for the preceding years (1990–1998)²⁶ to obtain a longer time span, equivalent to the forthcoming RAS database²⁷. This was done because a preliminary investigation of the *RAS database* showed that the variables measuring the role of religion in states remain fairly stable over time. In my analysis I therefore have a global sample of countries (168 countries in total²⁸) for the period 1990–2002. The RFR are made for most countries in the world²⁹, and give a good depiction of the status of religious freedom and the degree to which the states can be considered 'religious'³⁰. I now turn to a description of the operationalization of my explanatory variables.

²¹ With a population in 2000 of at least 1 million and a sampling of countries with lower populations (Fox, 2003)

²² Used also by Fearon & Laitin (2003) in their research on conflict onset.

²³ I was faced with several options. One possibility was using two samples in the empirical analysis; one consisting of the countries in the Middle East/North Africa and Western democracies for the years 1990–2002, taking advantage of the extensive number of variables available from the *RAS database*, and a global sample of countries, based on my own coding of a more limited set of variables from the *Religious Freedom Reports*, 1999–2002. A second option was to use all the countries in the RAS database completed at the present time. Neither sample would in this approach be very valuable. The Middle East/ North Africa and Western democracies sample does not allow generalizations about the relationship between the role of religion and conflict. Using the RAS sample completed at this time implies a selection bias on the conflict variable.

²⁴ US Department of State, Religious Freedom Reports: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt/>

²⁵ CIA World Factbook: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>

²⁶ Although extrapolating of variables back in time should ideally be avoided, the alternatives seem more problematic. However, there are potential problems associated with this regarding some of the states in Central Asia that were formerly Soviet republics, as they have had a period of 'religious free-market' in the first years of independence followed by tightening of restrictions particularly on foreign religious groups of 'untraditional' religions (Anderson, 2002: 181).

²⁷ Ideally I would have preferred to use the (promising) *RAS database* though, but as discussed this is for the time being problematic.

²⁸ See Appendix 1 for listing of countries included in the sample.

²⁹ All the states included in the empirical analysis have reports on the status for religious freedom, apart from the United States.

³⁰ The material in the RFR is however written narrative, descriptions and accounts, and I therefore had to systematize the information for statistical analysis.

Operationalization of Variables

My dependent variable is *intrastate armed conflict incidence*. This is a dichotomous variable, with the value 1 if there is an intrastate conflict on the country's territory a given year, and 0 otherwise³¹.

State Religiosity, Religious Heterogeneity, and Interaction between Them

State religiosity is operationalized by four measures³²: whether the state has an official state religion, a scale of restrictions on religious freedom, and a dummy for religious persecution, and a combined measure of the three: state religiosity.

State Religion is a dichotomous variable indication whether the state has one official state religion (1), or no state religion or multiple state religions with equal status (0). This is based on the assumption that having two or more state religions with equal status does implicitly mean that the state is somewhat unbiased. The state does not send out as strong a symbolic message that there is only *one* designated state religion put above all others, but is open to religious differences.

Restrictions is an additive index of five dummy variables of restrictions on religious freedom³³. The variables are coded 1 if the restriction exists in the given country-year and 0 otherwise. The additive index thus varies between 0 (no restrictions exist) to 5 (all the restrictions exist). The following variables were coded based on the *Religious Freedom Reports*: (1) Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion, (2) Restrictions on personal status regarding marriage, divorce, burial, and inheritance; (3) Restrictions on building, repairing and/or maintaining places of worship, including restrictions on holding religious meetings in private homes; (4) Restrictions on proselytizing; and (5) Mandatory religious education.

To qualify as having *persecution* I define that the state must take active part or accept severe harassment of religious minorities, which does not simply imply limitations to observance of religious minorities and the like, by the use of force or relentless coercion on part of the state or its agents to oppress religious minorities. In many countries there can be

³¹ One potential problem with this variable is that it does not account for simultaneous conflicts in a country. A country such as India which has experienced several simultaneous conflicts in the period is given the same value (1) as countries with only one ongoing conflict at a time. Neither does the variable account for the conflict intensity in terms of casualties. Smaller conflicts, just crossing the casualty threshold, are given the same weight as full-fledged wars with high number of casualties.

³² I relied heavily on the variable list presented in the RAS database codebook (Fox, 2003) as a guideline as to which exact variables relevant to code.

³³ The scale has a mean correlation of the variables of 0.4816, and a Cronbach's α of 0.8162, which indicates a reliable scale. See Appendix 3 for details.

incidences which can be considered oppressing, such as arrest or detention of certain individuals. However, for the majority of these countries this does not constitute a general practice or policy, but are rare and isolated incidences. Such isolated incidences are often targeted against marginal groups referred to as ‘cults’ or ‘sects’, and can even occur in highly open societies with generally high tolerance of diversity and respect for individual liberty. To be coded as having persecution on this explanatory variable I therefore wanted to include only countries with a general practice of persecution on a larger scale. The variable Persecution is a dichotomous variable of whether or not the state practices religious persecution based on two factors: (1) Arrest, detention, or harassment of adherents of minority religions, and (2) Forced conversions (including *attempts* of forced conversions).

To capture whether persecution is a *consistent* feature in the state’s policy that could affect a substantial number of people, a country is coded to have persecution (1) a given year if at least one of the factors is at minimum imposed to a certain degree on *most or all minorities*³⁴, and otherwise given the value 0.

I have combined the three explanatory variables discussed above in a composite measure of *State Religiosity*. This measure better captures the whole *continuum* of state religiosity. The state religiosity variable goes from 1 (indicating no/insignificant state religiosity) to 12 (high level of state religiosity). The values on the state religiosity variable are as follows³⁵:

- (1) Neither state religion, restrictions nor persecution
- (2) State religion but neither restrictions nor persecution
- (3) No state religion, some restrictions but no persecution
- (4) State religion and some restrictions but no persecution
- (5) No state religion, many restrictions but no persecution
- (6) State religion and many restrictions but no persecution
- (7) No state religion, no restrictions but persecution
- (8) State religion, no restrictions but persecution
- (9) No state religion, some restrictions and persecution
- (10) State religion, some restrictions and persecution

³⁴ Including also if it is imposed on only one minority but this particular minority is of considerable size.

³⁵ Having *some* restrictions is defined as having 1–2 of the restrictions, and having 3–5 of the restrictions is defined as having *many* restrictions.

- (11) No state religion, many restrictions and persecution
- (12) State religion, many restrictions and persecution

The assumption behind the categories on the state religiosity variable is that the severity of the explanatory variables is increasing for religious minorities in the order that having a state religion is the less severe, as it could (potentially) be merely symbolic with few if any practical implications. Restrictions are more severe and can be assumed to create more frustration amongst minorities, whereas persecution is the most severe, implying an active suppression by the state.³⁶

There are generally three different dimensions researchers have tried to capture and test regarding *religious heterogeneity*: dominance, fractionalization, and polarization.³⁷ In this paper I use a dummy for whether the state has a *religious cleavage*, defined as having a majority of at least 49 percent of the population, and a significant minority of at least 8 percent of the population³⁸. Such cases are given the value 1, and all other are given the value 0.³⁹ This is based on a variable used by Fearon and Laitin (2003) as a measure of polarization.

To test my hypotheses that the impact of the role of religion in states for conflict is different depending on the religious demography of the country, the proposed *interaction* effects between the explanatory variables are tested in my empirical analysis by including interaction terms between *religious cleavage* and measures of *the role of religion in states*.⁴⁰

Control Variables

The existing literature points out a broad set of other factors that can explain intrastate conflict. Gates (2002: 9) sums up the variables generally agreed to be associated with higher risk of civil war as poverty, lack of economic opportunity, the level of economic

³⁶ Thus, the a change from 0 to 1 on the official state religion variable only implies a small effect on the state religiosity variable (a one point change) keeping other factors constant, whereas having religious persecution has the largest impact on the score on the state religiosity variable, shifting the score by six points if the other factors are kept constant.

³⁷ Measures of polarization (such as presented by Reynal-Querol (2002), dominance (e.g. Ellingsen, 2000), and fractionalization (such as presented by Fearon & Laitin (2003) will be included in future research.

³⁸ Based on world religions.

³⁹ In other words, the reference category included both countries that can be considered fractionalized (in cases where the largest religious group is smaller than 49 percent), and homogenous (in cases when the largest minority is marginal).

⁴⁰ There are two ways of looking at this (in practice): at a given level of state religiosity, does a religious cleavage, affect conflict risk – or, given that a religious cleavage exists, does the religious policy of the state have an impact? Keeping as a rule of thumb that research should at some level lead to policy recommendations, the second approach is the more interesting of the two. The religious composition of a state is more or less a given (or should at least be a given), however, state policy could be altered in response to proved negative consequences.

development; conflict history, ethnic heterogeneity, and political instability. Other variables believed to be associated with intrastate conflict risk include dependence on natural resources, ethnic Diasporas, population size, rough terrain, political institutional structure, and state strength (ibid). In order to better determine the true effects of my explanatory variables, I have included the most important variables found to have an effect on conflict incidence from the research of Fearon & Laitin (2003), Collier & Hoeffler (2002), Ellingsen (2000), and Hegre et al. (2001).

Regime type is included in previous research as democracy can be seen as a channel for conflict, or as a method of non-violence. I measure regime type by the combined regime variable (POLITY2) from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2003). This variable varies from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic)⁴¹. In order to measure also a proposed inverted u-shape relationship (Hegre et al., 2001), I include a squared term. The regime variables are lagged with one year.

Fearon & Laitin (2003: 81) argue that insurgency will be favoured and thus civil war more likely when potential rebel groups faces a newly independent state, as the state loses the coercive backing of a former imperial power, and the military powers of the state are new and untested. *New State* is a dummy variable equal to the variable used by Fearon and Laitin (2003) for the first two years of independence.

One of the most robust findings of recent large-N studies of civil war is the link between aspects of economic development to intrastate peace⁴². Level of development is measured by the proxy log of GDP per capita⁴³ in constant 1995 US dollars. Following Collier & Hoeffler (2002) a variable *GDP growth* is also included in the analysis as a proxy for economic opportunities. Both these variables are lagged one year, and have been taken from the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank, 2003).

Countries depending heavily on *oil export* are found to have a higher risk of conflict onset (Fearon & Laitin, 2003:81). The theoretical rationale is twofold: that these state tend to have weaker state apparatuses because of a political ‘Dutch disease’, and secondly that oil resources can be ‘greed’- type motivation for potential rebel groups, as the gains from

⁴¹ This variable is collected from the latest version of the POLITY data, and has the advantage that it provides updated values for the interruption and interregnums previously coded as missing.

⁴² The theoretical arguments are usually based on the influence of this factor on state capacity (through taxation) (e.g. de Soysa, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and recruitment capabilities of potential rebel groups (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2002).

⁴³ Hegre et al. (2001) have used an alternative measure of energy consumption to measure level of economic development, but GDP is the most commonly used measurement lately, as energy consumption can be a deceptive measure for recent years.

controlling state power are large. The variable used is a dummy for countries with oil export revenue comprising at least 1/3 of state revenues, from the Fearon & Laitin dataset⁴⁴.

Fearon & Laitin (2003: 80) and Collier & Hoeffler (2000: 8) argue that the presence of rough terrain should favour insurgency and civil war as it makes counter-insurgency more difficult. I use a logged variable of proportion of mountainous terrain as a measure for rough terrain⁴⁵, as was done by Fearon & Laitin.

Collier & Hoeffler (2002) have found support for measures of total population being positively associated with civil conflict. Theoretically, a large population implies more potential constellations for conflict and a larger number of potential recruits for rebel groups. A large population generally also means a larger geographical area which can be more difficult to control than a smaller area (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Henceforth, I include a measure of the country's total population collected from the *Religious Freedom Reports* and the *CIA World Factbook* (CIA, annual). This variable is log transformed⁴⁶.

Controls for Statistical Dependency: Peace Years and Splines

The assumption of independence across observations inherent in a logistic regression would be violated in this study unless dependence across time is not controlled for. Conflict breeds conflict, and there is (naturally) a higher probability of conflicts in countries with a history of conflict (Gleditsch et al., 2002). I control for this by a method recommend by Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998) correcting for time-dependence by entering a variable measuring time passed since last observation of conflict ($Y=1$) '*peace years*' and *splines*⁴⁷. The splines give a smoothed curve of decline in conflict risk as time passes after the last conflict.⁴⁸ The peace years are calculated from the start of the time period in the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, 1946.

Statistical Method: Logit Regression

The dependent variable in my analysis is dichotomous, meaning that it takes only two possible values: conflict (1) or peace (0). The most appropriate statistical method is therefore

⁴⁴ Replication data at: <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html>

⁴⁵ Variable collected by geographer A. J. Gerrard, for the World Bank DECRG project on civil wars.

⁴⁶ The difference between 1 and 2 million inhabitants can be seem as more substantial than between 150 and 151 million.

⁴⁷ They replicate an analysis by Oneal & Russett (1997) investigating conflict onset, but they do not indicate in their article that peace years and splines could not also be used for analyses of conflict incidence. The peace years and splines none the less should be a preferred method to control for time-dependence, as the measure is more sensitive to the conflict history of the country than for instance a dummy for conflict the last year.

⁴⁸ Other ways of controlling for conflict history includes measures of time since last conflict, such as used by Hegre et al. (2001) measuring of the decreased risk as time passes by some factor.

logit regression (Hamilton, 1992). The regression coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of the X variable(s) on the probability that Y=1, and are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. The logit model is specified as $Log\left(\frac{P_{it}}{1-P_{it}}\right) = \alpha + \beta X_{it} + e_{it}$, where α is the intercept, βX is the set of explanatory variables with corresponding coefficients, and e is the error term for country i at time t .⁴⁹ The statistical program STATA, version 8, is used to run the analyses, as this program allows for the control for peace years and splines (Tucker, 1999; Beck et al., 1998). A model of religious heterogeneity and state religiosity with control variables is specified as follows⁵⁰:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Civil War Incidence} = & \alpha + (\beta \text{ Cleavage}) + (\beta \text{ State Religiosity}) + (\beta \text{ Cleavage} * \text{State Religiosity}) + \\ & (\beta \text{ Regime Type}) + (\beta \text{ Regime Type, sq}) + (\beta \text{ GDP per Capita}) + (\beta \text{ GDP Growth}) + (\beta \text{ Oil Exporter}) + \\ & (\beta \text{ New State}) + (\beta \text{ Mountainous Terrain}) + (\beta \text{ Population Size}) + (\beta \text{ Peace Years}) + e_{it} \end{aligned}$$

Empirical Findings

In the following I test my hypotheses over a set of multivariate regression models. I first test the primordialist assumption that heterogeneity in itself should be associated with a higher conflict risk, by running religious cleavage with all control variables (Table 1). Then I test whether the combination of a religious cleavage and the different measures of state religiosity better explain conflict incidence. For these models I include the variable religious cleavage and one by one the measures of the role of religion in states (official state religion, restrictions, persecution and state religiosity) and the interaction variable between them (Table 2)⁵¹.

Table 1 presents a multivariate model testing the effect of having a religious cleavage on intrastate armed conflict incidence (primordialistic assumption). The model shows that religious cleavages do not explain conflict incidence, as cleavage is insignificant. *Hypotheses 1 and 7* are therefore not supported: religiously heterogeneous states do not seem to have a higher risk of intrastate conflict incidence.

⁴⁹ Logit regression also has the advantage that one can estimate the probability that an event $y=1$ will occur. The probability is calculated by applying the formula: $p = \exp Z / (1 + \exp Z)$

⁵⁰ A model for testing the effect of official state religion would simply be specified by replacing the variable state religiosity by the variable official state religion, and the appurtenant coefficient, and likewise for models of restrictions and persecution respectively.

⁵¹ See Appendix 4 for descriptive statistics for all variables included in the empirical analysis.

Table 1 Risk of Conflict Incidence by Religious Cleavage, 1990–2002

<i>Model 1</i>		
	β	S.E.
<i>Cleavage</i>	.306	.208
<i>Regime Type</i>	.019	.019
<i>Regime Type (sq)</i>	-.004	.004
<i>GDP per Capita (ln)</i>	-.172 *	.095
<i>GDP Growth</i>	-.017	.011
<i>Oil Exporter</i>	.373	.295
<i>Mountainous Terrain (ln)</i>	.083	.070
<i>Population Size (ln)</i>	.327 ****	.076
<i>New State</i>	-2.456 ****	.580
<i>Peace Years</i>	-1.672 ****	.143
<i>Spline1</i>	-.036 ****	.005
<i>Spline2</i>	.007 ****	.001
<i>Spline3</i>	.000	.000
<i>Constant</i>	-1.033	.965
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-374.321	
<i>Pseudo R2</i>	.571	
<i>N</i>	1,837	

Note: **** p<0.001, *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2 presents tests of the combined effects of having a religious cleavage and various roles of religion in the states. The findings largely support my hypotheses, and the combined measures of religious cleavage and state religiosity predict increased risk of conflict. In Model 2 I test the effect of having an official state religion, in Model 3 the effect of restrictions on religious freedom, in Model 4 the effect of religious persecution, and lastly, Model 5 tests the effect of the combined measure of state religiosity.

In Model 2 I find that in accordance with my assumption neither having a religious cleavage nor having an official state religion are by themselves significant. However, the combination of these two factors significantly increases the risk of intrastate armed conflict, and *Hypothesis 3* is thus supported.

Model 3 tests *Hypothesis 4*, whether restrictions on religious freedom in religiously heterogeneous states increases conflict risk. None of my explanatory variables are significant in Model 3, and *Hypothesis 4* is therefore not supported.⁵²

In Model 4 I find that *Hypothesis 5* is supported, as the interaction variable between religious cleavage and persecution is positive and statistically significant. Also here cleavage and persecution by themselves are significant. The significant and positive finding on

⁵² However, running model 3 without the control for peace years and splines yields a positive and highly significant (p<0.001) result for the interaction term between religious cleavage and restrictions.

religious persecution could be claimed to stem from an inverted causality: that conflict leads to religious persecution. This possibility is something to be reckoned with. However, the fact that the variable is significant *even* when the conflict history of the countries are taken into account by the inclusion of peace years and splines, this speaks against a simple reversion of the proposed theoretical causality.

From Model 5 one can see that neither state religiosity nor religious cleavages by themselves increase conflict risk. However, in states with a religious cleavage, the odds of experiencing intrastate conflict incidence a given year goes up with more than 12% with a one-unit increase on the state religiosity scale if all other variables are kept constant. The impact of state religiosity is therefore different in states with a religious cleavage compared to the overall effect of state religiosity which is insignificant in Model 5. This finding supports *Hypothesis 6: in religiously heterogeneous states, increasing state religiosity increases the risk of intrastate armed conflict.*

The models in Table 2 also support the overall hypothesis (*Hypothesis 2*) that: *heterogeneous religious states have a higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than non-religious heterogeneous states and homogenous states – religious or not.*

As for the control variables, Models 2–5 do not support a significant relationship between regime type and conflict. However, although insignificant, the squared term of regime type is consistently negative, which is in line with the proposed inverted u-curve relationship (Hegre et al., 2001)⁵³.

GDP per capita has a consistently negative and significant effect on conflict. This finding is therefore consistent with the bulk of previous research (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Ellingsen, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; and Hegre et al., 2001). Economic growth is also consistently negative, but insignificant. The insignificant result is contrary to findings by Collier & Hoeffler (2001)⁵⁴.

Being oil export dependent is consistently positively related to intrastate armed conflict, although insignificant in Model 3. The significant finding in models 2, 4 and 5 is in line with Fearon & Laitin (2003) in their research on conflict onset.

⁵³ Running the Models 2–5 without the controls for peace years and splines yields significant finding for regime type squared.

⁵⁴ This variable is also highly significant without the control for peace years and splines.

Table 2 Religious Cleavage and The Role of Religion in States on Conflict Incidence, 1990–2002

	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
	β S.E.	β S.E.	β S.E.	β S.E.
<i>Cleavage</i>	.003 (.249)	.072 (.280)	.070 (.240)	-.191 (.327)
<i>State Religion</i>	-.213 (.297)			
<i>Cleavage* State Religion</i>	1.299** (.536)			
<i>Restrictions</i>		-.048 (.089)		
<i>Cleavage* Restrictions</i>		.167 (.137)		
<i>Persecution</i>			-.355 (.360)	
<i>Cleavage* Persecution</i>			.982* (.525)	
<i>State Religiosity</i>				-.040 (.042)
<i>Cleavage* State Religiosity</i>				.117* (.061)
<i>Regime Type</i>	.018 (.020)	.022 (.020)	.020 (.020)	.021 (.020)
<i>Regime Type (sq)</i>	-.004 (.004)	-.005 (.004)	-.005 (.004)	-.005 (.004)
<i>GDP per Capita (ln)</i>	-.220** (.097)	-.188* (.097)	-.204** (.097)	-.214** (.098)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	-.018 (.012)	-.017 (.011)	-.017 (.011)	-.018 (.012)
<i>Oil Exporter</i>	.545* (.306)	.453 (.305)	.499* (.302)	.544* (.309)
<i>Mountainous Terrain (ln)</i>	.115 (.070)	.087 (.070)	.075 (.071)	.081 (.071)
<i>Population Size (ln)</i>	.300**** (.077)	.290**** (.082)	.314**** (.077)	.304**** (.078)
<i>New State</i>	-2.382**** (.582)	-2.450**** (.584)	-2.563**** (.591)	-2.550**** (.589)
<i>Peace Years</i>	-1.648**** (.143)	-1.661**** (.143)	-1.666**** (.143)	-1.663**** (.143)
<i>Spline1</i>	-.036**** (.005)	-.036**** (.005)	-.036**** (.005)	-.036**** (.005)
<i>Spline2</i>	.007**** (.001)	.007**** (.001)	.007**** (.001)	.007**** (.001)
<i>Spline3</i>	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-.498 (.998)	-.510 (1.047)	-.590 (.998)	-.357 (1.020)
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-370.863	-368.433	-367.532	-367.298
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	.575	0.574	0.576	.576
<i>N</i>	1,837	1,823	1,823	1,823

Note: **** p< 0.001, *** p<0.01, **p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

The variable measuring the extent of mountainous terrain has also consistently positive coefficients in Models 2–5. The positive coefficient is in line with the findings of Fearon & Laitin (2003). However, the variable is never significant. This divergence could be caused by at least four factors: firstly, Fearon & Laitin have not done the robustness test of including peace years and splines to their models⁵⁵. Secondly, the Fearon & Laitin data uses a cumulative deaths (1,000) criterion⁵⁶, whereas the PRIO/Uppsala data has an annual battle-related deaths threshold of 25. This could potentially influence the results quite substantially. Thirdly, the time period investigated is different⁵⁷. Lastly there might be differences between the role of mountainous terrain for conflict *onset* and conflict *incidence*. Still, it is quite surprising if the effect of mountains on conflict onset should be stronger than for conflict incidence. Mountains should make it easier for rebels to hide from government forces, and the crushing of rebellion more difficult. One could therefore assume that conflicts in mountainous terrain last longer than conflicts in more accessible landscapes. However, mountainous terrain could possibly facilitate insurgencies also by smaller guerrilla groups that are able to mobilize concealed from government eyes, and therefore a proliferation of violence.

Population size has the strongest effect of the control variables in Table 2. Having a large population is positively and significantly related to conflict incidence in all the models. This is in line with the bulk of previous research on intrastate conflict.

Being a new state is consistently negative and even statistically significant in Models 2–7. The negative coefficient is quite the opposite finding of Fearon & Laitin (2003). The most probable explanation of this rather surprising divergence lies in the differences in time periods investigated, as in Fearon & Laitin’s period of investigation (1945–1999) there were more new states as a result of decolonization processes and subsequent conflicts.

Naturally the time since last conflict is a strong predictor of conflict incidence: The shorter the time since the last year of intrastate armed conflict, the higher the risk of conflict.

Graphing the Relationship between State Religiosity and Conflict Risk

The relationship between state religiosity and risk of conflict is presented graphically in Figure 2, holding all control variables at mean. This shows that for states with a religious


⁵⁵ As Beck et al. (1998) have found that this test can alter the results quite substantially; this should have been controlled for.

⁵⁶ It is unclear whether or not they include also other deaths than the battle-related

⁵⁷ Whereas I investigate the period 1990–2002, Fearon and Laitin (2003) look at the period 1945–1999.

cleavage, the risk of conflict increases with increasing state religiosity, whereas for states without a religious cleavage the line goes slightly down with increasing state religiosity⁵⁸.

Figure 2 Probability of Intrastate Armed Conflict Incidence by State Religiosity, 1990–2002. All Control Variables at Mean.



It should however be noted that the two lines cross at the value 4 on state religiosity⁵⁹. At lower levels of state religiosity therefore, there is actually a higher frequency of intrastate armed conflict in states that do *not* have a religious cleavage compared to states with such a cleavage.⁶⁰ What could explain the fact that the lines cross? The countries that have a religious cleavage but have a low score on state religiosity are by definition countries that do not severely limit the religious freedom of their religious minorities. The grievance in the religious minorities should therefore be low, and there should therefore be few (if any) reasons for religious minorities to rebel. But still, what could explain that the countries at this level of state religiosity but without a religious cleavage have more conflicts? One explanation could be that these countries could be religiously diverse in other ways than what

⁵⁸ As the variable GDP per capita also performs well in the empirical analysis, it would be interesting in future research to investigate the effect of this variable, and see whether a religious cleavage is important in different economic settings.

⁵⁹ Value 4 represents states that have an official state religion, some (1 or 2) restrictions on religious freedom, but no religious persecution.

⁶⁰ Value 4 represents states that have an official state religion, some (1 or 2) restrictions on religious freedom, but no religious persecution. The values 1–3 on state religiosity represents, as previously stated, situations where the state has either no, or at most two, forms of restrictions on religious freedom, but no religious persecution. State religiosity in the range 5–12 indicates that the state has many (3–5) restrictions, religious persecution, or both.

is captured by the cleavage variable⁶¹. The most obvious explanation is however that the conflicts can be over other things, such as ethnicity, scarce resources, ‘greed’ and so on⁶².

Summary of Findings

The hypotheses regarding religious heterogeneity and conflict (*Hypotheses 1 and 7*) were not supported by the empirical analysis. Indeed, I find support in Model 1 for Hypothesis 1_{alt}, that *there is no significant relationship between religious heterogeneity and conflict*.

My findings regarding the combined effect of religious heterogeneity and the role of religion in states support the overall hypothesis (*Hypothesis 2*) that heterogeneous religious states have a higher risk of intrastate armed conflict than non-religious heterogeneous states and homogeneous states – religious or not. The more specific hypotheses regarding this relationship (*Hypotheses 3–6*) were largely supported by the empirical analysis, although the coefficient for the interaction of religious cleavage and restrictions was not significant, and *Hypothesis 4* therefore only received partial support. Based on the findings regarding *Hypotheses 3, 5, and 6*, my findings can be summed up as: for states with a religious cleavage along world religions there is an increased risk of conflict *if the state has an official state religion, if the state persecutes religious minorities; and the higher the (combined) state religiosity*.

Conclusion

My contribution to the study of the role of religion for civil war has been to investigate whether the way states treat the religious issue has an impact on the risk of conflict. Based primarily on the discourse between primordial versus constructivist viewpoints I have tested whether religious differences in and of themselves create conflicts – the primordial assumption; or whether it is not in fact religious differences *per se*, but the context in which these differences are set that better predicts intrastate conflict – a constructivist viewpoint.

I proposed that, in certain circumstances, state regulation of religion for the sake of stability can have quite the opposite effect, increasing the risk of instability and thus violence within a country. My main hypothesis was that conflict results when religious differences are

⁶¹ I have discussed previously that the reference category for religious cleavage includes both homogenous countries and countries with polarization. Furthermore, there could be cleavages between sub-religions, such as is the case for Northern Ireland, or within the majority religion, involving extremist groups for instance.

⁶² Countries such as Colombia, Croatia, and Liberia are in the category of having no religious cleavage and low state religiosity, but protracted conflicts.

mobilized within the context of state religiosity. This hypothesis was largely supported in my empirical investigation for the period 1990–2002. Indeed, my findings show that the relationship between religion and state *does* influence conflict risk when the country has a religious cleavage along world religions. In short, I have demonstrated that the primordial theoretical assumption that differences create conflict does not hold, but found support for the constructivist assumption that differences can create conflict in settings where the religious identity of minority groups is being threatened by the religious policies of the state.

This paper has contributed to the research on civil war (particularly the research on the impact of ‘cultural variables’) in different ways. First, I have shown that in order to grasp the impact of religion on conflicts we need to move beyond simply comparing group sizes, and measures of individual religiosity. Further, I have demonstrated that, as suggested by Gates (2002a), the inclusion of interaction between variables is a fruitful path to improving our understanding of civil war. Perhaps a better way of modelling what causes conflict is therefore to investigate scenarios and wider contexts, rather than simply the individual impact of variables.

One other contribution of this paper is the development of data that measure the role of religion in states. As pointed out by Fox & Sandler (2003) the lack of cross-sectional studies of the influence of religion on phenomena such as conflict is mostly due to a lack of data. My measures do to a certain extent answer to this lack of data⁶³. However, a number of other measures of the role of religion in states could be included in measures of state religiosity. The forthcoming *RAS database* by Fox & Sandler will therefore be a highly valuable source of data for future research on this topic, as this data source will contain a significantly larger pool of variables.

Based on the empirical findings presented, future research should clearly take religion into account. This paper provides some empirical evidence that the way states deal with religion can increase the risk of conflict incidence given that the country is split between (at least) two religious groups from different world religions.

What are then the implications of this for policy-makers? In most cases the religious heterogeneity of a country is a given. However, one could envision dealing with conflicts between religious groups by granting some form or level of autonomy to minority groups.⁶⁴ Alternative solutions to problems of religious heterogeneity are typically grim. Thus, policies

⁶³ Although they evidently capture only a *part* of the potential influence of religion on conflict.

⁶⁴ Such (sometimes recommended) partitions can however have large implications, lead to instability, and could therefore come with a cost.

to redress grievances are more appropriate. The spread of religious tolerance and freedom of religion should therefore be major goals, not only for the international community and international organizations and institutions, but also for domestic policy-makers. Such a strategy should effectively and to a considerable extent remove causes of minority frustration and grievances, and thus help create stability and peace. Rather than limiting religious freedom, I propose that along with a continued focus on increasing prosperity and material security, tolerance and anti-discrimination laws should do much to avoid religious heterogeneity mounting to violent conflicts. Indeed, the spread of tolerance of religious minorities is not only *strategically* sound for attaining or keeping peace, but it is also desirable *for its own sake*.

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APPENDIX 1

Countries Included in Empirical Analysis; the Years of Armed Conflict Incidence; and Values on Explanatory Variables: Religious Cleavage, Official State Religion, Restrictions on Religious Freedom, and Religious Persecution (in 2001).

Country	Years Included	Intrastate Armed Conflict Incidence	Cleavage	State Religion ^a	Restrictions ^b	Persecution ^c
Albania	1990–2002		Yes	No	Some	No
Armenia	1991–2002		No	Yes	Some	Yes
Azerbaijan	1991–2002	1992–1995	No	No	Some	Yes
Belarus	1991–2002		No	No	Some	No
Bosnia	1992–2002	1992–1995	Yes	No	Some	No
Bulgaria	1990–2002		Yes	No	Some	No
Croatia	1991–2002	1992–1993, 1995	No	No	Some	No
Czech Republic	1993–2002		No	No	Some	No
Czechoslovakia	1990–1992		–	–	–	–
Estonia	1991–2002		No	No	None	No
Georgia	1991–2002	1991–1993	Yes	No	Some	No
Hungary	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Kazakhstan	1991–2002		Yes	No	Some	Yes
Kyrgyz Republic	1991–2002		Yes	No	Some	No
Latvia	1991–2002		No	No	None	No
Lithuania	1991–2002		No	No	Some	No
Macedonia	1991–2002	2001	Yes	No	Some	No
Moldova	1991–2002	1992	No	No	Many	No
Poland	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Romania	1990–2002		No	No	Some	No
Slovakia	1993–2002		No	No	None	No
Slovenia	1991–2002		No	No	Some	No
Tajikistan	1991–2002	1992–1996, 1998	No	No	None	No
Turkmenistan	1991–2002		Yes	No	Many	Yes
Ukraine	1991–2002		No	No	None	No
Uzbekistan	1991–2002	2000	No	No	Some	No
Yugoslavia (Serb.)	1990–2002	1991, 1998–1999	Yes	No	Some	No
Australia	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Austria	1990–2002		No	No	Some	No
Belgium	1990–2002		Yes	No	Some	No
Canada	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Denmark	1990–2002		No	Yes	None	No
Finland	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
France	1990–2002		No	No	Some	No
Germany	1990–2002		No	No	Some	No
Greece	1990–2002		No	Yes	Some	No
Iceland	1990–2002		No	Yes	None	No
Ireland	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Italy	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Luxembourg	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Malta	1990–2002		No	Yes	None	No
Netherlands	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
New Zealand	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Norway	1990–2002		No	Yes	None	No
Portugal	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Spain	1990–2002	1991–1992	No	No	Some	No
Sweden	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Switzerland	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
United Kingdom	1990–2002	1990–1993, 1998	No	No	None	No
USA	1990–2002	2001–2002	No	No	–	–
Algeria	1990–2002	1992–2002	No	Yes	Many	No
Bahrain	1990–2002		No	Yes	Some	No

Country	Years Included	Intrastate Armed Conflict Incidence	Cleavage	State Religion ^a	Restrictions ^b	Persecution ^c
Djibouti	1990–2002	1991–1994	No	Yes	Some	No
Egypt	1990–2002	1992–1998	No	Yes	Many	Yes
Iran	1990–2002	1990–1993, 2001–2002	No	Yes	Many	Yes
Iraq	1990–2002	1990–1996	No	Yes	Many	Yes
Israel	1990–2002	1990–2002	Yes	Yes	Many	Yes
Jordan	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	No
Kuwait	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	No
Lebanon	1990–2002	1990	Yes	No	Some	No
Libya	1990–2002		No	Yes	–	–
Morocco	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	No
Oman	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	No
Qatar	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	No
Saudi Arabia	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	Yes
Syria	1990–2002		Yes	No	Many	No
Tunisia	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	No
Turkey	1990–2002	1990–2002	No	No	Many	No
United A. Emirates	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	No
Yemen	1990–2002	1994	No	Yes	Many	No
Afghanistan	1990–2002	1990–2001	No	Yes	Some	Yes
Bangladesh	1990–2002	1990–1992	Yes	Yes	Some	No
Bhutan	1990–2002		Yes	Yes	Some	No
Brunei	1990–2002		Yes	Yes	Many	Yes
Burma	1990–2002	1990–2002	No	No	Many	Yes
Cambodia	1990–2002	1990–1998	No	Yes	None	No
Fiji	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
India	1990–2002	1990–2002	Yes	No	Some	No
Indonesia	1990–2002	1990–1992, 1999–2002	Yes	No	Many	No
Japan	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Laos	1990–2002	1990	Yes	No	Many	Yes
Malaysia	1990–2002		Yes	Yes	Many	Yes
Maldives	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	Yes
Mongolia	1990–2002		No	No	Some	No
Nepal	1990–2002	1997–2002	Yes	No	Some	Yes
North Korea	1990–2002		No	No	Some	Yes
Pakistan	1990–2002	1995–1996	No	Yes	Many	Yes
Papua New Guinea	1990–2002	1990, 1992–1996	No	Yes	None	No
Philippines	1990–2002	1990–2002	No	No	Some	No
Singapore	1990–2002		No	No	Many	No
Solomon Islands	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
South Korea	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Sri Lanka	1990–2002	1990–2002	Yes	Yes	Some	No
Taiwan	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Thailand	1990–2002		Yes	No	Some	No
Vietnam	1990–2002		Yes	No	Some	Yes
Argentina	1990–2002		No	Yes	None	No
Bahamas	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Barbados	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Belize	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Bolivia	1990–2002		No	Yes	None	No
Brazil	1990–2002		No	No	Some	No
Chile	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Colombia	1990–2002	1990–2002	No	No	Some	No
Costa Rica	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Cuba	1990–2002		No	No	Some	Yes
Dominican Rep.	1990–2002		No	Yes	Some	No
Ecuador	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
El Salvador	1990–2002	1990–1991	No	No	None	No
Guatemala	1990–2002	1990–1995	No	No	Some	No
Guyana	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No

Country	Years Included	Intrastate Armed Conflict Incidence	Cleavage	State Religion ^a	Restrictions ^b	Persecution ^c
Haiti	1990–2002	1991	No	Yes	Some	No
Honduras	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Jamaica	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Mexico	1990–2002	1994	No	No	Some	No
Nicaragua	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Panama	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Paraguay	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Peru	1990–2002	1990–1999	No	No	None	No
Suriname	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Trinidad & Tobago	1990–2002	1990	Yes	No	None	No
Uruguay	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Venezuela	1990–2002	1992	No	No	Some	No
Angola	1990–2002	1990–2002	Yes	No	None	No
Benin	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Botswana	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Burkina Faso	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Burundi	1990–2002	1990–1992, 1995–2002	Yes	No	None	No
Cameroon	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Cape Verde	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Centr. Afr. Rep.	1990–2002	2001–2002	Yes	No	None	No
Chad	1990–2002	1990–1994, 1997–2002	Yes	No	Some	No
Comoros	1990–2002	1997	No	Yes	Many	Yes
Congo Brazzaville	1990–2002	1997–1999	Yes	No	None	No
Congo/Zaire	1990–2002	1996–2002	Yes	No	None	No
Equatorial Guinea	1990–2002		No	No	Some	No
Eritrea	1993–2002		Yes	No	None	Yes
Ethiopia	1990–2002	1990–1991, 1996–2002	No	No	Some	No
Gabon	1990–2002		Yes	No	Some	No
Gambia	1990–2002		Yes	No	Some	No
Ghana	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Guinea	1990–2002	2000–2001	Yes	No	None	No
Guinea Bissau	1990–2002	1998–1999	Yes	No	Some	No
Ivory Coast	1990–2002	2002	No	No	None	No
Kenya	1990–2002		Yes	No	Some	Yes
Lesotho	1990–2002	1998	Yes	No	None	No
Liberia	1990–2002	1990–1996, 2000–2002	No	No	None	No
Madagascar	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Malawi	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Mali	1990–2002	1990, 1994	No	No	Some	No
Mauritania	1990–2002		No	Yes	Many	No
Mauritius	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Mozambique	1990–2002	1990–1992	No	No	Some	No
Namibia	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Niger	1990–2002	1990–1992, 1994, 1996–1997	No	No	Some	No
Nigeria	1990–2002		Yes	No	Many	No
Rwanda	1990–2002	1990–1994, 1998–2002	No	No	Some	No
Senegal	1990–2002	1990, 1992–1993, 1995, 1997–2001	No	No	None	No
Sierra Leone	1990–2002	1991–2000	Yes	No	None	No
Somalia	1990–2002	1990–1996, 2002	No	–	–	–
South Africa	1990–2002	1990–1993	Yes	No	None	No
Sudan	1990–2002	1990–2002	Yes	Yes	Many	Yes
Swaziland	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No
Tanzania	1990–2002		No	No	None	No
Togo	1990–2002	1991	Yes	No	None	No
Uganda	1990–2002	1990–1991, 1994–2002	Yes	No	None	No
Zambia	1990–2002		Yes	Yes	None	No
Zimbabwe	1990–2002		Yes	No	None	No

^a In 2001; ^b Some: 1–2 restrictions, Many: 3–5 restrictions (in 2001); ^c In 2001

APPENDIX 2

Correlations between Variables in Empirical Analysis

	Civil War Incidence	Religious Cleavage	State Religion	State Religion * Cleavage	Restrictions	Restrictions * Cleavage	Persecution	Persecution * Cleavage	State Religiosity	State Religiosity * Cleavage	Regime Type	Regime Type (sq)	GDP per capita (ln)	GDP Growth	Oil Exporter	Mountainous Terrain (ln)	Population Size (ln)	New State
Civil War Incidence	1																	
Religious Cleavage	.075	1																
State Religion	.050	-.209	1															
State Religion * Cleavage	.136	.300	.372	1														
Restrictions	.125	-.082	.575	.244	1													
Restrictions * Cleavage	.134	.541	.107	.620	.372	1												
Persecution	.148	.031	.217	.162	.478	.293	1											
Persecution * Cleavage	.086	.341	.041	.336	.219	.608	.588	1										
State Religiosity	.173	-.024	.492	.256	.816	.395	.879	.496	1									
State Religiosity * Cleavage	.113	.642	.029	.534	.259	.875	.447	.873	.439	1								
Regime Type	-.116	-.184	-.195	-.024	-.427	-.167	-.309	-.148	-.409	-.185	1							
Regime Type (sq)	-.236	-.265	-.006	-.067	-.112	-.123	-.103	-.067	-.127	-.143	.419	1						
GDP per capita (ln)	-.257	-.389	.085	-.040	-.060	-.147	-.197	-.140	-.155	-.215	.505	.636	1					
GDP Growth	-.120	-.004	.010	.043	.030	.062	-.020	.024	.003	.042	.045	.064	.094	1				
Oil Exporter	.038	.028	.216	-.007	.289	.108	.097	-.011	.218	.049	-.302	-.035	.044	-.014	1			
Mountainous Terrain (ln)	.174	-.033	.010	-.012	.095	.099	.208	.145	.188	.105	-.011	-.073	-.149	.007	.003	1		
Population Size (ln)	.274	-.006	-.074	.031	.159	.153	.134	.066	.162	.091	.085	-.013	-.103	-.001	-.023	.348	1	
New State	-.009	.003	-.055	-.032	-.012	-.002	.030	.047	.011	.028	-.058	-.088	-.001	-.118	.014	.035	-.033	1

APPENDIX 3

Restrictions Index: Reliability Analysis - Scale (Alpha)

Correlation Matrix

	Restrictions on Proselytizing	Restrictions on Places of Worship	Mandatory Religious Education	Restrictions on Conversions	Restrictions on Personal Status
Restrictions on Proselytizing	1				
Restrictions on Places of Worship	.60	1			
Mandatory Religious Education	.47	.40	1		
Restrictions on Conversions	.51	.38	.62	1	
Restrictions on Personal Status	.46	.31	.56	.47	1

N of Cases = 2121

Mean Correlation = .48

Alpha = .8149

APPENDIX 4

Descriptive Statistics: All Variables in Empirical Analysis (1990–2002)

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Civil War Incidence	2,147	0	1	.18	.384
Cleavage	2,147	0	1	.35	.476
State Religion	2,146	0	1	.26	.437
State Religion * Cleavage	2,147	0	1	.10	.304
Restrictions	2,099	0	5	1.26	1.620
Restrictions * Cleavage	2,099	0	5	.58	1.201
Persecution	2,133	0	8	.58	1.240
Persecution * Cleavage	2,133	0	8	.37	1.093
State Religiosity	2,099	1	11	3.93	3.446
State Religiosity * Cleavage	2,099	0	11	1.35	2.706
Regime Type	2,013	-10	10	2.02	6.962
Regime Type (sq)	2,013	0	100	52.54	33.807
GDP per Capita (ln)	1,976	3.9	11	7.48	1.617
GDP Growth	2,009	-52	101	1.20	7.398
Mountainous Terrain (ln)	2,120	0	4.6	2.00	1.458
Oil Exporter	2,134	0	1	.14	.351
Population Size (ln)	2,147	5.6	13.9	9.00	1.584
New State	2,147	0	1	.02	.143
Peace Years	9,039	0	56	15.21	14.541
Valid N (listwise)	1,814				