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*Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 33, Issue 1 (Feb., 1996), 1-10.

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*Focus On:*

## Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View

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### 1. *The New Orthodoxy*

In February 1995 a small border war erupted between Peru and Ecuador. *Time* notes that although ‘the armed clash between two democracies deep in the Amazonian jungle’ may appear bizarre to outside observers, the conflict is fairly straightforward for Peruvians and Ecuadorians alike: the area has been contested for 53 years, as it is rumored to contain rich mineral deposits (1995, p. 27). What should not be surprising is that both presidents Fujimori (of Peru) and Durán Ballén (of Ecuador) had suffered sagging popularity and were eagerly using the conflict to bolster their domestic approval ratings. Elected leaders who use external conflicts to generate domestic support can be found in past political history and in contemporary affairs, e.g. in the ‘new democracies’ which have emerged from the former USSR, even though the very idea flies in the face of the new orthodoxy in international relations theory: that democracies do not fight one another.

We are curious about the eagerness with which the Democracy–Peace (DP) argument has been embraced by post-Cold War scholars. We are skeptical about the tendency to portray a simple correlation (between democracy and peace) in causal terms. We accuse the DP project with being theoretically under-informed, and – since good theories are a precondition for good research designs – propose that it suffers from design failures. Our criticism, however, is levied in a constructive spirit. We have decided to forego a meta-critique of the project and instead engage it on the modernist field to which it is accustomed.

### 2. *Democracy, Peace and Levels of Analysis*

The argument that democracy encourages peaceful interaction among states has taken many shapes. One fruitful way of systematizing the sundry arguments is to organize them according to level of analysis. Gleditsch & Hegre (1995), for example, distinguish between three levels of analysis: the *national* level (‘do democracies more frequently live in peace?’), the *dyadic* level (‘do democracies usually maintain peace among each other?’), and the *systemic* level (‘is an international system with a high proportion of democratic states a

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\* We thank several readers for helpful comments on an earlier draft, especially Erick Duchesne, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Sara McLaughlin, Iver Neumann, Ido Oren, Anita Schjølset, Erik Solem, Susan Strange, and anonymous reviewers from the *Journal of Peace Research*. It is with great reluctance that we also absolve them of the responsibility for some of the claims made here.

more peaceful system?'). We find this parcellization useful, as we note their caveat that arguments at one level cannot be drafted for combat at another.

The nation level argument uses states as its primary unit of analysis and claims that democratic states are peaceful – or at least more peaceful than non-democracies. It draws from a long and influential history within political philosophy. It tends to be deductively constructed<sup>1</sup> and theoretically rich. But its basic claims are not empirically supported. Despite much research and an extended public debate, there does not appear to be any consensus about the greater 'peacefulness' of democracies (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1995).

The dyadic level argument uses nation-pairs as its unit of analysis and maintains that democracies do not fight each other. Where the nation level claim is richly informed by political philosophy, the dyadic level argument is theory-poor. While the former is deductively derived and empirically unsubstantiated, the latter argument is inductively constructed and empirically grounded.

The systems level argument is tentative and vague. We have decided to neglect it and instead focus our attention on the dyadic level argument. The dyadic argument is informed by a positivist social-research tradition and has accumulated a large bulk of statistical evidence to support its key claim (that democracies do not fight each other) – a claim which Levy (1989, p. 270) among others hails as the nearest 'we have to an empirical law in international relations'.

### 2.1 *Dyadic Level Claims*

Generally, dyadic level studies argue that democratic states are disposed toward avoiding war against each other. The reasons given for this are often grouped in two general sets of theories: cultural and structural. Cultural explanations portray 'democracy' as a particular political culture, where norms, values, perceptions, and practices are said to predispose democracies toward peaceful relations with each other. The democratic citizenry is informed by powerful norms which discourage the use of lethal force and prioritize peaceful means of conflict-resolution: democracies shy away from brute power. They favor adjudication and bargaining as their common means of resolving disputes (Russett, 1993, pp. 31ff.).

Structural explanations define 'democracy' in terms of political institutions. They draw on decision-making theories to argue that democratic institutions have built-in constraints which make it difficult for national leaders to pursue belligerent policies (*ibid.*, pp. 38ff.). The two most common arguments hold that democracies allow free expression of public opinion (through open and regular elections) and that they limit the ambitions and power of decision-makers (through a system of checks and balances). On closer scrutiny, such explanations are not really structural: at their root lie philosophical assumptions from Enlightenment humanism which distrust power and invest a great deal of faith in the common sense of common people. Citizens, it was then often argued, oppose war: it is them, ultimately, who will pay its price in blood and taxes. Examples of citizen opposition to war abound – from the medieval mobs who demanded a 'Truce of God' to contemporary Americans who called for an end to US warfare in Vietnam. But counter-examples can also be found – one example is provided by the patriotic mobs in Paris and London that demanded war in 1914 (Bond, 1984). Such counter-examples make the so-called structural theories suspect. Indeed, Layne (1995, p. 177) contends that they represent 'a dangerous retrogression to the kind of "normative international relations theory" (. . .) so popular in Britain and the USA after World War I'.

## 2.2 Dyadic Level Problems

The DP literature relies on two different sets of causal mechanisms to explain why democracies do not go to war with one another: one cultural, the other structural. Yet the literature displays little consensus about these explanations. No agreed-upon explanation has been devised which can account for the statistical relationship between regime-type and bellicosity.

We will not insist because the DP project contains no explanatory principle which can demonstrate a causal mechanism to connect ‘democracy’ with ‘peace’, that the entire project must be condemned. Such an insistence would imply an unrealistically stern scientific ideal – which would be championed by few others than the tobacco industry. Rather, we want to note that the absence of an agreed-upon explanatory principle reveals that the DP project in essence represents an inductive research strategy. Such a strategy does not always suit the social sciences which commonly combine induction with deduction. Theories are deductive vantage points. They guide the quest for evidence. And the lack of clear theories leaves social science projects without clear research designs.

The DP literature testifies to a rapidly expanding research program. But it constitutes a universe with one remarkable statistical observation as its point of gravity: an association between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’. But, as David Hume reminds us: an association explains nothing in itself; and it is one thing to describe an association between two phenomena in the past, and quite another to claim that it will continue in the future. Without a guiding theory to explain the association, we are left swimming in a sea of potentially interconnected variables. Given enough time and RAM, we might conceivably find other variables which correlate as strongly with ‘peace’ as does ‘democracy’. We have reason to believe that ‘similar systems’ may also exhibit a propensity for peace: Andreski (1980), for example, has found that purely military dictatorships – due to their domestic fragility – have little incentive to engage in foreign military adventures. Russett (1993) suggests that a similar principle may apply to ‘anocratic’ states.<sup>2</sup> Also, one may speculate whether communist states also avoid wars with each other. Another, perhaps even more promising, alternative is ‘market capitalism’. The connection between a capitalist free-market economy and ‘peace’ has been explored theoretically since the 1700s – and these explorations inform Rummel’s (1983) Joint Freedom Proposition: that libertarian systems mutually preclude violence. The key to peaceful interaction may, in other words, not lie in political factors which the DP authors have been want to probe, but in economic arrangements (which many of them have been loathe to defend). It also appears reasonable to propose, simply, that ‘stability’ is associated with peace. But most reasonable of all: that the key to perpetual peace does not lie with one single factor, but in a complex web of things. But we are getting ahead of the story . . .

## 3. Research Design Flaws

Dyadic level DP arguments hinge on the impressive demonstration of an association between ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’. This association relies on two assumptions – which we may call the ‘operationalization assumption’ and the ‘causality assumption’, respectively. The operationalization assumption pretends that the two key variables – ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ – can be easily operationalized. The causality assumption implies that the variables are causally related.

### 3.1 *The Operationalization Assumption*

The DP literature finds a relationship between two variables  $X$  ('democracy') and  $Y$  ('peace' or, in practice, 'absence of war'). It is a problem that both 'democracy' and 'war' may be operationalized in various ways. 'Democracy' is a notorious weasel among political terms. Its definition fluctuates – from one historical epoch to another and from one author to the next.<sup>3</sup> Such variation is only one of the problems; man's perceptions of democracies are also subject to alteration. It is worth recalling that before World War I, US social scientists perceived Germany 'as member of a select group of most progressive polities: modern, constitutional, cohesive (Teutonic) nation-states. And within this select group Germany was placed either higher than both England and France or, at minimum, higher than France' (Oren, 1994, p. 1). After 1917, prewar Germany was perceived as an 'autocratic' regime. Germany had not changed as much as the subjective 'coding rules' of US observers had.<sup>4</sup>

There are also problems associated with the operationalization of 'war'. One problem is associated with the data sets available. The 'Correlates of War' (COW) project, which has developed a data set milked by many DP analysts, defines 'war' as an armed clash between at least two actors (of which one must represent a government) that kills at least 1000 people. By this definition, the recent conflict between Ecuador and Peru would not be classified as a war.<sup>5</sup> As with the democracy variable, an analysis of the relationship between war and democracies should consider, if not include, alternative operationalizations.<sup>6</sup>

### 3.2 *The Causality Assumption*

It is a legacy of John Stuart Mill that when we confront an association between two variables, we assume that there are three simple (causal) relationships possible: (i) that  $X$  causes  $Y$  ( $X \rightarrow Y$ ); (ii) that  $Y$  causes  $X$  ( $Y \rightarrow X$ ); or (iii) a third variable, call it  $Z$ , affects them both –  $Z$  might affect  $X$  or  $Y$  in either of two fashions: it could either intervene between  $X$  and  $Y$  ( $X \rightarrow Z \rightarrow Y$ ; or  $Y \rightarrow Z \rightarrow X$ ), or the relationship could be spurious ( $Z \rightarrow X$  and  $Z \rightarrow Y$ ).

#### 3.2.1 *The Possibility that $X \rightarrow Y$*

We are skeptical about the extant DP arguments and their ability to substantiate the  $X \rightarrow Y$  link. Structural theories have three main problems. First (as noted in section 2.1), they rely on an Enlightenment faith in the pacific preferences of free citizens (or *demos*). Second, they generally assume that citizenry preferences are exogenous, and that decision-makers follow those (constituent) preferences. In the buildup to war one should question the autonomy of citizenry preferences, as war propaganda is likely to manipulate constituent preferences. As Oren (1994) notes, national perceptions of 'enemy' or 'democracy' can change according to need. Finally, structural theories cannot unaided explain why the democratic citizens' adversity to war only applies to war with other democracies. The DP project demonstrates statistically that democracies do not fight wars with each other (the dyadic level argument). But it also shows that democracies are no less reluctant than other regime types to fight wars in general (the nation level argument) – many of them brutal wars of colonial expansionism.<sup>7</sup> If citizens are reticent to employ their blood and taxes for fighting wars, why should they care if the opponent is a democracy or an autocracy? Structural theories, then, must include an auxiliary cultural component. They must somehow add that democratic states, over time, develop positive perceptions of other democracies but not of non-democracies.

Cultural theories have difficulties of their own. Their main point is that certain perceptions and practices encourage compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This argument assumes that democracies learn to respect and reinforce each other's orderly behavior, and – over time – develop a common code of peaceful practices in their relations with one another<sup>8</sup> (Doyle, 1983, p. 230). If this argument is not tempered by a keen sense of historical evolution, it may slide into a tautology: relations between democratic states are peaceful because they are informed by a common perception that democracies are peaceful.

### 3.2.2 *Endogeneity (and the Possibility that $Y \rightarrow X$ )*

We are skeptical about the DP argument for a second reason as well: all mainstream theories assume that  $X$  causes  $Y$ . Both the cultural and the structural theory types assume as a matter of course that 'democracy' is the independent variable; that democracy causes peace (that more democracy causes more peace and that less democracy causes less peace). We are uncomfortable with the obvious policy implications which are derived from this assumption; viz., that the spread of democracy will diminish the frequency of war in the world.<sup>9</sup> We are loathe to accept this assumption without having seen convincing rejections of the obvious alternative; viz., the possibility that the causal direction may actually be the reverse. Peace may, in fact, contribute to the growth of democracy (Wright, 1942, p. 841). On the one hand, more peace may cause more democracy – a peaceful and stable society may encourage trade, investment and economic growth (Smith, 1776, pp. 878f.); investors and entrepreneurs may, in turn, work to expand the sentiments of openness, freedom, persuasion and compromise which they understand to provide the preconditions for their prosperous activities, and in the process they become vested interests for maintaining peaceful relations with likeminded actors (Godwin, 1793; Owen, 1994). On the other hand, less peace may cause less democracy – societies in war have often restricted citizen rights and freedoms; even democratic governments have postponed elections or declared martial laws during wartime.

If there is endogeneity in the relationship between democracy and peace (feedback from  $Y$  back to  $X$ ), the explanatory variable will be correlated with the residuals leading to a bias in the relationship. No one has, to our knowledge, addressed this possibility. How can we deal with it? Following King et al. (1994, pp. 185–196) we can either transform the endogeneity problem into an omitted variable problem (i.e. consider variables which should be part of the broader relationship between democracy and peace), or we can divide the explanatory variable so that one part is clearly exogenous and the other at least partly endogenous, and then use only the exogenous part in the causal analysis (e.g., parse democracy across its dimensions). Both of these potential solutions return us to the original issues of operationalization and theory.

### 3.2.3 *Omitted Variable Bias*

Failure to control for variables that are correlated with an explanatory variable can also lead to bias. In this way, omitted variables offer another potential problem. The DP community, it should be noted, has done a better job of addressing this issue than other research design problems. Maoz & Russett (1993), for example, specifically consider the effects of cultural norms<sup>10</sup> and institutional constraints.<sup>11</sup> Despite these laudable efforts we can identify other factors that should be considered. Structural explanations, for example, ought to give more consideration to the possibility that a liberal-capitalist regime-type predisposes a country to cooperation and negotiation in its foreign affairs.

With the expansion of international economic interactions, might we not expect to see the same sort of pressure to inhibit war between states?<sup>12</sup> Milner (1988), for example, argues that increasingly multinational firms lobby governments to forego protectionist pressures. Could a similar argument be drafted to explain the pressure which might result during periods of potential conflict from firms with production facilities in the respective countries? In short – while we applaud much of the recent effort within the DP community to examine the effects of third variables – the inclusion of these variables often seems ad hoc. Unfortunately, to determine what variables are omitted we must refer back to a theory.

#### 4. *The Poverty of Theory*

This brings us to a final critique of the DP project: its remarkable lack of curiosity about the genealogy which informs its explanatory efforts. This lack of interest is evident in the many references to Immanuel Kant's essay on *Perpetual Peace*. It is a sad testimony to the state of DP theorizing that so many authors hurriedly genuflect in front of the rumored content of this essay before delving into their various inductive pursuits. Kant's essay is the tip of a complex Enlightenment iceberg. It should be read carefully before it is extolled as a tribal idol. Has no DP author found it curious that Kant quite plainly states that his argument does *not* apply to democracies? It applies to republics! Indeed, in this much-quoted essay, Kant goes out of his way to clarify the distinction between a democracy and a republic in order to 'prevent the republican constitution from being confused with the democratic one, as commonly happens' (Kant, 1795, p. 100)<sup>13</sup> It is an odd tribute they pay, those who assume that when Kant wrote 'republic' he really *meant* 'democracy'.<sup>14</sup>

The lack of theoretical interest is also obvious from the remarkable lacunae in the DP literature with respect to the many essays on perpetual peace by other Enlightenment authors. Kant was informed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Knutsen, 1994). Rousseau was, in turn, impressed by Montesquieu – whose *Spirit of the Laws* [1748] foreshadows the dyadic level thesis (in Book 10). Why have not Rousseau and Montesquieu been more closely considered in the DP literature? Where are the references to Thomas Paine [1792]? The man who delivered one of the clearest (and most consequential) formulations of the claim that a state founded on democratic principles (e.g., of equality before the law, civil liberties, private property, and government by elected representatives) must also be, fundamentally, against war. Why has William Godwin been overlooked? Godwin may have been the first author to extol the peaceful nature of 'democracy' (as opposed to 'republic'). His *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* [1793] was one of the most influential political books of the 1790s. Godwin claims that international peace can only be created by replacing the old, militant, monarchic balance-of-power doctrines with active policies of democratization (as democracies, he argues, are inherently peaceful). Godwin may provide an argument which is more congenial than Kant's to the dyadic level DP argument. He notes that in practice it will always be difficult to observe the peaceful nature of democracies because they will regularly fight with non-democracies. However, the peacefulness of democracies should be apparent in cases where democratic states share common boundaries. From this proposition Godwin derives two implications. First, that the peaceful nature of democracies can only be shown by observing the behavior of democracies towards one another; and, second, that several adjacent democracies would constitute a zone of peace in the international community.

### 5. *The Nature of the Democratic Peace*

We do not mean to suggest that there is no relationship between democracy and peace. Rather, our argument is that the relationship has not been adequately demonstrated; that it lacks a firm theoretical foundation that can identify a convincing causal mechanism. In particular, we wish to urge DP scholars to pursue research which addresses the *nature* of the democracy–peace relationship. We have surveyed four potential avenues of pursuit: theoretical paucity, endogeneity, constituent preferences, and operationalization. While traffic has proceeded down some of the better-marked thoroughfares, much remains untravelled.

First, and most important, is the issue of theoretical paucity. While the poverty of DP theory has been noted by others (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992; Lake, 1992), it remains the biggest barrier to productive research. It is now 200 years since Kant's essay was published. Since the essay has so often been misrepresented, it may be a good idea to celebrate this bicentennial by re-reading the piece in light of its proper historical setting and a broader theoretical context. While Kant has been misused, other Enlightenment theorists stand at the DP project's disposal. Rousseau, Montesquieu, Paine, and Godwin are four important theorists whose arguments are conspicuously absent in the literature. It would be an important contribution if someone were to collect and systematize their arguments about war and peace. Reading them, and other Enlightenment authors,<sup>15</sup> would stimulate the DP community to do more of what it does really well: engender hypotheses and test them. It would also anchor their project in a long tradition. It would give depth to its theorizing and direction to its research.

Recent work in the field has made admirable progress on the road to theoretical explicitness. Although they have not relied on the potential lying dormant in the tradition of political philosophy, several recent authors have begun to provide detailed causal propositions. Russett (1993, ch. 2), Lake (1992), Kilgour (1991) and Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992), for example, provide encouraging examples of how luminaries in the field are finally beginning to address the problem of theoretical paucity. We hope that more efforts are focused in this direction.

Second, the issue of endogeneity cries for attention. Without a unified, sound theory for guidance, there is no justification for assuming a priori the privilege of unidirectional causality. How do we develop a research design which can show that democracy causes peace (rather than vice versa)? Attempts at clarifying the other aspects of the posited causal relationship (e.g. the efforts by Maoz & Russett (1993) to clarify the effect of omitted variables) are developing admirably. Others are advised to follow their lead.

Third, constituent preferences need to be examined more closely. Why does the DP community continue to assume that constituents are more pacific than leaders? This is a crucial assumption, as Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992) have noted, which must be substantiated before productive research can continue. Researchers might consider in-depth case studies of 'near-wars' between democratic states to see who is actually leading whom. Russett's (1993) and Layne's (1994) examinations of the propensity for democratic dyads to avoid large-casualty conflicts are two laudable examples of the way in which such research might develop.

Finally, more work needs to be done on refining the operationalization of both variables. How much of the relationship between democracy and peace breaks down as we extend the definitional boundaries of each of the variables? Political theorists have spent millennia trying to distinguish the nature of democracy; why are contemporary authors satisfied with mere coding rules? We believe, for example, that a careful examination of the role of

Finland in WWII would shine much light on the operationalization problem. Another example worthy of emulation is Oren's (1994) case study of changing attitudes toward Germany.

These four paths return us to the Andes. We sincerely hope that the conflict between Peru and Ecuador is settled before it kills 1000 soldiers in some year – and thus qualifies as 'war'. We also hope that DP researchers will ask why the violence erupted and will help identify the mechanisms which drew the parties away from a large-casualty conflict. If the tiff should broaden to surpass 1000 battle deaths, however, it is not just Ecuadorians and Peruvians who should be counted among the casualties.

## NOTES

1. Nation level arguments tend to be deductive in the sense that their key proposition (that democracies are inherently more peaceful than other regime types) is usually derived from axiomatic claims about human nature. These claims tend to be 'endowment propositions' – e.g. assertions that every human individual is endowed with specific needs and wants (and sometimes rights), along with reason – and thus the ability to satisfy his needs and wants in a rational manner. It may be argued that this deductive-type of argument ought to be categorized as individual level (rather than nation level) propositions.
2. The suggestion may be found in Russett (1993, p. 79); his Table 4.1 shows that no wars have been fought between 'democracies' after World War II; it also shows that no wars have been fought between 'anocratic' states. Maoz & Russett (1993) use Gurr's scale of regime types where, 'the essential quality of the "anocratic polity" is its relative lack of political power and institutionalization' (Gurr, 1974, p. 1487).
3. Similar points are raised by Layne (1994, p. 40) and Spiro (1994, p. 55).
4. Even with consistent coding rules, the DP community often finds reason to exclude *deviant* cases. Haas (1995, pp. 10–14) discusses the numerous exceptional cases which for one reason or another are not considered to involve democracy fighting democracy.
5. Peru and Ecuador do not qualify as democracies in the most frequently used data sets. One wonders why popular perceptions of democracy and peace vary so significantly with those employed by liberal theorists.
6. See Russett et al. (1995) as well as Haas (1995, pp. 9–10).
7. This fact, together with Rummel's (1983) defense of libertarianism, Doyle's (1983a) critique of Kant and the observation that some of the modern capitalist democracies have also been most eager to export their regime-type and have been mighty imperialist powers, raises the uncomfortable possibility that liberty, democracy and peace in the West have somehow been purchased at the cost of repression, autocracy and war in non-Western regions. See Patterson (1991) for a controversial history of 'freedom' along these lines.
8. Paradoxically, the very (peaceful) characteristics of a democracy may make it more likely to be attacked by other states, as it is perceived to be weak (even, possibly, by other democracies who have different, say, economic objectives). This is the argument of Chan (1984) and Podhoretz (1980, 1983). A second problem with the political culture argument, as Weede (1984, p. 652) has pointed out, is that '... the very same citizenry that objects to military action may on occasion simultaneously object to the concessions required for maintaining peace'. Is there really a political culture which is inherently peaceful and is it really confined to democracies?
9. Consider Russett's (1993, pp. 135ff.) inference that a good post-Cold War security doctrine for the USA would therefore be to actively work for the spread of democracy. Such reasoning attracted the attention of Margaret Thatcher and James Baker in the early 1990s. It has also been embraced by President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, who arranged a policy talk around the inference in 1993.
10. However, 'democracy' is not a cultural accident: democratic states share certain similarities which may help illuminate their apparent desire for peace. Peaceful behavior, as a disposition, may be influenced by one or several of the following cultural features: Christian, rational-bureaucratic, humanitarian, protestant, those embodied with the 'spirit of capitalism', 'tolerant', etc.
11. Also see Bremer (1992, 1993), Lake (1992), Gleditsch (1995), Morgan & Schwebach (1992).
12. This line of argument was delineated by Schumpeter (1919) early in this century. Schumpeter drew on the Manchester School liberals, who in turn borrowed from, e.g., Bentham (1794).
13. Kant's clarification reverberates with Aristotle's view of 'democracy' as the perverted/despotic form of majority rule (from Book III of *Politics*). Writes Kant: 'Of the three forms of sovereignty, *democracy*, in its truest sense of the word, is necessarily a *despotism*, because it establishes an executive power through which all the citizens may make decisions about (and indeed against) the single individual without his consent, so that decisions are made by all people and yet not by all the people; and this means that the general will is in contradiction with itself, and thus also with freedom' (the emphases are Kant's own). This is hardly the

- reasoning of a modern liberal democrat; it reads more like the views of a Prussian admirer of Rousseau. Besides, it should be emphasized that the essay on 'Perpetual Peace' is not the best place to assess Kant's views on international politics; a far more complete argument is found in Part II, Section I of his *Metaphysics of Morals* [1797]. Relevant excerpts of this work are found in Reiss (1991, pp. 164–175).
14. One may also argue that Kant's is not strictly an argument about political institutions or political culture (as is often claimed), but that it is anchored in political economy. Republics, Kant argues, trade with one another, and it is this free trade which will guarantee a 'pacific federation' (Sørensen, 1992). Furthermore, Kant claimed that the proliferation of republics leads to the creation of a 'pacific union' (among states similarly disposed), but he also suggested that such development might create a state of war between republics and non-republics (Doyle, 1983a).
  15. A longer list of pre-Kantian Enlightenment theorists whose views on war and peace deserve to be collected and systematized would include: Giulio Alberoni, John Bellers, Jean-Baptiste Cloutz, Marquis de Condorcet, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Gabriel-Henri Gaillard, Pierre-André Gargaz, Ange Goudar, Baron Wiltrich d'Holbach, Thomas Jefferson, Johann Michael von Loen, Abbé Mably, James Madison, Louis-Sébastien Mercier, Palier de Saint-Germain, Johann Franz von Palten, William Penn, Richard Price, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Johann Gotfried Schindler, Johann August Schlettwein, Adam Smith, Jean Baptiste de Val-de-Grâce . . .

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