

Globalisering: Spøkelse eller visjon?

Sissel Lie og Kjersti Falder Lishaug (red.)

Who Let the Dogs Out? Globalization, Culture and Change

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In contrast to several other contributors at this conference¹, I have found some utility and fun in contrasting the two caricatures of globalization offered by the title of this conference, "*Globalization: Ghost or vision?*" To avoid misunderstanding, let me be perfectly clear at the outset: I'm not suggesting that this utility is derived from the ability of these caricatures to provide useful descriptions of contemporary cultural (or political or economic) phenomenon and their developments over time. Rather, the ghost/vision dichotomy provides us with perceptual categories that allow some perspective on my own (and my colleagues') methodological priors to the study of globalization.

In this way, I want to use the ghost/vision dichotomy of globalization to characterize two different approaches to the study of globalization—approaches that correspond in a very rough fashion to the different academic traditions of the humanities and the social sciences. While I'm confident that denizens of each professional school of thought, be they students of the humanities or the social sciences, will feel great unease from being depicted in this way, the caricatures can be used to locate and distance ourselves in relation to these concepts. With the perspective that this distance provides, we can—in looking-glass fashion—juxtapose these caricatures to reflect back upon the methodological biases of our disparate traditions and their approach to the study of globalization.

In other words, I have used this opportunity to reflect on the various ways in which different academic approaches address their respective subject matters. In doing so, I risk boring one audience in emphasizing the obvious, while (concomitantly) shocking the other by alluding to its methodological undergarments. In considering culture in this way, I am forced to stray from the familiar territory of my own branch of social science. Along my journey I collect methodological relics from neighboring sites, with the aim of bringing them home to display in new surroundings. This is the beauty and fun of trying to straddle the barriers that separate.

In short, in the argument that follows I suggest that both caricatures of globalization (ghost and vision) are possible, and they are facilitated by different methodological traditions in the social sciences and humanities, respectively. Though it may appear to be initially counter-intuitive, I will suggest that there is a professional bias among social scientists that lead us to capture globalization in the image of a ghost (or specter), whereas the methodological vantage point of the humanities allows us better to see the vision of globalization. This distinction is not just academic, but has real and important political consequences.

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Who Let the Dogs Out?

I can think of no better phantom of globalization than the ubiquitous sound of the *Baha Men*'s "Who Let the Dogs Out?"² Here is a dirty, pushed by MTV, Disney and Nickelodeon, until it became part of pop culture's vernacular across the globe. In the year 2000, the album dominated the US Top Ten (and went Top Ten in eleven other countries), reaching triple-platinum status in just four months; in that same year it won the Grammy for "Best Dance Recording", the Billboard Award for "World Music Album of the Year" and "World Music Artist of the Year" and the Nickelodeon Kids Choice Award for "Favorite Song".³ I speak from experience when I say that there were few corners of the globe, at the turn of the millennium, where one could escape from the barking refrain of: "Who? Who? Who?"

Who Let the Dogs Out? can be interpreted as a mindless, lowest-denominator, global marketing success that came to dominate over local, indigenous forms of cultural expression.⁴ When we think about globalization in this way, we juxtapose a global phantom (amorphous and meaningless, but backed with superior marketing firepower) against an implicit caricature of the local (colorful, unique, but defenseless). The success of the *Baha Men* is then seen as a threat to some imagined, virginal, cultural artifact.

This depiction is itself a characterization of, and informed by, modernity, and the modern approach to social studies.⁵ Cultural, political and economic concepts are sterile and rigid, standardized, and tightly linked to specific territorial (national) spaces. In this tradition, cultural stereotypes, while crude caricatures, are used as rules-of-thumb, accurate enough to provide the cultural observer with simple ways of categorizing vast amounts of information. They also provide firm ground on which individuals (and nations) anchor their identities.

Consider an example close to home. Norwegians can be understood as *bunad*-wearing, *Hardanger*-fiddling, *brunost*-eating, social democrats. The distance we fathom between the Norwegians we meet daily on the street and the cultural stereotype captured above can be explained by the influence of foreign (read global, or American—if you will) forces. Unique cultural categories are swept away in the rush toward global cultural convergence. In this way, the influential modern anthropologist, Margaret Mead, spoke of her singular concern that we are drifting to a more homogeneous world—to a blandly amorphous and singularly generic modern culture, with no rivals.

This sort of convergence can also be interpreted without leaving the modern perspective, though it is not always couched in such negative terms. Most famously, it can be found in the prescient remarks of Marx and Engels, in the *Communist Manifesto*:

"In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse

in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world literature."⁶

For 19th century Communists, after all, this global convergence was understood as a liberating, optimistic process as it laid the foundations for a new, more equal, society. Globalization was a vision that would bring liberation. Indeed, for Marx and Engels, the *specter* that was haunting Europe—the specter of Communism, was not a ghost that terrified the worker, the environmentalist or the unemployed. The specter haunted Europe's political and economic elite. How far we've traveled (but in a circle!)⁷

In the 20th century, this optimism was again evident in the work of political scientists, economists and sociologists of modernist persuasion. Not unlike Marx and Engels, these authors credited convergence to the forward march of technical/scientific knowledge and efficient markets. For example, Clark Kerr (and a group of influential labor economists) developed an industrialism hypothesis, where a society's need for the most effective technology of production led to a convergence of social systems to the norm of "pluralist industrialism".⁸ More famously, perhaps, was Daniel Bell's influential argument for the *End of Ideology*.⁹ With a similar grounding in scientific/technical progress, Bell predicted a service revolution and the rise of a service class that would transform society. The older humanistic ideologies, themselves a product of the 19th and early 20th century, were losing their utility; a new, post-industrial society would challenge geographic and national constraints. Most recently, of course, we find a similar conception in the work of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*.¹⁰

Not all modern observers have been wooed by this Siren's song. Max Weber's depiction of the *Spirit of Capitalism*¹¹ provides a much more sober depiction of the way in which rationalization and competition leads to social convergence. Famously, Weber suggested that the modern individual found himself caught in an iron cage, from which both the individual and his society had difficulty escaping. For the individual, the cage is represented by the fact that modern man is dominated by the making of money. For society as a whole, the cage was a complicated artifact of the world's increasing complexity. In a nutshell, this complexity ensured that the rationality of political and social leadership (so-called substantive rationality) would be overrun by the narrow rationality of the technician/bureaucrat (formal rationality). In the end, the vision of man would be subject to (and caged by) the efficiencies of the bureaucrat. When I try to get my students to picture the nature and scale of this cage, I simply ask them to imagine the BBC-sitcom, *Yes Minister!*, as a documentary.

Much of the spookiest literature on globalization draws on this tradition, in either of its two variants. Indeed, most of what might be called the first-generation of globalization pieces took

2. Baha Men, *Who Let the Dogs Out?* (S-Curve Records, 2000).

3. <http://www.s-curve.com/bahamen/>

4. I am not suggesting that music from the Caribbean is mindless. Indeed, most of the Baha Men's musical legacy should be understood in the way that they have revolutionized the *junkanoo* sound of the Bahamas. My point is that there is the "message" of this song is entirely unclear, and that the success of the song is more a tribute to the marketing savvy of Steve Greenberg than the musical or cultural qualities of the song (or the band) itself. If you disagree, I am soliciting meaningful interpretations of the lyrics (see the Appendix)—but I have yet to receive one.

5. I use this term advisedly, as it implicitly suggests that I will later juxtapose it with some sort of post-modern notion. While I am agnostic with respect to postmodern study, I prefer to see this distinction in terms of Ulrich Beck's 1st and 2nd modernity. See Ulrich Beck, *What is Globalization?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).

6. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), pp. 12-13.

7. For more reflection on the specters of Marx, see Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*. Translated by Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994).

8. Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and CA Meyers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Harvard University Press, 1960).

9. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

10. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

11. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958 [1904-5]).

modernization theory as their (often implicit) starting point.¹² Of course, I do not mean to suggest that this ghost of globalization studies can only be found on the trash heap of history. There remain observers who see the promise of international and efficient markets, and rejoice in the breaking down of protectionist barriers and divisive ideologies. Equally prolific are those that lament the loss of political, economic and cultural sovereignty in the face of the natural spread of faceless markets. Phantoms of both forms still reside in the old and comfortable house that is modernism.

In short, the legacy of modern social science makes it easy, even convenient, to capture the globalization phenomenon in the form of a ghost. Static, fragile, national conceptions of culture (or politics and economics, for that matter) are continually exposed to the corrosive efficiencies of the capitalist market. In effect, we remain prisoners in Weber's iron cage—though its bars have been pushed back, beyond, national borders.

Bricolage

The second characterization of globalization, as a vision, can be represented by a new collection from the French jazz musician, Erik Truffaz. In a song entitled "Magroum", on the 7th track of the *Manitis* CD,¹³ we hear the Tunisian singer Mounir Troudri introduce a track that includes an innovative and eclectic combination of musical traditions. This is truly a sound collage that challenges any attempt to provide easy (static) labels: the nationality, genre, and periodization of the piece are all fluid. "The innate concert between representation and abstraction, the crucial breakthrough of 20th Century art, palpable in the work of Picasso, Matisse and Klee, has a musical counterpart in jazz recordings such as *Manitis*."¹⁴

Consider the dilemma of national characteristics: As Erik Truffaz is a Frenchman, is this music somehow French? Does its "jazzy" connotation an American identity? Does Troudri's Islamic vocals make the music somehow Tunisian? Arabic? Does any one of these characterizations (or, all of them!) really do justice to what Truffaz is trying to accomplish? It seems to me that attempts such as these, at capturing the essence of this piece with reference to static national categorizations, come very near the social science equivalent to the Heisenberg's principle: the very attempt at capturing or positioning the phenomenon leads us to miss its dynamic component.

In the artist's own words, we are told his approach is about "Leaving space for silence, and thus for music, thus for the other." From the CD cover, we learn that "Manitis is the name of a generous man living in NYC... a man, like this music, arms wide open, to embrace the world and take it somewhere else. A music to welcome musicians of diverse origins, both musical and cultural."

In short, this characterization of globalization allows us to examine its potential: its vision. Truffaz's music is an innovative and imaginative blend of cultural impulses that creates a new layer of culture—something vibrant, interesting... something that confronts and challenges—that makes us reconsider and reflect on the limits of the classificatory schemes upon which we rely.

If we raise our glance above musical genres, and survey the larger landscape of culture (and

beyond that economics and politics), we see a world constantly in motion—where the very nature of culture and our identity (or politics or economics) is violated when we try to box it into simple, static, categories. And yet our conception of culture—the very way we in which we operationalize it—is in very static, and territorial terms: Norwegian culture, German culture, French culture, etc.

Let me offer my own personal experience with Norwegian culture; my foreignness may provide a unique perspective on the matter. At one level, nearly everything that I think of as Norwegian has a foreign legacy. My first experiences with Norway were long winter-time visits over bottomless cups of black coffee and plates of deep luscious *bleikake*, filled with exotic kiwis and bananas. Obviously, coffee, kiwis and bananas are not Norwegian in origin—but neither is the language used to converse over the very same board. To the foreigner sympathetic to cheap Danish alcohol, modern Bokmål seems a poor cousin to Danish. It is easy to trace the German origins of the Norwegian bunad and traditional folk tales (not to mention its educational system), or the English and French origins of its young political culture. If we scratch the surface a little bit more, it may be that the cheese-slicer (*ostehøvel*) is the only thing indigenous to Norway—but the Swedes even lay claim to its invention.

Let me hasten to point that my intent here is not to ridicule Norwegian culture—every culture has been stylized in this way. Rather, my aim is to ridicule the static nature of the cultural clichés that we have come to rely upon. Maybe another, more honest, example will help clarify matters.

Not too long ago it was possible to find the local town square alive with teenage skateboarders, draped in baggy pants, capped in *Bull's* red and black, wrapped in *Nike/Reebok/Adidas* confidence, and immersed in pounding *Hip Hop*. These kids are miles away from the culture, language, danger and vibrancy that is America's inner city; yet they've adopted the cultural brands of Chicago, LA and New York. In doing so, these skateboarders have created a hybrid culture by melding foreign inputs with their own local conditions and needs. Globalization can be understood as this reflective interaction between foreign and local. To understand the signals sent by local teens, we need to understand the foreign, the local, and the way in which they meld together. The un-careful, unreflective, cultural voyeur might easily misinterpret the dress, the music, the slang or the actions of the local skateboarder.

On this point, of course, I am not revealing any state (national?) secret or surprise. Indeed, at this point I am in great danger of preaching to the choir. One of the great advances of modern cultural theory, to quote Edward Said, "is the realization, almost universally acknowledged, that cultures are hybrid and heterogeneous, and... that cultures and civilizations are so interrelated and interdependent as to beggar any unitary or simply delineated description of their individuality."¹⁵ In contradistinction to the modern social scientific perspective, this vision of culture (or identity) is far from static—it is a complicated reflexive process that includes historical, social, intellectual and political processes, as well as the imagined constructions of oppositions, like them and us.

12. E.g., Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine, 1995); George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society*, Revised Edition (London: Pine Forge, 1996); Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State* (New York: Free Press, 1995); and even Jonathan W. Moses, "Abdication from National Policy

Autonomy: What's Left to Leave?" *Politics and Society* 22, No.2 (June 1994): 125-48.

13. Erik Truffaz, *Manitis* (Blue Note Records, 2001).

14. Javier Antonio Quintones Ortiz, "Review of *Manitis*," http://www.allaboutjazz.com/reviews/pf_r0402_039.htm

15. Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. With a new afterword (London: Penguin 1995 [1978]: 348-9).

To my mind, the best—most insightful—works on globalization employ this flexible notion of culture.¹⁶ John Tomlinson's work is a particularly good example.¹⁷ But this "anthropological" approach to social studies is increasingly being imported into the traditional venues of social science, with great success. Ulrich Beck's book, *What is Globalization?*,¹⁸ is a good example of the latter trend.

If we take a pliable and reflexive notion of culture as our starting point, then globalization offers a new and splendid vision of opportunity. Globalization ceases to be a one-way process of determination from the powerful to the meek (or the global to the local)—it opens the possibility for reflexive manipulation by the local and new—hybrid—identities. Globalization allows us to conceive of US-built Toyotas, Japanese Rap music, Russian democracy... the new loci of identity are not simply shadows of their former glory, nor simple imprints of global influences. These new identities are a collage, an imaginative blend, of the global and local. Seen from this perspective, globalization offers the vision of emancipation and assortment, not dominance and convergence.

Ghost or vision?

Is there any real basis to this distinction I make between the two visions of culture? After all, in my *Word* spell check, vision is synonymous with "apparition", which is—*itself*—synonymous with ghost, spirit, specter, phantom, and ghoul. Could it be that some people (and academic traditions) always see the glass as being either half full or half empty?

In this closing section I wish to argue why the ghost-apparition is the more common—especially among social scientists. But I will also suggest that this very image of globalization's ghost has a tendency to paralyze us with fear and political apathy. For these reasons, the distinction is not simply academic.

So far I have not described what I mean by globalization—but this is not out of disingenuousness: the opportunity didn't seem to present itself before now. But if we conceptualize globalization in terms of David Harvey's "annihilation of time and space", the modern vision of the ghost of globalization becomes increasingly problematic.¹⁸ With the advent of technical, political and market developments, the world has changed in significant ways that challenge many of the basic foundations of modern social science. It is not culture that is under attack of globalization, but the stylized and static way that we have conceived of it.

In short, these static taxonomies of the social science (and for that matter those that separate the social sciences), cannot be maintained in a world where conceptual boundaries are constantly probed and compromised.¹⁹ Yet, the modern social science perspective remains firmly anchored in three (interrelated) biases, that make it difficult to gauge the damage being wrought:

- *Methodological Nationalism*. Modern social science builds on what Beck calls the "containing theory of society", what Smith has called "methodological nationalism"²⁰ or what

others have called the "nationalist trap". Indeed, the modern social science tradition encouraged this sort of nationalist bias, and it has been integrated into our national systems of education, and the distinct orientations of academic disciplines. For all their differences, Marx, Weber and Durkheim all shared a nationalist bias. If you study sociology in Trondheim, the vast majority of the work and examples will be on (from) Norwegian society. If you study macroeconomics in Norway, the focus will be on understanding the Norwegian economy. The study of political science in Norway is dominated by the study of Norwegian political behavior (e.g., voting) or Norwegian institutional arrangements. Given this nationalist bias to most academic work, globalization will always appear threatening. But why prioritize the national?

- *Temporal*. The modern notion of time as linear and progressive also makes it difficult to break out of this perspective. For us, time passes as if it really abolished the past behind it.

"That theory of progress amounts essentially to a theory of savings banks," says Clio. "Overall, and universally, it presupposes, it creates an enormous universal savings bank for the entire human community, a huge intellectual savings bank, general and even universal, automatic, for the whole human community, automatic in the sense that humanity would make deposits in it and would never withdraw from it. And in the sense that the contributions would keep on depositing themselves, tirelessly, on their own initiative. Such is the theory of progress. And such are its blueprints. A step ladder."²¹

Since everything that passes is eliminated forever, our conception of time is unidirectional: as capitalization, as progress. With the temporal perspective of the modern observer, cultural convergence is a natural direction of the historical trajectory.

- *Scientific method*. This is a more tricky argument. I wonder if the method of social science doesn't bias us toward the modern apparition. To the extent that parsimony, taxonomy and universality are important for comparison (which, in turn, are central to the scientific project), these characteristics encourage us to prioritize static stereotypes. Consider, for example, the way in which social democratic states are frequently operationalized in terms of deficit-spending (as part of some sort of Keynesian demand management strategy),²² or a recent NUPI report that operationalized globalization in terms of precise indicators of FDI and investments in the OECD.²³ The (explicit) argument of these sorts of social scientific projects is that understanding globalization simply entails more precise measurement. With some reflection, however, it appears as though the observers' attempt to capture social democracy or economic sovereignty fails in the very attempt at capture: the object captured is no longer the object desired.

My point is not to belittle the social scientific project—I am myself a product and producer of social science. Rather, I wonder if the biases of modern science don't lead us away from alternative ways of understanding the world—ways that, perhaps, may lead us to better comprehend

16. For example, see Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990); M. Featherstone (ed), *Global Culture: Nationalism, globalization and modernity* (London, Sage, 1995); S. Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity." In S. Hall, David Held, and A. McGrew (eds), *Modernity and its Futures* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992); 274-316; and R. Robertson, "Glocalization: Time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity," in Featherstone et al. (eds.) *Global Modernities*, (London, Sage, 1995); 23-44, 1995).

17. John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).

18. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

19. Cf. Bruno Latour, *We have never been modern*. Translated by Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

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21.

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23.

A. D. Smith (1979) *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford).
Charles Péguy, "Clio. Dialogue de l'histoire et de l'âme paternelle" in *Oeuvres en prose*, pp. 93-309 (Paris: Gallimard, Éditions de la Pléiade, 1961), p. 129, as cited in Latour, *We have never been modern*, pp. 68-9.
In particular, I'm thinking of the work by Geoffrey Garrett—but this sort of operationalization is not at all unique to him. See his influential, *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Hermik Wieg, "How much Globalization? Reassessing the Growth of International Trade and Investments in the OECD" Report No. 241 (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institut, February 1999).

complex causal interactions. As science draws us away from alternative ways of knowing, we may lose the ability to imagine complex phenomena in ways that were more common to the "native": "The native is a logical hoarder, he is forever tying the threads, unceasingly turning over all the aspects of reality, whether physical, social or mental."²⁴

In addition to these structural biases, there are more basic psychological issues at stake. Like the head on Zarathustra's snake, this perspective on identity and culture is difficult to swallow. To suggest that our identity, our culture (not to mention our politics and economics) are fluid is to hint that human nature itself is not natural, stable and fixed—but a product of changing conditions—sometimes constructed, sometimes invented. We strive for some foundation upon which to anchor our identity—and patriotism, nationalism, and fundamentalism are conveniently stable. For these reasons, there would appear to be a systemic bias that leads us to choose the ghost from a line-up of globalization images.

I am left with a final question: the most speculative of all. If there is this sort of systemic bias to social scientific approaches to globalization and change, does it have any real consequence? As I am running out of space, I will have to be (conveniently) brief. I believe that the modern conception of culture (and the globalization ghost that haunts it) holds the following implicit threats.

First, the perspective is inherently conflictual: the world is seen to be made up of exclusive and fixed (territorial) entities, battling over a permanent divide. Every culture is seen to be a self-contained, natural entity; each is ethnocentric and fiercely loyal to its own (parochial) view of the world.²⁵ This parochial view of the world may be its greatest threat. Worse, as time and space shrinks, these exclusive differences are increasingly challenged. It is this perspective that leads Samuel Huntington to conclude (wrongly) that increased globalization will lead to a *Clash of Civilizations*.²⁶ Do not misunderstand me: the objective bases of difference are not in dispute; the danger lies in the *perception of difference* that is generated by this approach.

Second, the modern perspective tends toward political apathy:

"Globalization policies featuring an orchestrated global scare are thus intended to shake off the fetters not only of trade unions but also the national state, to deprive national politics as such of its power."²⁷

Jean-Marie Guéhenno speaks of the death of politics which arrives with the end of the nation (or, more famously, the End of Ideology—see above). From the modernist perspective, globalization suggests that there is neither the capacity nor desire to imagine any alternative to the national architecture of politics, economics and culture. From this perspective, globalization "has stricken all parties, all editorial departments, all institutions. Its main article of faith is not that

people must engage in economic behaviour, but that everyone and everything—politics, science, culture—should be subordinated to the primacy of the economic."²⁸

For these reasons I have, over the past decade or so, come to see the vision of globalization. It may be that familiarity breeds comfort: the frequency of the ghost's visits makes it less haunting. But I have come to believe that a vision of globalization provides me with vantage points that confound national taxonomies. This vision breaks down the iron cage of modernity, with its tight little compartments: the economic, the political, the social, the ethical, the environmental...

Escaping from the now-rusty cage of modernity allows us the freedom to cross barriers that once separated cultures, identities, even musical genres—affording us great perceptual possibilities. With this vision it is possible to imagine a world where a traditional country-gospel singer can find success and re-birth in the grunge lyrics of *Soundgarden's* Chris Cornell.

Johnny Cash's rendition of "Rusty Cage"²⁹ reminds us of the freedom of a world where the boundaries separating musical genres (and more broadly, economics, politics and culture) are diffuse and pliable. In my search to confirm these impressions, I stumbled across a minefield of musical reviews, most of which began with some curt expression of their (prior) contempt for country music. With "Rusty Cage", Johnny Cash breaks out of the iron cage that held him captive for most of his long career. In the doing, he illustrates the fragility of modernity's hold. Weber's iron cage has become rusty and weak from exposure to globalization, even an old, now dying, man-in-black can imagine a life beyond the bars:

*I'm gonna break
I'm gonna break
I'm gonna break my rusty cage and run*

24. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Savage Mind* (1962, 1966), p. 267.

25. This is not just a characteristic of "modern" cultures. Indigenous peoples are also prisoners to their own perspective. Consider three examples: 1) Many indigenous peoples refer to themselves simply as "the people"—every one else is, by definition, non-people; 2) The etymological roots for barbarian is the word *barbarous*, which means "one who hables"; and 3) the Aztecs believe that those who can't understand Nahuatl are mute. Nor should it be limited to single ethnic groups—as Edward Said has so masterfully shown.

26. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993): "...the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations" (p. 25).

27. Beck, *What is Globalization?*, p. 3.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

29. Johnny Cash, *Unchained* (American Recordings, 1996).

Appendix

Who Let the Dogs Out

(A. Douglas)

C

Who let the dogs out
Woof, Woof, Woof, Woof, Woof
Who let the dogs out
Woof, Woof, Woof, Woof, Woof
Who let the dogs out
Woof, Woof, Woof, Woof
Who let the dogs out

V1

The party was nice the party was pumping
Ah Yepce Ah Yo
And everybody having a ball
Yepce Ah Yo
Till them man them start they name calling
Yepce Ah Yo
Then them girls respond to the call
I hear a woman shout out...

Chorus

Last year in the dance you had a ball
You call me millibog and sketell
Get back gnuffy, mash scruffy
Get back you flea infested mongrel

V3

Now I tell meh self den man go get angry
Ah Yepce Ah Yo
To hear dem girls calling them canine
Yepce Ah Yo
But they say hey man dat is part of the party
Ah Yepce Ah Yo
Them woman in front and they man behind
I hear ah woman shout out...

Rusty Cage

(Chris Cornell)

You wired me awake
And hit me with a hand of broken
nails
You tied my lead and pulled my
chain

To watch my blood begin to boil

But I'm gonna break

I'm gonna break my

I'm gonna break my rusty cage and run

Too cold to start a fire

I'm burning diesel burning

dinosaur bones

I'll take the river down to still

water

And ride a pack of dogs

I'm gonna break

I'm gonna break my

I'm gonna break my rusty cage and run

His like a Phillips head into my brain

It's gonna be too dark to sleep again

I'm gonna break my rusty chains

I'm gonna break my rusty cage and run

When the forest burns along the road

Like God's eyes in my headlights

When the dogs are looking for their bones

And its raining icpickles on your steel shore

I'm gonna break

I'm gonna break my

I'm gonna break my rusty cage and run

RAP

If I was a dog

The party is on

I got to get my groove on

Cause my mind done gone

Can't you see the rays coming from my eyes

Walking through the place like Digi-man

Breaking it down

Me and my white tail

Short coat

Can't see color

Any color will do

I'll stick on you

That's why they call me pit bull

Cause I'm the man of the land when they see me

They say ooooooh

Chorus