Europe Today

A Twenty-first Century Introduction

Fourth Edition

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2011

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.
Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

CHAPTER 12

Migration in Europe

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The history of Europe is one of massive movements of people, either across Europe, beyond Europe, or (increasingly) into Europe. While these long-term trends provide an important backdrop, this chapter focuses on the nature of these flows today and on some of their most evident consequences.

To do this, we need to untangle the complex political and institutional weave that influences migration patterns in Europe today. In the process, we can learn of the two important roles that migration plays in the larger European project. The first of these is functional, in that free labor mobility plays a central role in the establishment of a common European market. The second role is more ideational, in that migration facilitates the creation of a common European identity. When German workers move to France, they gain perspective on their own national identities; they begin to see themselves less as Germans, and more as Europeans.

But there is a backside to the face of European identity, one more visible in recent years. Europe is scarred by a growing xenophobia, and many Europeans see their own identities and communities being threatened by foreigners. This fear is reflected in the rise of Europe's radical right and its calls to restrict immigration. In short, the European project both depends upon and is threatened by the foreigner at its doorstep.

This chapter aims to shine some light on Europe's inconvenient truth. It begins with a short introduction to the history of European migration patterns before offering a brief description of the nature of contemporary migration trends in Europe. The bulk of the chapter is then used to describe the complex and overlapping political geometry that regulates and channels these diverse flows. In this depiction, the European Union is just one of several relevant actors—but it is one that is playing an increasingly visible and important role. The third section considers the difficulty of integrating Europe's sundry faces into a common identity, while the forth section concludes.

Europeans on the Move

We begin by sketching out a historical backdrop. This backdrop can help us see how Europe's relationship with migration has changed over time and how that

relationship is neither particularly unique nor special. In fact, when we manage to wrestle a little distance between ourselves and the current context, we can see that the history of European migration follows a familiar pattern: over the course of 150 years, Europe has gone from a region that experienced net emigration to one that is now characterized by net immigration.

The history of Europe is full of migrant stories. From the middle of the sixteenth century until the French Revolution, Europe experienced a number of major population shifts, whether it was the repopulation of the German territories after the Thirty Years' War, the flow of migrants that followed the retreat of the Ottomans under Hapsburg rule, the opening up of the southern Russian plains for settlement, or the Baltic migration system that followed in the wake of the Hanseatic League.

The continent was also animated by more temporary migration flows, as rural populations moved around in search of better farmland, to follow the harvests, or to settle in towns and cities. Merchants and skilled artisans moved from town to town selling their wares and skills—or they were tempted to settle in new areas following the incentives offered by enterprising political elites. To give you an idea of the size of these flows, consider the growth of a major European city. From 1600 to 1650, Amsterdam is said to have grown from 60,000 to 175,000 people! This expansion could not have occurred by natural population growth alone—the town was filling up with the likes of German workers, Norwegian sailors, French refugees, and Spanish traders. With industrialization, the opportunity for temporary migration increased along with the ease of transport. Large industrial projects—such as the digging of canals or the construction of railway and road networks—required workers to travel, often to faraway places.

With time, these local and regional migration patterns became increasingly international. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, before World War I, millions of Europeans left the continent in search of a better life. As a percentage of population, the Irish, Norwegians, and Italians were most prone to intercontinental emigration, but their examples were followed by many across Europe. In the century after 1820, it is estimated that about 55 million people left Europe to settle in the New World.

This story of Europe, as a source of emigration, is well told and understood—but this period of the Great Atlantic Migration tells another story, less often heard. While large numbers of Europeans left for the New World, even larger numbers stayed in Europe but moved within the continent. Small landowners moved into towns, skilled artisans and workers moved to markets that still appreciated their skills, and unskilled workers of all sorts moved to Europe's growing industrial centers in search of employment. Given the nature of this emigration, its size is more difficult to trace: the migrants were not collected in large, oceangoing vessels, with clear and explicit destinations. But we know that intra-European migration was large and varied: England attracted

workers from Ireland, Switzerland from Italy, Germany from Poland and Italy, and France from wherever she could find them. Indeed, France was already a major importer of labor before World War I and was a country of immigration when the rest of Europe was experiencing net emigration. Whatever the reason, we find it convenient to remember the exodus from Europe to the New World while forgetting about the even larger migration streams that crisscrossed Europe at the same time.

After World War II, the same sort of bias in perspective is evident: our attention is drawn to the immigrant experience in Europe. We know that Europe has turned from exporting to importing its workers, and this transition introduces significant challenges. But we must not forget that Europe maintains a heavy ballast of internal migrants, of Europeans moving from one state or region to another. While the external balance may have changed over time, pan-European migration has remained an important and relatively constant feature on the face of European politics.

State of the Union

Before exploring the tricky politics of European migration, we can begin with a simple demographic snapshot. This picture gives us a glimpse of the nature and scope of migration in Europe, lending a backdrop for the discussion that follows.

In 2006, about 3.5 million people moved to a new country within the EU-27.[1] This is a remarkably large number of people—but what does the figure actually capture, and how has it changed in recent years? Of these 3.5 million people, a slight majority (52 percent) came from non-EU countries (roughly distributed across world regions), 34 percent came from other EU member states, and the remaining 14 percent were people returning home after living abroad. Across the EU-27, the rate of immigration is about 7 per mill (‰), that is, 7 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants.

Of course, people are leaving Europe as well, so if we look at the net migration level in the EU-27, we see more sobering numbers: slightly less than 2 million people (net) entered EU member states from a foreign country. This constitutes much less than 1 percent (actually 0.39 percent) of the total number of inhabitants in the EU-27 that year (2007). As is evident in figure 12.1, this trend jumped around the turn of the millennium, but it now seems to have stabilized.

In 2007, most of these immigrants ended up entering Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom. But the heaviest hit states (in terms of the size of the immigrant flow relative to the population) were in Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, and Luxembourg, as seen in figure 12.2. These countries experienced immigrant inflows that represented about 1.5 percent of their respective populations. Outside of

Figure 12.1 Net Migration, EU-27



Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2009 (Brussels: EU): 168.

the EU, Iceland, Switzerland, and Norway were also exposed to significant immigration.

Figures 12.1 and 12.2 capture the foreigner's most common means of entry into European states: worker migration, family reunion, and as students. These figures reveal a very broad measure of immigration, but there are two additional categories of migrants that fall outside these statistics: refugees and irregular migrants.

Figure 12.2 Net Migration in 2007, by Country



Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2009 (Brussels: EU): 169.

A refugee is someone who has been granted a right to live in a country because the authorities suspect that he or she will suffer persecution at home (e.g., on account of race, religion, nationality, class, group, or even political opinion). This right is granted under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. States that have signed this convention—including all states in Europe—are obliged to take in refugees: this is not something they are allowed to steer for political gain. But signatory states do evaluate asylum claims to see whether they are legitimate. To gain access, then, a person must first apply for asylum, and the host state is obliged to grant asylum if the applicant can show that she or he meets the convention's criteria. As a result of this process, there is a wide spectrum of different types of immigrant status that fall under the refugee rubric.[2]

The size of the asylum stream into Europe is surprisingly small when compared to the more general migration figures shown in figures 12.1 and 12.2. In 2006, the EU-27 received just less than 200,000 asylum applicants, with France, the UK, Sweden, and Germany receiving the largest numbers. This compares to the EU's 3.5 million total immigrants (or roughly 2 million net immigrants). On top of this, about 60 percent of asylum applications are rejected by EU-27 member states. Thus, while the number of asylum seekers is relatively small to start with, an even smaller number of them makes it through the verification process: only about 55,000 refugees were granted protection by EU member states in 2006. This is a remarkably small number of refugees, from a world mired in political conflict, for an area whose total population exceeds 500 million people! Nonetheless, as refugees tend to receive much critical media attention, the public's perception of their numbers is almost always larger than they actually are.

The third remaining source of foreigners is more difficult to measure: this is the stream of undocumented immigrants to Europe. While some rough flow counts are available, attempts at measuring irregular migrant stocks are somewhat more reliable. To take one example, the Hamburg Institute of International Economics estimates that there were between 1.9 and 3.8 million irregular foreigners living in the EU-27 in 2008.[3] This represents somewhere between 0.39 and 0.77 percent of the total population. To get a feel for the size of this irregular stock, Eurostat's estimate of the share of the (regular) foreign-born population in the EU-27 was about 8 percent in that year.

When we combine these three different sources of immigration, we realize that a lot of people are moving around Europe today. A very rough count (including both regular and irregular immigrants and refugees) puts the total (gross) number at around 4.5 million people a year. Roughly 1.7 million of these are people moving within Europe, from one European country to another. This means that a substantial number of foreigners have been arriving in Europe for some time, and we can expect their numbers to accumulate. For this

reason, it is important to be familiar with the size of Europe's foreign population stock.

Figure 12.3 presents the share of foreign residents, by state, across Europe in 2009. On average, for the twenty-five member states included in the dataset (for unknown reasons, Belgium and Romania are not included), foreigners make up about 8 percent of the total European population. This average was spread across Europe, with small states such as Luxembourg, Latvia, Cyprus, and Estonia (and non-EU member, Switzerland) reaping the largest shares. This handful of states at the deep end of integration suggests that the distribution of the share of foreigners across Europe reflects the history (the foreign populations of Latvia and Estonia are predominantly Russian) and size of these countries, as much as any evidence of a move toward greater labor market harmonization.

In fact, Europe's share of foreigners is not all that large by international standards. Compared to other world regions, such as North America and Oceania, the broader European migrant stock was relatively small, at 9.5 percent of the population (see table 12.1). This level is especially low when one realizes that the European figures include migrants from other member states of the European Union. On the other hand, compared to Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Europeans do host many foreigners.

There is a substantial amount of migration within and across Europe. Most of this movement comes from beyond Europe's common borders—in the form of broad-based immigrants, refugees, and irregulars. But a significant share consists of fellow Europeans moving around within the EU. The next section

Figure 12.3 Share of Foreign Population by State, 2009



Source: Eurostat 2010.

Table 12.1 International Migration Stocks by World Region, 2010

	Number of Migrants	*Migrant Share (% of Population)*
L. America & Caribbean	7,480,267	1.3
Asia	61,323,979	1.5
Africa	19,263,183	1.9
Europe	69,819,282	9.5
N. America	50,042,408	14.2
Oceania	6,014,693	16.8

Source: United Nations, *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*, United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2009, online at http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1.

seeks to unravel the complex political constellations that channel these migration flows in, and around, Europe.

Levels of Difference

The challenge of understanding European migration patterns lies in the fact that there is no one political authority, or no single set of rules, that applies to each type of migrant. Thus the rules affecting migration between EU member states are different from the rules affecting migration between nonmember states and member states. Worse, those rules can change from member state to member state, and from one type of migration to another. For this reason, it is rather optimistic, even misleading, to speak of an EU migration regime. What we have is a complex, multilevel geometry of political authority governing European migration. The task of this section is to make sense of this confusion.

The easiest way to do this is to break the migrant stream down into three component types: European migration, international migration, and asylum. At this level of generality, one can begin to see the different rules, and constellations of power, that are relevant for understanding the size and nature of the component flows.

EUROPEAN MIGRATION

European migration refers to migrant streams within Europe, but across national borders.[4] This realm is usually seen as the domain of EU politics, as it was one of the fundamental rights secured in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. As such, worker mobility is understood to be an integral part of the logic of Europe's

market integration: workers need to be able to move across national borders as freely as do capital, goods, and services.

But this interpretation privileges the European Community. Mobility is a right that is also enjoyed by other workers, whether they originate in nonmember EU states or from further abroad. Already in 1953, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, subsequently the OECD) adopted a rule that facilitated movement across member states: when a job opened up, native workers were given priority for a specified period of time (usually four weeks), after which foreign workers were allowed to compete on an equal footing with native workers. In the following year (1954), the Nordic countries entered into a formal agreement that secured a common labor market across signatory states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). Also, several individual states in Europe had remarkably liberal immigration laws in the immediate postwar period (e.g., Switzerland and the UK). In short, worker mobility is not some sort of gift from the European Union—it is an ambition that precedes the Treaty of Rome and one that has found a home in several multinational organizations across Europe.

Still, the Treaty of Rome is often used as a road sign to mark the advent of a European common labor market, and the EU is clearly the most important political mover on this front today. The 1957 treaty embraced the free movement of labor within Europe, and—just as importantly—it provided mobility rights for workers from other member states.

Immediately after World War II, the Treaty of Rome and the OEEC agreement proved insufficient for meeting the labor needs of Europe's growing economy. For this reason, member states found it necessary to open their labor markets by way of a number of bilateral guest-worker agreements, which extended these mobility rights to workers from other countries. Individual states in Europe signed agreements with other states (both within Europe and across the Maghreb) to facilitate temporary migration.

Since then, there has been much progress (and resistance!) in securing a borderless labor market for European workers, and a more secure and fortified border for keeping low-skilled foreign workers at bay. (As we shall soon see, these are two sides of the same coin.) Today, European legislation grants all EU citizens the right to move and settle with their family to any other member state, so long as they are able to support themselves.

The problem is that this EU-wide system applies to more than just EU member states. Actually, when speaking about European-wide labor markets, it is more accurate to refer to the European Economic Area (EEA), created in 1994, and which includes EU member states plus EFTA member states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway).[5] Add to this the fact that Swiss voters passed a referendum in 2005 that allowed them to participate in this common labor market (effective December 2008). Finally, several non-EU microstates (such as Monaco, Lichtenstein, San Marino, and the Vatican City) participate de facto in

the European labor market, as they enjoy open borders with neighboring states that are already integrated into the broader EEA area. Thus, when we speak about a European migration regime, we refer to the mobility rights that exist between most of the EU member states (more on this later), plus the EFTA states, plus Switzerland and the microstates. For this reason, it is more accurate to refer to this area as the EEA+.

Locating the political center of gravity for this variable geometry of European migration issues is anything but straightforward. It tends to shift with the issue space: sometimes it is located in the EU, sometimes it is not. The heterogeneity and institutional rigidities of the EU make it difficult to secure consensus on contentious issues—even when they reflect the core values agreed to in the Treaty of Rome. For this reason, EU member states sometimes find it more convenient to work outside the EU's political framework.

This sort of difficulty is clearly evident in the history of the Schengen Agreement—the original pilot project for today's borderless Europe. In the mid-1980s, the EC's ten member states could not agree among themselves about how to further liberalize the borders that separated them. Five of these states—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany—became impatient with the lack of progress and set out on their own path to a borderless Europe. In 1985, these states met to sign an agreement on a riverboat in Schengen, Luxembourg—an agreement that would remove physical border controls among signatory states. In 1990, this agreement was made into a convention, and other states (both EU member states and not) began to join the club. In 1991, Italy signed the convention, followed by Spain (1992), Portugal (1992), Greece (1995), Austria (1995), and in 1996 the Nordic countries—including the nonmember states Iceland and Norway. It was only with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999—fourteen years later—that the Schengen Convention was integrated into the EU framework, introducing the Schengen *acquis*.

Since 1999, most of the remaining EU member states have embraced the Schengen idea, if not all its glory. Indeed, most of the subsequent signatory states have only agreed to certain aspects of the larger dream. The original Schengen Agreement was about abolishing border controls and checks among signatory states and creating a unified external border where common rules of entry into the Schengen Area were to be carried out. To facilitate this common border control, signatory states needed to pool and share information in what is now known as the Schengen Information System (SIS) and its supporting network of Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry (SIRENE) offices. (EU bureaucrats have an odd affinity for unwieldy names, so long as they produce sexy acronyms.) This framework, in effect, instituted a system for sharing relevant political and legal information among signatory states.

After the Amsterdam Treaty, most new signatory states to Schengen have only agreed to the police- and judicial-cooperation elements of the treaty—they

have not yet agreed to drop their border guards. In other words, one could argue that the police forces of new member states have gained more than their ordinary workers. This is true of the UK (2000), Ireland (2002), and each of the ten new member states in 2004. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, only Switzerland (a non-EU member state) has agreed to full membership in the Schengen Agreement (in 2004, pulling Lichtenstein in with it).[6]

Neither does this area of free mobility apply to workers in all states equally. Old members of the European club have always treated new members with equal doses of caution and suspicion, and the EU has allowed states to employ restrictions on migrants coming from new member states. Thus workers from Greece, Spain, and Portugal were not allowed access to the whole of the European labor market until six years after joining (i.e., Greece in 1987, Spain and Portugal in 1992). The argument for limiting these member state rights was the need to ensure that labor migration from poorer states did not have a sudden and inverse impact on older member state economies. In practice, these concerns proved to be overblown, but that has not stopped today's member states from exploiting the precedent.

Two of the new member states in 2004 managed to avoid this fate. Malta and Cyprus secured immediate access for their workers in the European labor market. But the other eight new members, the A8,[7] met a colder reception (like Greece, Spain, and Portugal before them). A number of protectionist measures were allowed by the EU, as it did not require existing member states to open their labor markets to A8 workers until seven years after their joining (i.e., 2011). In effect, the new member states were not granted full access to EEA + labor markets unless individual member states granted them dispensation.

Several EEA + states have done just that. Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the UK allowed immediate access to workers from the ten new member states. Other states agreed to a variable timeline: some member states agreed to a two-year moratorium (Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy); others to three years (the Netherlands, Luxembourg); four years (France); or five years (Belgium and Denmark); while still others chose to protect their domestic labor markets until the entire grace period had expired (Germany and Austria). Thus EU membership for these eight countries did not offer immediate or full access for their workers, only the promise to secure that access over time.

In theory, worker mobility rights in the EEA + are impressive. And it is important not to belittle this remarkable and admirable achievement: the opportunities available to millions of workers and their families have been expanded significantly. In practice, however, these rights are too often curtailed by a number of factors. Migrants must be able to prove that they have sufficient means to support themselves (and their families), and member states retain the prerogative to determine nationality and citizenship laws. These constraints, in addition to the barriers of culture and bureaucratic/legal entanglement, mean that the European labor market remains very rigid.

To understand the nature of these constraints, we might look at them from the perspective of a fictional worker. Imagine that you are an unemployed real estate agent from Portugal in search of work in Germany. As an EEA+ citizen, you have a right to enter any other EEA+ member state (including Germany) on presenting a valid form of identification. You can then stay there for six months. At the end of this period, you will need to apply for permission to stay, and that permission will depend on your ability to show one of the following four things: (1) that you are working or self-employed; (2) that you are not a drain on Germany's resources (i.e., that you have enough resources, including health insurance); (3) that you are enrolled in a vocational school (and have the financial support necessary to continue); or (4) that you are a family member of someone who meets one of the three previous requirements. If you meet these criteria and stay for five years, you can then gain a right to permanent residency.

But the constraints do not end here. There are a whole slew of informal constraints that are difficult to overcome. The most striking of these is the formidable language barrier that separates Portuguese from German. And before you move, you will need to check to see if your Portuguese realtors' license is valid in Germany, and you'll have to learn the very different ways that the German real estate market works compared to the Portuguese market. You will need to consider the difficulty of transferring your pension credits and social security benefits, and the very different tax regimes in both countries.

To put this in a comparative perspective, I'll make this personal. Several years ago, I moved from Seattle to Los Angeles to pursue my graduate career. I found the move difficult, not only because I missed the rain. Everything from the traffic rules to the tax code seemed to be different in these two states. Despite these challenges, I was still speaking the same language, still paying taxes to the same federal government, and I didn't even need to change my television news provider (or, more importantly, my brewer). The nature of the constraints facing a Portuguese migrant to Germany is of a whole different order of magnitude.

The European Union is completely aware of these difficulties and how they limit the options available to workers (and the degree of mobility that they can hope to entice). Europe cannot expect to experience the same level of mobility found in the United States—not to mention the degree of mobility we find for capital, goods, and services. But the EU has worked hard for several years (if not decades) to try and minimize these barriers. Already in 1996, the Commission set up a High-Level Panel on the Free Movement of Persons, which identified a number of barriers to mobility and produced eighty (!) recommendations, many of which were included in the Commission's 1997 Action Plan for the Free Movement of Workers. This action plan has been succeeded by others, but the barriers to free mobility across the EEA+ area—although shrinking—remain formidable.

But the level of migration across European states remains remarkably low. This is especially problematic for a region where many of these states share a common currency, the euro, as labor mobility and wage flexibility are important means for regional economic adjustment within a common currency area. Labor market integration is a necessary and integral part of the attempt to create a common European-wide market. The asymmetries in this market allow European firms and capital much more freedom of mobility compared to European workers. Compared to the United States, for example, EU citizens are about half as mobile: over the last ten years, 38 percent of EU citizens changed residence, but only about 4 percent of these moved to another member state.[8]

As mentioned briefly in the introduction, the creation of a common labor market plays an important role in the larger European project. The lack of real mobility in Europe is a symbol of the difficulty in creating a common sense of identity and trust across nation-states with deep and conflict-filled histories. While much progress has been made, we still refer to Polish and Portuguese workers—not to European workers—even in an increasingly integrated European labor market.

NON-EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION

Europe's regulatory attitude toward immigrants from beyond the EEA+, so-called third-country nationals (or TCNs), is even more chaotic. One reason for this is that the Treaty of Rome failed to mention external border controls. Another reason is that member states have long histories, some of which include colonialist pasts, and have several good reasons for maintaining special relationships with some third-country nationals. Not to be left out is the recognition that states are often leery of seceding political authority, and physical control of the border is seen by many as a core sovereign right.

It is for these reasons that the regulation of TCN immigration has been located mostly outside of the EU's legal framework: member states jealously guard this area of authority. But it is to this area—the effort to create a common immigration, asylum, and family-reunion policy with respect to TCNs—that the EU is devoting much of its current attention.

Despite these intentions and much supporting rhetoric, there remains remarkable variation across states in Europe with respect to their TCN immigration policies. To illustrate this variation, consider the immigration policies of two neighboring countries in northern Europe, both of which are EU member states: Sweden and Denmark.

Sweden has a remarkably liberal immigration policy with respect to TCNs. Indeed, as we saw in the discussion about Schengen, Sweden has embraced immigrant labor from the new member states as well. In December 2008, the Swedish government introduced new laws and regulations that allow Swedish

employers to hire TCN workers directly, if they are not able to find suitable workers in the EEA + labor pool.

In effect, the Swedish government is giving its employers a free hand to decide which workers are best qualified to do the required work. These employers—not the state—are then put in charge of processing the necessary residence and work permits based on their own assessment of needs. The Swedish Migration Board then ensures that the terms being offered (e.g., salary, insurance protection, and other terms of employment) are in accordance with the rules and standards applied to employees who are already in Sweden. As part of the reform, it has become easier to attend job interviews in Sweden, and permit periods are more easily extended to help match the supply and demand for labor in Sweden.

Just a stone's throw away, across the Kattegat, sits a state whose immigration policy has a much more colored reputation: Denmark. In practice, Danish immigration policy, with respect to skilled TCN workers, is not as restrictive as its reputation would have it. Indeed, the Danish authorities are very active in trying to attract highly skilled workers from outside of Europe, so long as they meet a number of specific criteria, collected under three rubrics: the Danish green-card system, which allocates temporary permits on the basis of age, education, work experience, and language skills; a "positive list," where certain occupations are fast-tracked; and a "pay limit scheme," which provides access to high-salaried foreign employees. But, in contrast to Sweden, the state is a very central actor (and gatekeeper) in this heavily-regulated system.

Denmark's isolationist reputation is earned not from its attitude toward foreign (and skilled) workers, but for its restrictive position with respect to family reunification. In particular, Danish immigration laws block family reunification for non-EU citizens residing in Denmark illegally and in cases where one of the spouses is under the age of twenty-four. Denmark also requires that family reunion applicants sign a declaration of integration before they are granted a right of entry.

In fact, a 2008 ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) challenged this law, to the annoyance of Denmark's authorities. The court's decision prompted Denmark's prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to declare, "Denmark determines its own immigration policy and it remains unchanged. . . . The government will not tolerate having its family reunification rules hijacked."[9] Fogh Rasmussen's rebuttal to the ECJ illustrates the challenges facing European Union authorities as they try to streamline and coordinate member state immigration policies. Immigration is a very high-profile and sensitive political issue, and elected national officials are hesitant to secede authority to the European Union, unless this secession brings with it a more restrictive policy that they can defend in front of skeptical constituents.

Despite the resistance of many member state governments, the EU has made much progress in coordinating member state policies and assuming

greater authority over wider areas of immigration policy. This evolving role is traced in table 12.2, where we can see immigration and asylum issues being increasingly consolidated under the EU's political mandate.

Given this rapidly changing distribution of authority and responsibility, it makes little sense to focus on the particular institutions involved in forming and implementing Europe's immigration policy. Needless to say, there is a dense network of committees, permanent representatives, and working groups—most of which are associated with the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council—producing a series of five-year action plans: Tampere (1999–2004), The Hague (2005–2009), and Stockholm (2010–2014).

For most Europeans, however, the authority of the European Union in these matters is most evident in its issuing of regulations, directives, decisions, and recommendations. It is important to note that these actions apply to both EU and EFTA states, even if the latter do not have any formal say as to how they are formulated. To illustrate the breadth of this reach, and its controversial nature, we can take a brief glimpse at three important directives, each on an important source of migration: European migration, family reunification, and irregular migration.

- The Services Directive (2004) is one of the most controversial directives to come down the European pipeline. The biggest magnet of controversy was a reference in the original draft to the so-called country-of-origin principle, under which companies registered in any member state could provide services abroad, but under the laws and regulations of the country in which they are registered. This destined the directive to become a focal point in a larger debate about social dumping in Europe. While the "country-of-origin" reference was dropped from the text of the revised directive, its political sting lingered, as it provoked intense debate and mass protests in several countries, including France, Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark. Indeed, the directive became a flashpoint for European integration; it was perceived as a critical test for the Commission's (liberalizing) agenda and a threat to the power of organized labor in Europe.
- The Directive on Family Reunion (2003) came to life only after a rather lengthy and controversial period of negotiation, as it concerns the right to family reunification for TCNs who reside lawfully in the EEA+. The directive sets out the conditions for entry and residence in the EEA+ area, the sort of demands that these states can make on TCNs, and the specific rights that family members have once reunification is granted (e.g., with respect to education and training). The controversial nature of the directive is underscored by the fact that it doesn't apply to all EEA states: Denmark, Ireland, the UK, and Switzerland are not subject to its provisions.
- The Returns Directive (2008) underwent three years of negotiations following the original Commission proposal before final adoption by the European

Table 12.2 Evolving EU Control over Immigration Issues

1976	Council of Ministers' Resolution encouraging member states to develop common immigration policies, in consultation with the Commission.
1985	The Commission issues a series of "Guidelines for a Common Policy on Migration." • But emphasis is on free mobility for EU citizens and equal treatment for all migrants (EU-citizen or not). Commission decision requiring member states to signal in advance future decisions relating to TCNs. • But member states challenged the decision in the ECJ, which delivers a compromise opinion.
1986	With the introduction of the Single European Act and its four freedoms, the Commission interprets "freedom of persons" to mean legally resident people. • But member states issue a declaration affirming their right to control immigration policy.
1992	The Maastricht Treaty attempts to introduce a common migration policy, based on a common asylum and immigration policy and control over a common external border (Art. K.1 EUV). • But the resulting institutional setup, with a third (intergovernmental) "pillar" to deal with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), effectively prevented this. Decisions needed to be unanimous, and were largely made outside EU institutions.
1999	The Amsterdam Treaty pushes immigration cooperation back to center stage, by incorporating the Schengen Agreement into the EU framework, and taking migration and asylum out of the JHA pillar (and away from intergovernmental cooperation) and into a new Title IV TEC* (concerning visas, asylum, immigration, and other policies related to the free movement of persons). The explicit competences were laid out in articles 62 through 64 and included things like responsibility for assessing asylum claims, action against undocumented migrants, procedures for granting/withdrawing refugee status, and the like. The ECJ was given jurisdiction over immigration issues (but only on referrals from high courts). • But UK, Ireland, and Denmark opt out.
2001	The Nice Treaty places visa, asylum, and immigration policy under the co-decision principle (where the Commission presents proposals, and the text is adopted if it secures the approval of the European Parliament and the Council, where member states vote by qualified majority, QMV). In particular, Article 61was amended to put a deadline on adopting measures aimed at ensuring free

Table 12.2 (Continued)

	movement within Europe and flanking measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, and immigration. • But the right of member states to determine access to their labor markets by (and integration of) TCNs remains unaffected by the treaty.
2004	FRONTEX, or the Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU, is created by a Council Regulation to coordinate the border security measures of member states.
2005	Commission green paper on the "EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration" aims to establish a common framework for economic immigration. For example, it proposes to adopt common admission criteria for TCNs, simplify entry procedures, and clarify the rights and legal status of the different types of migrants. It also emphasizes the importance of accompanying measures for ensuring the control of immigration.
2008	Commission creates a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) to prevent unauthorized border crossings, to reduce the number of deaths associated with irregular immigration, and to prevent cross-border crime.
2009	The Lisbon Treaty further increases consolidation: migration and asylum become, in effect, "normal" EU issues, with QMV in the Council, co-decision with the European Parliament, and the ECJ given complete jurisdiction (with referrals now from any-level court). In relation to specific measures, articles 77 through 80 set out provisions on borders, asylum, and migration. • But member states maintain an exclusive right to determine the number of foreign nationals admitted to their territory. Also, cooperation on integration is supplementary and not about the harmonization of laws. EU Blue Card is introduced. The Council adopts a directive to facilitate the entry and residence of TCNs with desired skills for employment in Europe. In effect, it introduces a fast-track procedure for issuing a special residence and work permit. • But UK, Ireland, and DK opt out.

* *TEC refers to the Consolidated Treaty establishing the European Community, i.e., the revised Treaty of Rome.*

Parliament. Its purpose is to lay down EU-wide rules and procedures on the return of irregular immigrants. It covers periods of custody, reentry bans, and a number of legal safeguards. EEA+ states are banned from applying harsher rules to irregular immigrants, but they are allowed to keep or adopt more generous rules. In any case, this legislation applies only after a decision has been taken by the national authorities to deport an illegal immigrant: that

is, each state retains the authority to decide whether it wishes to regularize or deport the immigrant.

As in the realm of European migration, considerable progress has been made toward establishing a legislative foundation and the institutions necessary to formulate and implement a common immigration policy for TCNs. Immigration and asylum issues have been taken out of an institutional setting that allowed states a veto over sensitive outcomes, and moved into a new institutional setting that is determined mostly by qualified majority voting. While substantial areas of national policy autonomy remain, and national politicians loathe ceding any more authority, the institutional framework now in place ensures that the EU can advance its common immigration policy.

ASYLUM

Europe believes that it must erect imposing and common barriers toward the outside world if its internal market is to work as planned. A common internal market implies a common external front. Given the political history of Europe's component states, it has proven quite difficult to secure consensus over the rules governing family reunion and immigration from TCNs. These sorts of constraints do not hinder Europe's common asylum policy, at least not to the same degree. It is for this reason that we see most progress on developing a common front in the area of Europe's asylum policy.

The willingness of states to cooperate has resulted in an ambitious attempt to standardize national approaches, processes, applications, and recognition of status for protection. The end result of this collaboration has been a generally more restrictive policy with respect to asylum across Europe—if only because the number of potential asylum havens has diminished, thereby limiting the opportunities available to asylum seekers.

Since the Amsterdam Treaty, one European agreement after the other has signaled an interest in creating a common European asylum policy. In particular, the Nice Treaty moved asylum issues from the third to the first pillar of European governance, allowing asylum decisions to be carried out by majority voting. This means that member states lost their right to veto policies that they oppose, accelerating the development of a common policy in this area. In short, the EU intends to create a common EEA-wide asylum system. This system would rely on a single procedure, mutual recognition of member state decisions, and the creation of an institutional hub at the European Asylum Support Office. So far, a European-wide asylum system rests on four important components:

- The first of these is known as the Dublin Regulation from 2003, the objective of which is to identify (as quickly as possible) the member state responsible

for examining an asylum application, to establish reasonable time limits for each of the phases of determining the member state responsible, and to prevent abuse of asylum procedures in the form of multiple applications. In effect, this regulation creates a one-stop asylum procedure, where asylum applicants are forced to make a claim in the first EEA+ state that they enter or pass through. The system is designed to prevent "asylum shopping" and, at the same time, to ensure that each asylum applicant's case is processed by only one member state. Thus, if you enter the EEA+ space through Italy but settle in Denmark, your application for asylum needs to be filed in Italy, and Italy alone.

- The second component of a European-wide asylum system is anchored in the Reception Conditions Directive (2003), which introduced minimum standards for reception and detention (e.g., access to information, labor markets, health care, etc.). The motivation behind the directive was to ensure that asylum applicants received a dignified standard of living, wherever they settled in the EEA+ area. This is especially important now that asylum seekers have lost their ability to choose the state that will examine their application (due to the Dublin Regulation, above).
- The third component lies in the Asylum Procedures Directive of 2005, where states are obliged to agree on minimum standards for processing asylum claims. In particular, the directive grants certain basic procedural guarantees (e.g., the right to a lawyer and interpreter, access to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], and the right to appeal).
- Finally, the Qualifications Directive (2004) establishes minimum standards for granting and withdrawing refugee status. The objective of this directive is to establish common criteria for identifying persons who need international protection (and to ensure that they are granted a minimum level of benefits). In particular, the directive provides minimum standards for protection from "refoulement" (the forced return of a person to a country where he or she faces persecution); maintaining family unity; and access to employment, education, health care, and so forth.

These four legislative steps have brought the European Union much closer to a common asylum policy, and the future will surely bring even more harmonization and streamlining. But there is still a very long way to go before Europe's asylum policies and practices are completely harmonized. National governments continue to wield significant power, and national practices are remarkably diverse.

This diversity can be seen in the different rates by which member states still reject (or, inversely, recognize) asylum claims. For example, in 2007, the rejection rate ranged from a low of just under 30 percent (in Poland) to 98.6 percent (in Greece). National differences are also evident in the very different ways that member states responded to recent asylum streams from Afghanistan, Iraq, and

Chechnya. In short, states interpret common regulations in different ways and employ derogation clauses that allow them to maintain national policies and interests. The end result is a lack of harmonization, both in terms of recognition and reception conditions.

Shades of Difference

Thus far I have aimed to paint a face of European immigration that is varied but not threateningly different. As we have seen, European immigration levels are not especially high in a global perspective, Europeans have been on the move for centuries, and a significant share of European migration comes from other European states.

My intent with this depiction is to temper a more common perception of Europe—a picture of Europe full to the gills with foreigners (mostly draped in burkas and turbans), and going quickly to hell in a handbasket. Foreigners are seen as a growing threat to romanticized images of the European polity, bringing with them values and social practices that threaten the essence of European traditions. This picture is familiar to anybody following European politics in recent years, and I would like to close this chapter by reflecting on some of the integration challenges facing Europe today.

THE RISE OF THE RIGHT

In recent decades, the radical right has gained significant political support in Europe. In almost every European country, it is possible to find a nationalist party that is poised to exploit voter dissatisfaction and alienation. The radical right has gained enough support to enter government coalitions in Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Vehement national parties can also be found in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia (though they are not yet strong enough to enter government).

This political landscape is marked by a number of important and influential political figures, whose political successes have rippled across Europe. In France, Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front has been the third-largest party for most of the millennium, and he was runner-up in the 2002 French presidential elections. In 2000, Jörg Haider—then leader of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria)—joined a coalition government that sent the European Union into a political frenzy. In the Austrian elections of 2008, far-right parties captured 30 percent of the vote, and in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV) finished as the third-biggest party in the country's 2010 elections.

The nationalist right is rising at the European level as well. In the June 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections, almost a million Brits voted for the British National Party (BNP), giving the party its first two seats in the EP. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' PVV won second place. Similar parties managed to gain around 15 percent of the European vote in Austria, Denmark, Hungary, and Slovakia.

These are complex and varied political movements, responding mostly to local conditions in each country. This makes it difficult to generalize about them. But they do share some common features, the most common of which are a very critical view of the current state of affairs and a strong and explicit distrust of foreigners, especially Muslims.

From an outsider's perspective, Europeans seem intent on provoking conflict. Danish newspaper editors gloated in their stubborn determination to publish offensive caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005. Voters in a 2009 referendum in Switzerland accepted a constitutional amendment banning the construction of new minarets. Across Europe, politicians debate whether and how to regulate the religious attire of their increasingly diverse populations (in an effort to liberate women from what they see as the tyranny of the veil). Clearly, something is amiss in Europe—and its problems seem to be connected to immigration.

WHERE'S THE BEEF?

The rhetoric of the radical right links its rise to increasing immigration to Europe. The net numbers lend some credence to this claim. As we saw in figure 12.1, net immigration to the EU-27 countries increased dramatically, more than doubling, at the turn of the millennium (although it has since leveled off). It could be that the intensity and pace of this immigration surge is driving European xenophobia. But this interpretation should be tempered by the realization that Europe's share of foreigners, as a percentage of population, is not particularly high from a global perspective, as we saw in table 12.1.

Neither is the size of Europe's Muslim population particularly high. Figure 12.4 ranks European countries by the share of their Muslim population. Here we see a very significant variation separating Ireland (0.01 percent) and Slovakia (0.02 percent) from France (10 percent) and Bulgaria (11.9 percent). On average, however, the percentage of the EEA + population that is Muslim is only about 2.2 percent.[10] This is very close to the 2.19 percent we find in North America and is not especially high or threatening in its own right. Given the remarkably small size of the Muslim population in Europe (2.2 percent!), it draws an inordinate amount of critical attention.

Whatever the reason, foreigners in Europe are treated differently. Evidence of this is seen in the variance in unemployment levels between foreigners and

Figure 12.4 Muslim Population



Source: Islamicpopulation.com (2008)

nationals across European labor markets. Figure 12.5 compares these unemployment spreads. Here we see that foreigners in the EU-27 average have an unemployment rate that is more than double that of EU-27 nationals (14.4 percent compared to 6.7 percent for nationals), but the spread differs remarkably across Europe, with Luxembourg and Belgium hosting the largest spread, whereas foreigners in Cyprus and Greece enjoy a lower unemployment rate than the natives (!), or the rates are indistinguishable.

In short, it would seem that Europeans have a difficult time integrating their foreigners—even in the labor market, where most of the EU's legal and political attention has been focused. To understand this difficulty, we need to glance back on the history of nationalism in Europe, and at the competing perceptions of how to control membership in Europe's national communities.

NATIONALISM AND INTEGRATION

Immigration has a long history of challenging traditional conceptions of community. This history is complicated, in that its effect works in two opposing directions. On the one hand, migrants provide a convenient benchmark for defining "the other." On the other hand, immigration forces communities to consider ways by which newcomers can (or cannot) be incorporated into that community.

The first lesson is clearly seen in the long history of European migration, as briefly traced in the introduction to this chapter. It is a history that has al-

Figure 12.5 Unemployment Spreads in Europe, by Country, 2008



Source: Eurostat 2010.

ways brought communities into contact with foreigners—whether they are from across the valley, the continent, or the globe.

Today we think of the foreigner in terms of religion or skin color, but differences can be spun out of almost anything (or nothing at all). Indeed, during earlier periods of (intra-European) migration, the migrant in question did not look or act any differently from his or her host: they often shared the same religion, diets, music, and traditions—but host communities still excluded the migrants as outsiders, as foreign. We have a remarkable capacity to find (and to generate) the differences we use to separate ourselves.

This primitive sentiment was exacerbated by a system of nation-states built on national myths. The modern nation-state system was born in northern Europe with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Its modern forms of citizenship were the result of a very European debate about the source of nationhood (and membership in the national community) and competing conceptions of how new members should be integrated into those national communities.

While these traditions are slowly eroding, they continue to influence the way that many Europeans think about membership and inclusion in the political community. These attitudes also hamper attempts by Europe's political elites to create a new common identity for all Europeans.

- *Citizenship.* There have been two main traditions by which membership in the political community was determined in Europe: *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. *Jus sanguinis* grants citizenship on the basis of ethnicity (it is Latin, meaning "right of blood"), so that a person gains access to citizenship by being born

of parents who are already citizens of the state. Traditionally, this has been the most common means of allocating citizenship in continental Europe, and Germany is usually seen as the archetype. The alternative source of citizenship, *jus soli* ("right of soil"), provides citizenship to any individual born in the territory of the state, even if the child's parents were ethnically foreign. The archetype for this source of citizenship is republican France. As it becomes easier to migrate and settle across Europe, we might expect Europeans to abandon *sanguini* traditions of citizenship. After all, the birthright (*soli*) tradition of citizenship facilitates immigrant inclusion (as immigrants cannot choose the ethnicity of their parents). Instead, we find a convergence of citizenship traditions in Europe, as states such as Germany soften up their *sanguini* positions, while countries such as France have scuttled important *soli* components.

- *Integration.* On top of these competing conceptions of citizenship lies another relevant cleavage. States in Europe have maintained different traditions for incorporating or integrating new members into the political community. While the first (citizenship) cleavage concerns an individual's access to rights, obligations, and privileges, the second cleavage concerns the character or nature of the resulting community. Here, too, we can distinguish between two main variants: assimilationist and multiculturalist integration strategies. Assimilationists believe that immigrants benefit most if they become part and parcel of the new community. In effect, immigrants are expected to grow into the host culture, adopting its norms and values. This assimilation is directed by a number of host culture institutions (e.g., schools, local communities, state officials, etc.), but also by families and civic-society organizations. In Europe, the archetypical state in this tradition is France, where immigrants are not encouraged to embrace their ethnic or national background or to describe themselves as Algerian-French (as Norwegian-Americans do in the United States, for example). Rather, a Frenchman is a Frenchman is a Frenchman. Multiculturalists, by contrast, celebrate difference; they are less concerned about the need to fuse immigrant and host communities together. Instead, the emphasis is on encouraging tolerance and pluralism so that different immigrant communities can coexist with, without feeling threatened by, the host community. In this approach, the host community's efforts are directed at ensuring that immigrant groups are not disadvantaged with respect to established groups, and at creating social conditions that encourage tolerance. From the EU's perspective, it makes sense to encourage member states to embrace multiculturalist approaches: the creation of a common European identity cannot be facilitated by a mushrooming of twenty-seven competing assimilationist responses!

Some of Europe's growing xenophobia may be explained by the way that increased integration challenges attitudes borne of these competing conceptions

of citizenship and integration. More to the point, these competing conceptions represent a serious challenge to the effort by Europe's political elites to create a new, and common, *European* identity.

This challenge is particularly difficult in Europe, if only because the modern nation-state was born there, and the concept of (and debate about) nationhood has deep roots in European soil. It is, after all, this strong sense of nationalism that is often blamed for Europe's affinity for war and conflict; and it is this sort of nationalist history that the European Union is designed to overcome. The point of creating a pan-European identity is not just to create a common European market so that producers can sell more products. One of the driving logics of the European project has been to create a common sense of identity in order to overcome national identities, which have too often led to war and conflict.

To bridge these competing conceptions of nationhood, citizenship, and integration, Europe needs to create a common political space where different nationalities can meet and meld. Somehow it needs to navigate the treacherous waters that separate *jus soli* from *jus sanguinis*, and assimilationists from multiculturalists. It is this tricky navigational task that the next section considers.

POLITICAL EFFORTS AT INTEGRATION

Like everything else in Europe, competing integration policies can be seen at different levels of government. At the member state level, vestiges of earlier traditions continue to linger, but more European states seem to be embracing assimilationist strategies.

In particular, a growing number of European states now require potential TCN immigrants to take an exam that tests their capacity to integrate. Best known of these, perhaps, is the "Civic Integration Examination Abroad" given to non-EU immigrants to the Netherlands at the Dutch embassy of the sending country in question. This examination consists of a half-hour-long film, some questions (in Dutch) about the film, and a more general test of the potential immigrant's Dutch-language skills. But there is nothing unique about the Netherlands in this regard: other countries conduct similar tests (including the UK, Denmark, France, and Germany).

Increasingly, European states expect TCN immigrants to assimilate into the distinct national cultures of the host country. These states expect immigrants to bear the costs of integration; by implication, they do not see a need to facilitate integration by changing national attitudes or institutions. At the national level, the effort of integration is aimed at minimizing the original distance separating the foreigner (on arrival) from the host culture.

The strategy at the European level is somewhat different, if not fully developed. The EU is obviously concerned about the problem, but it can hardly sup-

port twenty-seven different assimilation policies, where each new TCN immigrant is turned into a new mininationalist! Instead, the EU's legislative efforts have aimed to secure immigrants' equal treatment and protection from discrimination after they arrive. While member states lean in the direction of more assimilationist policies, the EU's thrust has been in a more multiculturalist direction.

In particular, the EU's focus is trained on deterring abuses and discrimination in member states. By implication, the problem of integration lies in national frameworks that require correction. This concern is long lasting, and we can see it early on in the EC's desire to make jobs available to foreign workers from other EU states, or by TCNs already working in Europe.

Indeed, the treatment of TCNs has been a hot-potato issue for several years between the EU and its member states. Already in 1986, with the Single European Act's (SEA's) commitment to the four freedoms, the Commission was anxious to interpret the freedom of persons to include legally resident TCNs—but member states wanted this freedom to be restricted to EU citizens only. In 1999, the Tampere European Council emphasized the need to harmonize national legislation on the conditions for admission and residence of TCNs.

In 2003, the Commission introduced a directive (2003/109/EC) that created a single status for long-term TCN residents to ensure their equal treatment across the EU, regardless of state residence. While the original ambitions were admirable, the resulting legislation was watered down by a number of national requirements, including a German demand for favoring the treatment of nationals over TCNs. Member states were also allowed to set numerical quotas on TCNs and to require them to comply with integration measures (such as taking the sort of language classes referenced above).

On a parallel front, Europe is developing a common antidiscrimination policy. The seeds of this policy were planted in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, where the Community gained new powers in Article 13 to combat discrimination. These seeds have begun to bear fruit in the form of three directives. The first two of these were enacted in 2000. The Race Discrimination Directive (2000/43) guarantees equal treatment of people, irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, while the Equal Treatment Framework Directive (2000/78) provides a framework for equal treatment at the job (or training) site. As these directives were limited to the sphere of employment, the Commission has more recently (July 2, 2008) issued a new draft directive on antidiscrimination, which is intended to extend antidiscrimination protections into areas that go beyond employment.

Mostly the EU has talked about the need for action but has accomplished very little. Since 2002, the EU has issued annual reports on migration and integration, which basically review trends in member state integration policies and identify common barriers; it has published a handbook on integration (2004), which lists a number of best practices; and EU leaders have adopted several

(mostly common-sense) principles for immigrant integration policy. It has established the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) to document and advise on these sorts of issues. In the same year (2004), the Commission proposed a "Common Agenda for Integration," which included some very concrete proposals (such as boosting participation of immigrant women in the workplace, promoting interfaith dialogue, etc.), but—like all the measures noted in this paragraph—none of its proposals were binding.

More promising is the European Fund for the Integration of TCNs—an €825-million fund (covering the 2007–2013 period) to help member states enable TCNs in their attempt to integrate into their host countries. Tellingly, Denmark is the only member state to have opted out.

Conclusion

Even though Europe has a long relationship and much experience with migration, it has not been able to develop a coordinated response to the challenges of migration, whether the migrants are workers from other member states or TCNs from abroad. Europe's difficulty is evident in the relatively low levels of internal (European) migration and the frighteningly high levels of support for the xenophobic parties of the radical right.

The European Union has worked hard to try and overcome these difficulties, and recent developments have clearly shifted more responsibility for migration issues from member states up to the EU level. But the unwillingness of member states to consistently adopt European policies that apply to issues of mobility, immigration, and integration has meant that the European policy space with respect to migration issues is remarkably complex.

To provide some order to these overlapping ambitions, policies, and outcomes, I have divided immigration issues up into three main areas: European migration, international immigration, and asylum. Within each of these areas, I have shown how different states interpret and respond to EU proposals, and this variance makes it difficult to refer to any common EU policy platform with respect to migration issues.

This variance is also evident in the ways in which member states and the EU respond to the growing challenges of integration. With the growth of nationalist sentiment and the radical right, we see a plethora of attempts to require foreigners to assimilate into diverse national political cultures. The EU's response to this development has been a rather feeble attempt to discourage discrimination.

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