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Recent research on the causes of civil war seeks to identify whether group grievances, or opportunity for organisation, motivates rebellion. Similarly, scholars debate whether ethnicity matters in civil war due to group grievances or the opportunity to mobilise. We introduce the lack of empowerment rights, defined as social, political and economic empowerment directly and conditionally in models of civil war onset using novel methods and data. We find no direct effect of repression of rights on war, but higher ethnic fractionalisation increases the risk independently. Nonetheless, higher levels of repression condition the effects of ethnic fractionalisation in ways that maintain peace. State policies that dis-empower people under conditions of high fractionalisation actually reduce the chance of civil war. We do not find that high fractionalisation is only related to lower level armed conflict as some have suggested, but it seems to explain onsets of civil wars above 25 deaths but lower than 1,000 and conflict measured above 1,000 deaths for the period of study that our data allow. The conditional effects of repression and ethnic fractionalisation explain onsets at both levels of war. Our findings are generally unsupportive of the view that grievances due to lack of ethnic group rights drive civil war, but it seems that the opportunity to mobilise does.

INTRODUCTION

A train has been attacked and de-railed in the southern Pool region of the Republic of Congo, injuring 31, with the number of dead as yet unknown. The government has blamed the attack on so called Ninja rebels, a militia group active during Congo’s civil wars of 1997 and 1998, who style themselves on the ancient Japanese warriors.¹

Recent research on the causes of civil war has revived debates about whether deeply rooted convictions, or opportunities for private gain, motivate rebellion.² Knowing generally whether objective and perceived grievances, or whether certain social, economic and demographic conditions simply lower the ‘opportunity costs’ of rebellion for narrowly based groups, is crucial for policy. Scholars have focused heavily on identity-based factors such as ethnicity as one way of unpacking the
group-grievance explanations contrasted with individualistic, rational choice explanations for predicting civil war. Can identity act as a vehicle for conflict based on broadly shared grievances against repressive states? The rational choice, economistic reasoning employed by the World Bank’s studies, which suggest that men rebel because of private gain rather than the search for justice, have been heavily criticised, not least because the results imply that states are victims of cynical, opportunistic rebels and because they potentially undermine explanations that stress group grievances based on ideational factors, such as group rights. This study examines these two interrelated but distinct issues by employing data that measure the degree of political and economic empowerment, such as the right to organise, freedom of speech and assembly and freedom of religion, directly in models of civil war.

If ethnic groups rebel for justice, then the level of empowerment rights should condition the risk of rebellion with increasing numbers of ethno-linguistic groups, ceteris paribus. If fractionalisation reduces opportunity for rebellion at the same time that states raise the costs through repression, then opportunity for successful rebellion should decrease.

We find that state repression of empowerment rights has no direct effect on the onset of civil wars above the thresholds of 25 deaths per year and above 1,000 deaths. On the other hand, ethnic fractionalisation increases the chances of an onset of civil war, a result that is statistically highly significant. Interestingly, higher levels of repression condition the effects of ethnic fractionalisation negatively. In other words, state policy that dis-empowers people under conditions of high fractionalisation prevents civil war, and relatively homogenous societies are more likely to have serious armed conflict against repressive government than they are when repression is absent, a result generally unsupportive of the view that ‘group grievances’ due to lack of rights drive civil war. Contrarily, the easing of repression possibly reduces the costs of organising costly violence where fractionalisation is low, allowing greater opportunity for mobilisation. In multinomial models, we find no evidence to suggest that high fractionalisation is only related to lower level armed conflict, but it seems to explain onsets of civil wars defined as 25 deaths but lower than 1,000, and onsets measured above the 1,000-death threshold. The conditional effects of repression and fractionalisation explain onsets at both levels of civil war. We do not find, thus, that ethnic fractionalisation affects the severity of conflict differentially as some others report. Our results show, however, that fractionalised societies are safer when political disempowerment is high, not low, as grievance-based explanations would predict. This finding demonstrates that fractionalisation may moderate costly mobilisation, and that ethnic groups may not necessarily rebel due to broadly shared motives for group justice.

WHY VIOLENCE?

The news item from Congo Brazzaville cited at the beginning contrasted with the quotation attributed to Patrick Henry during the American war of independence...
suggested by the title demonstrates our purpose. The Republic of the Congo is ethnically highly fractionalised and has experienced three onsets of civil war in the period under study, but the groups organising violence are just ‘Ninjas’, who might easily have organised their violence for championing a broader cause, such as an ethnic or regional grievance. According to the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database, Congo-Brazzaville had a good record of protecting empowerment rights. In the 1980s, however, under its leader Denis Sassou-Ngoesso’s ‘one-party Marxist state’, Congo-Brazzaville had a much poorer record of protecting empowerment rights, yet the country did not suffer a single onset of civil war. Perhaps, groups organise violence for justice (particularly ethnic justice) when empowerment rights are bad (‘give me liberty or give me death’), whereas groups such as the ‘Ninjas’ (opportunists) organise violence when empowerment rights are better, and appeals to ethnic justice and or other such salient identity claim are less credible. Similarly, Malaysia, which consistently scores far lower on empowerment rights compared with Sri Lanka, has avoided ‘ethnic war’ for over 40 years, while Sri Lanka has suffered numerous bouts of ‘ethnic civil war’ on the basis of state discrimination. The issue relates fundamentally to what motivates people to organise costly conflict. Is violence narrowly based, opportunistic behaviour, for self-serving reasons, or more broadly based for justice-seeking motives as many explanations of ‘ethnic conflict’ suggest? Does this simple comparison between Sri Lanka and Malaysia represent a broader, more aggregate picture, or is it unique?

When Collier and Hoeffler wrote their hotly debated article ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, they tested factors of opportunity and grievance as motivations for rebellion. They found that opportunity (e.g., abundant natural resources and large diasporas) had more explanatory power than grievances (e.g., rebels are motivated by ethnic or religious hatred or lack of democracy). Grievance is defined as ‘widely shared dissatisfaction among group members about their cultural, political and/or economic standing vis à vis dominant groups’. Ethnic fractionalisation as a proxy of political grievance has generally failed to support a significant connection with civil war also in other focused studies on similar questions. These studies typically use the degree of ethnic fractionalisation in a country as a proxy for ‘grievance’ as it serves well as a probabilistic measure of finding a potentially dissatisfied identity group in a country, all other factors being equal. If a country has only two groups, the chance that one group will be dissatisfied at any point in time is simply lower than in a country with 10 groups, since the number of potential cleavages in society increase proportionally. However, the number of cleavages alone is criticised as atheoretical, since ethnic arithmetic alone does not capture what is salient about the conflicting groups. Thus, we introduce a measure of a discriminatory political climate as an explanatory variable directly in the model and test the conditional effects of ethnic diversity under these discriminatory policy conditions on the probability of an onset of civil war.

Those who are less pessimistic about ethnic clashes due to high fractionalisation emphasise the moderating effect of fractionalisation due to group size. The greater the number of groups, the smaller each group’s relative size, which forces consensus
and compromise by thwarting the ease of mobilisation. A fractionalised society is safer because any one group will find it harder to garner a minimum-winning coalition. Cross-cutting cleavages act as a risk-reducing factor whereas segmented cleavages (or polarisation) are likelier to occur when two groups are of relatively equal size, which increases the risk of conflict. To complicate the issue further, Esteban and Ray argue that high fractionalisation may lead to smaller (shorter) civil wars precisely because the issues at stake are likely to be small, whereas polarisation (relative homogeneity) may cause larger war as the costs of not prevailing are bound to be higher, thus generating heavier investment in fighting. Since conflict is costly, under conditions of polarisation, the onsets of conflict are likelier to be fewer than under conditions of fractionalisation, but when they do occur they are likely to be more severe. They argue importantly that much of the predictions from their model might be dependent on the type of regime in place. The group size arguments, however, pay little attention to the view that conflict can be narrowly organised, and that groups do not speak with one voice. In fact, this view reifies groups as if they have strictly distinguishable boundaries and constitute a cohesive whole based on ethnic solidarity.

Comparatively few researchers have looked directly at human rights abuses as an explanatory factor in civil war, particularly focused on its conditional effect with ethnicity. This shortcoming, we hold, is unfortunate given that repression is a more direct measure of conditions that cause grievance rather than simply proxying it with the degree of ethnic fractionalisation, or level of political democracy. By investigating human rights abuses, one can test more precisely the conditions that determine grievance, or the opportunity for rebellion, conditional on the ethnic arithmetic that makes up a society. Our analysis takes into consideration empowerment rights. This measure is ostensibly a more direct proxy for conditions leading to group grievance, and captures specific aspects of rights that matter for ethnic groups, such as religious and labour rights.

THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

There are two competing schools that purport to explain collective violence, namely the deprived actor and rational actor schools. These grand approaches to understanding violence differ significantly. Following deprived actor (DA) logic, state repression leads to grievances, which constitute an important cause of armed rebellion. The rational actor (RA) school downplays the role of grievances as a triggering factor for rebellious activity and instead highlights potential rewards and favourable circumstances as factors motivating insurgents.

Deprived Actor Model

Relative deprivation is described as the experience of being deprived of something to which an individual feels entitled to. The deprived actor (DA) research programme tries to explain the link between perceived and real deprivation and violent behaviour. Relative deprivation is defined as man’s perceived discrepancy
between value expectations and value capabilities. The leading proponent of the deprived actor theory is Gurr. He postulates that the potential for collective violence is conditioned by the intensity and extent of relative deprivation. The causal chain Gurr proposes is as follows: ‘first the development of discontent, second the politicisation of that discontent, and finally its actualisation in violent action against political objects and actors’.

Rational Actor Model

The rational actor (RA) school has its background in economic theory. RA theories emphasise both resource mobilisation and opportunity structures. The RA school does not believe that deprivation and anger were either a necessary or sufficient condition for violent behaviour. In a study of the English, American, French and Russian revolutions, Brinton pointed out that each of these events occurred at times when the material conditions for people were improving. He suggests that the elites played an important part in these revolts, and emphasises factors like weak states and distrust among the old ruling class for the revolts. These revolutions were driven by opportunities afforded by state weakness and strategic mobilisation.

To summarise, RA theories view the expectation of reward as the most important motivating factor for rebellious activity. The RA school proposes that all actors are rational actors who use a simple cost–benefit calculus to decide whether violence will yield a better payoff than no violence. This choice will be made only if their personal gains from dissident activities are greater than that from other activities. Thus, a rational decisionmaker will engage in rebellious activity whenever this approach proves to be the most advantageous way of competing in a world where payoffs are scarce. Following the logic of RA theory, it is reasonable to expect that state repression would reduce the risk of rebellion since the opportunity of rebellion will be more constrained, raising costs.

Overcoming the Collective Action Problem

One of the earliest proponents of the rational actor approach was Olson, who highlighted the collective action problem. Collective action is the activity of a group of individuals to pursue public goods. The collective action problem is an important element in the critique of the deprived actor approach. For a group of people to decide to incite a rebellion, they would need to overcome the collective action problem, i.e. induce individuals to cooperate instead of taking advantage of others’ co-operative behaviour. The rational actor school claims that grievances are always present, and that the prime motivation for collective action is an expectation of reward. The RA approach holds that collective action occurs after changes in group resources, organisation and opportunity. And although grievances might be viewed as necessary for the formation of movements, these are explained either by changes in power relations or by structural conflicts of interests.

Ethnicity allows the deprived actor approach to explain how the collective action problem can be overcome. Identity is supposed to act as an ‘effective tie’ that binds people together for pursuing common goals. In order for a group of people to
mobilise, they need a common identity. The structural theory of ethnic collective action pre-supposes that when members of the same ethnic group hold important positions in occupational structures, or in the labour market, and when they become aware of their common plight, collective action will follow naturally. If the group has something to gain by co-operating, then this produces an incentive to embark upon a strategy of collective action. This theory can easily be transferred to the study of civil war. A DA approach to ethnicity as an explanatory factor in civil war looks to psychology. Psychological theories explain ethnic groups as fulfilling an individuals’ need to belong to a group and to maintain or enhance self-esteem. When other groups threaten these beliefs, conflict ensues. Ethnicity, thus, might lower the cost of rebellion due to lower organisation costs.

THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE: ‘GREED VERSUS GRIEVANCE’

In 2004, Collier and Hoeffler presented their hotly debated article ‘Greed and Grievances in Civil War’. Their model also influenced the various World Bank’s studies on civil war. Mirroring RA arguments, they provide a model and supporting empirical evidence demonstrating that opportunity factors provide a better explanation of the occurrence of civil war than grievance factors. Their finding – i.e., that economic variables provide more explanatory power than social variables – received much attention from the media, policymakers and academics. The greed or opportunity argument states that rebellion is not explained by motive, but rather by conditions that generate profitable circumstances, the underlying motivating factor being narrow self-interest rather than broad justice provision. One could argue that the greed versus grievance debate is the continuation of the RA versus DA disagreements.

We introduce a measure of state repression to evaluate the greed versus grievance debate more succinctly. Rather then grievance, the opportunity or ‘greed’ explanations of civil war have recently been highlighted in two significant ways – namely state weakness and economic/material factors. Both Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler report that opportunity factors are more important. However, we contend that the grievance side of the argument could be proxied more directly. When investigating the causes of civil war onset, Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler have used ethnicity and regime type as proxies for grievances. The probabilistic assumption about why fractionalisation alone matters for explaining grievance is theoretically weak. We suggest that ethnicity must matter in conjunction with a deleterious political environment for group rights – i.e., ethnicity must matter contingent on repression. Thus, we introduce state repression of ‘soft rights’ – i.e., government respect for political rights and civil liberties as a more direct measure of conditions that would predict the motivation for ethnic group mobilisation against the state.

Our measure captures the degree of state repression of rights. Tilly posits that repression raises the costs of collective action, and that this has a negative effect on mobilisation, i.e., the classic RA explanation. Lichbach, on the other hand, proposes an alternative RA model to explain why government repression increases the risk of violent activities. The underlying logic is that an increase in repression of
non-violent activity will reduce the use of non-violence. But this will, however, increase the level of violent activities by an opposition group because the relative costs of non-violent behaviour thereby increases, while the costs of violent behaviour decrease. Thus, the issue of whether repression increases or decreases civil war is an empirical one. On the one hand, the direct effect of the lack of political and social rights should tell us whether these factors motivate rebellion, and on the other hand, if ethnicity leads to group mobilisation and rebellion, is this bound to be conditioned by the level of state repression?

Few studies have examined the link between government repression of the rights of citizens and the onset of civil war. In our empirical analyses we choose to employ empowerment rights – rather than physical integrity rights – as our measure of state repression, given that the former is far less likely to be associated with problems of endogeneity (meaning that the dependent variable can be said to influence one or more of the independent variables). It can be argued that an index composed of measures of torture, imprisonment and extra-judicial killings is too closely related to a state’s response to armed challenges. The CIRI human rights data measure empowerment rights that include indicators denoting freedom of movement, freedom of speech, workers’ rights, political participation and freedom of religion. The measurements are obtained by content analyses of rights on the books and rights in practice obtained from Amnesty and the US State Department reports. The scale is constructed using a probabilistic cumulative scale analysis, employing five indicators of movement, freedom of speech, worker’s rights, political participation and freedom of religion. The rights are scaled on an 11-point additive scale, which we have inverted to mean repression rather than rights for ease of interpretation. For the coding scheme of the empowerment rights index, see the Appendix.

Some have questioned the standard measures of human rights abuse used in statistical analyses. It is indeed important to be aware of the danger that we might be really measuring what Donnelly calls excessive or ‘false’ universalism. Goldstein maintains that defining what human rights really are poses great difficulties. He argues that the US government and several western-based human rights organisations have concentrated mainly on political and civil rights and the rights of personal security, whereas communist and third world countries have emphasised social and economic rights. The US State Department as well as Amnesty International provide worldwide accounts of human rights violations through their annual country reports. Both sets of reports have been criticised: the Amnesty International for being too ‘soft’ on communist and third world countries; and the US State Department for being too lenient on allies of the US. Poe, Carey and Vasquez examined both data sources and conclude that the State Department’s reports have at times favoured US friends compared with the reports from Amnesty International, but that this bias has disappeared in later years. Although we do acknowledge that there is some validity to the argument that human rights may not be universal, our article is designed to address theoretical debates working from the assumption, such as rational choice theory, that human motivations stem from very similar desires, where cultural differences only condition underlying motives at the margins.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Our dependent variable is onset of civil war. The Uppsala data, which is used in the analysis, operate with a limit of 25 and above yearly battle deaths as their threshold for identifying a civil war. Gleditsch et al. argue that the Correlates of War threshold of 1,000 yearly battle-related deaths (BRDs) is too high and tends to exclude many politically significant conflicts where theoretically at least 999 people could have died in a single year. Since we are investigating a relatively short period of time, using a lower threshold allows greater variability in the dependent variable, which is a statistical advantage. Operating with two different thresholds of conflict also allows us to include a trichotomous dependent variable (for the multi-nomial models), where the two thresholds of civil war onset are compared separately with the reference category (no civil war onset). Further, the conflict must occur between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups. Civil war onset is a dichotomous (two-category) variable – the categories being onset (1) and no onset (0) – and we therefore use a maximum likelihood logistic model. This approach provides an adaptable, general purpose modelling strategy with easy-to-grasp interpretation. The logistic (or logit) regression model gives us the calculated probability of the dependent variable having the value 1, given the values on the explanatory variables. We have chosen to employ King and Zeng’s model of rare-event data, i.e., their rare events logit (or ReLogit) software.

By employing logistic regression analysis on longitudinal data, our choice of method is what Beck, Katz and Tucker call binary time series cross sectional data (BTSCS). Time series data of this sort suffer from problems of temporal dependence, or non-independence of the error term. We follow their advice and fix this technicality by including a count of the years since the last onset of conflict, i.e., the number of years that have passed since the country in question last experienced civil war, to account for temporal dependence.

One major caveat concerning the use of state repression as an explanatory variable of civil war onset is the problem of endogeneity – i.e., that the endogenous variable can be said to influence one or more of the exogenous variables. Previous studies have shown that civil and interstate wars determine the degree of state repression. However, in these instances state repression has been proxied by violations of people’s ‘physical integrity rights’ captured by measures such as the Political Terror Scale (PTS). By examining civil war onset rather than incidents, much of the endogeneity problem is taken care of. By definition, there has to be no war in the two years prior to an onset, thus it is highly unlikely that violence was the cause of repression rather than the other way around. In addition, the low threshold of 25 deaths for civil war onset reduces the problem of endogeneity, particularly when we explain conflicts above 1,000 battle deaths holding small wars constant in the model.

We have taken three further precautions to minimise endogeneity. First, we use a measure of state repression of empowerment – or ‘soft’ – rights rather than measures of physical integrity like the PTS or the CIRI physical integrity rights.
Empowerment rights are correlated with these measures by a Pearson’s R of .496 and .535, respectively. A distinction can surely be made between ‘soft’ rights and integrity rights, and our contention is that the causal relationship is less problematic with regards to the former. Second, by lagging empowerment rights one year, we ensure that repression is prior to the outbreak of civil war. Third, we employ a multinomial regression model to deal with the endogeneity problem since large civil wars are preceded by the smaller ones, which are accounted for in an encompassing single model.

Multi-nomial regression builds on ordinary binary logistic regression but allows the researcher to explore dependent variables that have more than two categories. This makes it possible to examine different thresholds of civil war onset in the same model. We have chosen to divide up the dependent variable onset and create a new three-category dependent variable: multi-onset. The categories are listed in Table 1. Each of the categories of war onset is compared separately to the reference category (no onset). In a binary model, the base outcome $Y = 1$ is the same as $Y \neq m$ ($m =$ probability of outcome $Y = 1$), but in a model with three or more possible outcomes, the results $Y = 1$ and $Y \neq m$ are different.63 The equation for our multi-nomial model is as follows:

$$L_1 = \ln \left( \frac{P(Y = 25 - 1,000BRDs)}{P(no\_onset)} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \cdots + \beta_k X_{ik-1} + e$$

$$L_2 = \ln \left( \frac{P(Y = 1000 + BRDs)}{P(no\_onset)} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \cdots + \beta_k X_{ik-1} + e$$

As we see from this equation, we now have different logit co-efficients for the two different thresholds of civil war onset.

**Variables.** Our analysis covers 143 states over the period 1980–2004 totalling 2,605 observations. We use a variable constructed by Strand64 based on the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset.65 For our first models, we use the onset variable coded by Strand,66 but we proceed by recoding this dichotomous variable to make a trichotomous variable (multi-onsets). The value $Y = 1$ is given to all civil war onsets with more than 25 BRDs

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Multi-onset</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No war</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>96.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 25 and 1,000 BRDs</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1,000 BRDs</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

BRDs = battle-related deaths.
in the year the conflict started. A civil war onset is a conflict-year that is preceded by at least two successive years of peace. As Table 1 shows, small and large wars seem to have a very similar frequency, which challenges the view that small wars are more frequent but large wars are less. Perhaps the Cold War years saw larger numbers of small wars, an issue we leave for a future date to explore.

Control variables. We follow Fearon and Laitin’s widely cited study on civil war to inform our models. Regime type is a commonly employed control in empirical studies of civil war. Many researchers find that democratic and autocratic countries alike experience fewer civil wars compared with intermediate regimes (henceforth anocracies). Anacrocies are societies where central authority is weak or non-existent. Others highlight the transition period from one form of government to another as a factor increasing the risk of civil war. Following others, we use the Polity IV dataset on institutional democracy. We dummy code democracy so as to separate democracies and autocracies from the anocracies, which serve as the reference category. We lag all our control variables by one year.

Income per capita is a robust predictor of civil war onset. Data on GDP per capita is from the World Bank. This variable is log transformed to avoid skewness. We also include economic growth in our analysis. According to rational actor theory, a primary commodity exporting country would be more prone to civil war, not least because oil exports increases the potential rewards of rebellion. It can also be a measure of a weak state structure, and resource dependence may help finance rebel movements. We use Fearon and Laitin’s dummy variable for oil dependent countries. Each country-year in which fuel exports surpassed one-third of total export revenues is coded as 1 and 0 if not.

Apparently, large countries are more susceptible to rebellion than smaller ones. As a measure of size, we have included population, taken from the World Bank. This variable is log transformed to reduce skewness. In addition, we include two measures that capture conditions favourable for insurgency. The first one, per cent mountainous, is from Fearon and Laitin. They argue that rough terrain should favour insurgency. The second geographic measure is non-contiguous state, also obtained from the Fearon and Laitin dataset. Non-contiguous state is a dummy variable where the value 1 is given to those states that have populations above 10,000 that are separated from the mainland by at least 100 km of water. Such a separation of territory apparently leads to irredentist/secessionist insurgency, all of which are good controls when predicting how ethnicity may matter for civil war.

RESULTS

We present the rare events logit analysis with state repression as the main independent variable in Table 2.

As seen there, repression of empowerment rights has no statistically significant effect on the onset of civil wars defined as 25 BRDs and above. Ethnic fractionalisation, on the other hand, positively predicts the onset of civil war, results
also reported by others. Holding all the variables at their mean values, we computed a baseline predicted probability of an onset of civil war. We then raised the value of fractionalisation by its mean value plus a standard deviation holding all the other variables at their means. The recomputed prediction was 46 per cent larger than the baseline. The same exercise using income per capita led to a change of the baseline by 43 per cent. This suggests that the substantive impact of ethnic fractionalisation is as large as that of income. Ethnic fractionalisation is positively related to the onset of civil wars above 25 deaths, supporting the view that the larger the number of ethnic groups in a country the greater the chance of conflict. Of course, since we find some evidence that the effect maybe curvilinear, which supports the polarisation argument, at least for the time period that we test (1980–2004), fractionalisation matters. In order, however, to figure out whether this is opportunistic versus a grievance-based outcome, we test the conditional effect of fractionalisation with empowerment rights.

As seen in Table 3, the interaction term between repression of empowerment and ethnic fractionalisation is negatively related to the onset of civil war and statistically significant. The single term of ethnic fractionalisation is now highly significant statistically, and should be interpreted as the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on the onset of a civil war at the value of zero repression. Ethic groups rebel when they have no repression applied by states. Likewise, repression’s effect alone is positive and statistically significant on onsets of civil war when fractionalisation is zero, suggesting that repression under conditions of homogeneity increases the risk of civil war. In other words, Table 3 suggests that state repression decreases the

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>p-value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State repression*</td>
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<td>.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalisation*</td>
<td>1.349</td>
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<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income*†</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Autocracy*</td>
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<td>Oil exporter*</td>
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<td>.045</td>
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<td>Population*†</td>
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<td>.018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per cent mountainous</td>
<td>0.147</td>
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<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal dependence</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spline (3)</td>
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Note: * Lagged one year; †log transformed; ‡anocracy as reference category. The parameters are estimated using King and Zeng ReLogit software. The units are clustered by country using Huber-White robust standard errors. The dependent variable includes all civil war onsets with more than 25 BRDs. BRDs = battle-related deaths.
probability of civil war onset in ethnically fractionalised societies, and does the opposite in relatively homogeneous states. These results call into question the use of ethnic fractionalisation as a measure of grievance in similar studies.

Figure 1 shows the substantive effect of repressing citizens’ ‘soft’ rights conditioned by fractionalisation. If all other variables are held at their mean values, the probability of the onset of civil war in a society with maximum values on both ethnic fractionalisation and state repression is 3.13 per cent. However, if repression is at its lowest in the same society, the probability increases to 5.51 per cent. For a homogeneous society, the corresponding values are 0.56 (in a non-repressive state) and 2.49 per cent (in a repressive state). Thus, the effect of state repression is quite the opposite for homogeneous countries. Grievances due to the lack of liberties might be a factor explaining onset in homogeneous countries, but the risk of war in these societies are in general considerably lower than in fractionalised ones.

Next, we test the effects of ethnicity on different levels of conflict using multinomial regression method. Apparently, ethnic fractionalisation may raise the risk of small wars but lower the risk of larger wars. Multi-nomial methods also allow us to test our basic findings with a method less sensitive to endogeneity problems. We include peace years with three splines as a control for time dependence also in the multi-nomial models. This variable includes the years that have passed since the country last experienced a conflict-year with more than 25 BRDs, which implies

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
<th>b</th>
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<th>p-value</th>
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<td>State repression*</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalisation*</td>
<td>2.578</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction repr–ethnic*</td>
<td>−0.227</td>
<td>−1.89</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income*†</td>
<td>−0.467</td>
<td>−2.52</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth*</td>
<td>−0.020</td>
<td>−1.04</td>
<td>.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy*a</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>.608</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autocracy*a</td>
<td>−0.267</td>
<td>−0.86</td>
<td>.392</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil exporter*</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population*†</td>
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<td>2.20</td>
<td>.028</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per cent mountainous</td>
<td>0.153</td>
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<td>.150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-contiguous state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>−2.43</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal dependence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>.143</td>
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<td>Spline (1)</td>
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<td>1.36</td>
<td>.172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spline (2)</td>
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<td>−1.19</td>
<td>.236</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spline (3)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>.447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations: 2,605

Note: * Lagged one year; †log transformed; “anocracy as reference category. The parameters are estimated using King and Zeng85 ReLogit software. The units are clustered by country using Huber-White robust standard errors.86 The dependent variable includes all civil war onsets with more that 25 BRDs. BRDs = battle-related deaths.
that the effect civil war itself might have on the repression of rights is accounted when predicting onsets above 1,000 BRDs, a rather strong control for endogeneity.

As seen in Table 4, state repression when ethnic fractionalisation is 0 is positive and significant on the onset of civil wars at the 25 deaths but below 1,000 level and the above 1,000 levels. Ethnic fractionalisation when repression is 0 is also positive and significant for both levels of civil wars. The interaction term is negative and narrowly misses significance for small wars but is statistically significant for large wars (the three terms are jointly highly significant in both instances, however). Ethnic fractionalisation is the strongest predictor of civil war, regardless of onset level, which does not support Esteban and Ray’s assertion that fractionalisation will cause more frequent small wars and less severe large ones, but as they suggest, the effect is reversed when fractionalisation is conditioned by repression. Ethnic fractionalisation’s effect on conflict does not seem to come from a lack of rights, however, for both intensities of civil war.

Per capita income is highly significant for war onsets with between 25 and 1,000 yearly BRDs, but it loses significance when we compare large wars with the reference category. When richer countries have an onset they seem to be more severe even if they have fewer onsets in general. This effect maybe largely due to the time period tested as our data is bound to be over representative of the end of Soviet conflicts. The opposite is true for oil exporter, which is significant at the higher level of conflict but not at the lower threshold. Population loses significance at the low threshold of conflict, but is statistically significant at the higher threshold. Economic growth is significant at the 25–1,000 BRDs level, where growth leads to a reduced risk of onset, but this does not apply to the 1,000+ BRDs category. Non-contiguous states are at increased risk of civil war at the higher threshold, but not for the smaller ones. Per cent mountainous has little or no effect on small wars, but it does have some explanatory power on the larger ones. A mountainous country has a greater risk of increasing intensity.
If we look closer at the effect of state repression on both levels of civil war onset, we find it to differ depending on which threshold we are examining. The effects of state repression on the probability for two levels of civil war onset, conditioned by the effect of ethnicity, and all other values set at their respective means, are shown in Figure 2. For homogeneous societies, the risk of a smaller internal armed conflict increases as repression increases, and for a fractionalised society, the risk of a large-scale civil war increases as repression decreases. In other words, if a heterogeneous country suffers the full brunt of government repression of empowerment rights, the risk of a large-scale civil war breaking out in a given country-year is 0.39 per cent. But if the ethnically divided society is free of repression, then the chance of onset increases to 2.42 per cent, which is a massive change (6.2 times greater). Thus, the same conclusion can be drawn from the multinomial model as from the general model tested in Table 2: Grievances due to lack of freedoms seem not to be the explanation as to why ethnically divided countries experience civil war, if lower empowerment rights of groups is what some will try to change through violence. Like Wiesehomeier and Schneider, we too find that conflict under conditions of fractionalisation is more likely when democratic rights are increasing.

For heterogeneous countries, the effect of repression is largest for civil wars with more than 1,000 battle related deaths. This can be explained by what some suggest is effective in-group policing, where persons who inflict violence upon an individual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Between 25 and 1,000 BRDs</th>
<th>More than 1,000 BRDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State repression*</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalisation*</td>
<td>2.296</td>
<td>3.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction repr–ethnic*</td>
<td>-0.213</td>
<td>-0.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income*†</td>
<td>-0.585</td>
<td>-0.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth*</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy*</td>
<td>0.922</td>
<td>-0.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy*</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>-0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil exporter*</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>1.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population*†</td>
<td>0.198</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per cent mountainous</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.322</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-contiguous state</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.797</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-8.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal dependence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.770</td>
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<td>Spline (1)</td>
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<td>Spline (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spline (3)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo log likelihood</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Lagged one year; † log transformed; ^ autocracy as reference category. The units are clustered by country using Huber-White robust standard errors. BRDs = battle-related deaths.
belonging to a different ethnic group are expected to be punished by members of their own group. Under repression, ethnic groups might prevent small conflicts from escalating into big wars, or that organising violence under conditions of fractionalisation simply remain small due to group-size rather then any given intensity of grievance. We also see that repression increases the risk of 25–1,000 BRDs onset in homogeneous states, but even the most extreme value of repression does not make this effect stronger than the effect of ethnic fractionalisation. According to our models, an ethnically diverse country will be more conflict prone than a homogeneous one, regardless of their value on state repression (all other variables held at their means). The results support those who argue that ethnic conflicts are more narrowly based than people are generally willing to believe.

To test the robustness of our results, we have performed a number of sensitivity tests. By and large, however, the robustness checks yield similar results to those reported in the main analyses. In fact, when replacing the dependent variable with Fearon and
Laitin’s, the effects of repression and ethnicity, including the interaction term, are even stronger and more significant. This is despite the fact that Fearon and Laitin’s onset variable is correlated only at \( r = .296 \) with our dependent variable using the Uppsala-PRIOR coding. We try the conditional effects by replacing empowerment rights with harder violations of rights measured by the Physical Integrity Rights index and the Political Terror Scale (PTS), but the interaction terms are not significant. This may confirm our suspicion that harder rights are bound to be violated with the onset of conflict, or the effects are masked by problem of endogeneity.

CONCLUSION

This study addressed the issue of whether or not men rebel out of grievance, or whether rebellion was most likely for opportunistic reasons. Scholars have tried to tackle this issue by looking at group-identity based factors but generally used a measure of ethnic fractionalisation or lack of political rights to proxy grievance. Apparently, ethnic identity can allow groups to overcome collective action problems, particularly when responding to discriminatory state policies. We have tested the effect of state repression of group rights directly and conditionally with measures of ethnic fractionalisation. Our results support those who argue that opportunity rather than objective measures of grievance matter for predicting rebellion because the risk of civil war increases when state repression of empowerment rights eases under conditions of high fractionalisation. We also do not find different results on this dimension when we test two categories of civil war defined as small and large civil wars. As several scholars have recently commented, the organisation of violence may have little to do with the meta-discourses of ethnic grievance and enmity.

Has the US occupation force in Iraq, for example, paid too much attention to the loud discourse of grievance by particular ethnic groups? Should security to communities have been provided on the basis of inoculating the narrowly based sources of violence rather than look for ways to fight broad ethnic representation? Does the Taleban represent an ethnic grievance broadly? We have related this question to the current debate about how and why ethnicity matters for predicting the outbreak of war. Do armed groups, such as the Ninja’s in the Congo, or the Serbian Nationalist group, Arkan’s Tigers in the former Yugoslavia, the Westside boys in Sierra Leone, or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, actually represent a legitimate cause, even if narrowly based, or are they opportunists that cannot play the ethnic card successfully because their claims of seeking justice may not be credible? During the last cease-fire between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, the commander of the Eastern wing of the LTTE broke away and joined the government. In fact, he acted opportunistically, which has considerably weakened the LTTE’s ‘ethnic’ claims. Is ethnic grievance then that banal? Previous studies have not conditioned the effects of ethnic fractionalisation on objectively measurable indicators of repression by states. Our results show clearly that rebellion is most likely when empowerment rights are high. It maybe a huge mistake thus to think that peace in Malaysia is due to the objective
'satisfaction' of ethnic groups there. The Malaysian state may simply be more capable of inoculating violence more effectively than others.

Our findings indicate that removing repression of empowerment rights should not be the main goal if one wants to reduce the risk of rebellion by ethnic groups. Allowing repression of human rights, however, will lead a country into the anocracy category, which cannot be regarded as a positive development given the observation that, over time, countries that become strong democracies will enjoy sustainable peace. In the long run, democracies are more stable.97 Neither is violating human rights normatively defensible. A long-term goal should therefore be to democratise countries, but with the recognition that opportunists might use the occasion for self-interested violence, as has been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Proper attention to identifying and isolating opportunistic behaviour might be key to how international and local policy succeeds – impassioned cries of ‘liberty or death’, from the romantic past, are best seen for what they are. As Thomas Jefferson wrote of Patrick Henry’s speech, 'when he had spoken in opposition to my opinion . . . I myself had been highly delighted and moved, I have asked myself, when he ceased, “What the devil has he said?” and could never answer the inquiry’.98 Appeals to passion may be effective in the short term, but, as Paul Collier has put it, 'rebel groups may need to harness a grievance to get started, but only those that can become profitable through predation are sustainable'.99

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are extremely grateful to Nina Wiesehomeier, Erik Melander, Tove Grete Lie, Tanja Ellingsen, Jim Fearon, Rangan Chandra, the editors and two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. Only we are responsible for any errors. The data used in this article are available for downloading at: <http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/Indra.de.Soysa/default.htm>.

NOTES


6. Ibid. Cederman and Girardin (note 3) and Cramer (note 2).


8. Thoms and Ron’s (note 5) excellent review of the literature provides some simple preliminary correlations to suggest that group grievances due to state repression matters for predicting civil war. However, it is hard to judge the validity of their conclusions. We use more complex multivariate models using standard statistical techniques that allow us also to test the crucial conditional effects of repression on ethnicity.

9. We use Fearon and Laitin’s (note 2) measure of ethnic fractionalisation. They define a ‘prototypical’ group as one that fits the following criteria: common decent, members are conscious of common ties, members share distinguishing cultural features, these features are valued by the membership, the group has or remembers a homeland, and the group has an identifiable ‘shared’ history. The fractionalisation score is the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the population of a given country will belong to different ethno-linguistic groups. Thus, a country with many small ethnic groups will score higher on an index of fractionalisation than a country with two equally large groups.

10. There is some debate about whether it is ethnic fractionalisation, ethnic exclusion from government or polarisation (relative ethnic homogeneity) that matters (see Cederman and Girardin, note 3; Esteban and Ray, note 3; and Fearon *et al.*, note 3). In fact, the arguments about fractionalisation and polarisation are based on opportunity and not grievance-based arguments. Polarisation apparently matters for large civil wars but fractionalisation for small ones. We address this issue in some detail below. Fearon *et al.* (note 3) demonstrate that Cederman and Girardin’s findings are not robust.

11. We find a clear curvilinear effect of ethnic fractionalisation as others too have reported but only if we use a cutoff of five years or more of peace as an end of a civil war before the next onset. We use the two-year cutoff as our dependent variable, which increases the number of onsets. However, our results are consistent with those reported by Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 3).

12. Esteban and Ray (note 3).


16. Sri Lanka scored 9 out of 10 on the empowerment rights scale on the year of civil war onset in 1983. Despite several onsets of civil war since then, its empowerment rights score has never dipped below Malaysia’s.

17. Collier and Hoeffler (note 2).


20. According to Kanchan Chandra and Steven Wilkinson, ‘Measuring the Effect of “Ethnicity”’, *Comparative Political Studies* 41/4–5 (2008) pp.515–63, the question of conceptualising and measuring ethnic groups is not straightforward, since there is overlap in terms of how people actually identify with any given ethnic group and because people confuse and conflate ethnic structure with ethnic practice. As they argue, when ethnic fragmentation is used as a measure for ethnic salience, one cannot really conclude that ethnicity does not matter for conflict since fragmentation only captures ethnic structure and not how any group might feel and act upon political and social issues, what they call ethnic ‘practice’. They also argue that fragmentation measures may conflate both ‘ethnic practice’ and structure since many measures count groups based on self-identification, which relates to ‘practice’. Despite their criticisms, they are quite clear that ‘Fearon and Laitin are perhaps the most careful in the measures that they use’.


23. Esteban and Ray (note 3).
24. Thoms and Ron (note 5).
25. The Empowerment Rights Index explains less than half the variance of our measure of democracy, suggesting that these two variables truly capture different dimensions of political and social rights.
30. Oberschall, for example, implies that the DA notion of relative deprivation contains little more than that hardship produces anger and grievances; see Anthony Oberschall, ‘Theories of Social Conflict’, Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978) pp.291–315, p.299.
36. Muller et al. (note 33).
41. Collier and Hoeffler (note 2) p.564.
44. Fearon and Laitin (note 2) used measures for ethnic fractionalisation, religious fractionalisation, new state, instability and regime type as proxies for grievances. Collier and Hoeffler (note 2) tested a grievance model that included ethnic fractionalisation, religious fractionalisation, polarisation, ethnic dominance, democracy, income inequality and land inequality.
47. Ibid. p.293.
55. Gleditsch et al. (note 13).
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p.617 and de Soysa (note 2) p.617.
64. Strand (note 13).
65. The Uppsala dataset defines internal armed conflict as a conflict that ‘occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states’, and internal armed conflict as one that ‘occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states’ (Strand, note 13).
66. Ibid.
67. Strand’s (note 13) variable originally had four categories: 0 = no onset; 1 = the conflict on total did not cause more than 1,000 BRDs; 2 = a total of more than 1,000 BRDs in the conflict, but no single year crossed this threshold; 3 = at least on year had more than 1,000 BRDs.
68. Strand (note 13) operates with several intermittency thresholds, and models using the five-year threshold as the dependent variable are also tested. The results from these do not differ substantially from those using the two-year threshold.
69. Fearon and Laitin (note 2).
73. The original variable is coded from –10 to 10. We have recoded the variable so that values above 6 on the polity scale are put into DEMOCRACY, and values below –5 into AUTOCRACY.
77. Due to the strong correlation between population and the countries’ geographical size, we chose only to include the former one in our analyses.
78. World Bank (note 75).
79. Fearon and Laitin (note 2) p.80.
80. Ibid.
83. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 3)
85. King and Zeng (note 81).
86. White (note 82).
87. Esteban and Ray (note 3).
88. White (note 82).
89. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 3).
90. Fearon and Laitin (note 40).
92. Fearon and Laitin (note 2).
93. Fearon and Laitin (note 2) p.76, define civil war as one where at least 1,000 people were killed over the course of the conflict, with a yearly minimum of 100 BRDs. The correlation for units included in the analysis is .236.
94. Cingranelli and Richards (note 48).
96. Mueller (note 2); Gagnon (note 91).
97. Hegre et al. (note 70) p.44.

APPENDIX: Coding Scheme for Cingranelli-Richards’ Measure of Empowerment Rights

- *Government censorship* and/or ownership of the media (including radio, TV, domestic news agencies) is:
  (0) complete
  (1) some
  (2) none

- There are *restrictions on some religious practices* by the government of the country:
  (0) yes
  (1) no

- Domestic and foreign *travel* is:
  (0) restricted
  (1) generally unrestricted

- *Political participation* is:
  (0) very limited
  (1) moderately free and open
  (2) very free and open

- *Union activities* are:
  (0) severely restricted or controlled by the government
  (1) somewhat restricted
  (2) unrestricted