

1 **When a Fish is a Fish:**
2 **The Economic Impacts of Escaped Farmed Fish**

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1 **ABSTRACT**

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3 The escape of cultured fish from a marine aquaculture facility is a type of biological invasion
4 that may lead to a variety of potential ecological and economic effects on native fish. This
5 paper develops a general invasive species impact model to capture explicitly both the
6 ecological and economic effects of invasive species, especially escaped farmed fish, on native
7 stocks and harvests. First, the possible effects of escaped farmed fish on the growth and stock
8 size of a native fish are examined. Next, a bioeconomic model to analyze changes in yield,
9 benefit distribution, and overall profitability is constructed. Different harvesting scenarios,
10 such as commercial, recreational, and joint commercial and recreational fishing, are explored.
11 The model is illustrated by a case study of the interaction between native and farmed Atlantic
12 salmon in Norway. The results suggest that both the harvest and profitability of a native fish
13 stock may decline after an invasion, but the total profits from the harvest of both native and
14 farmed stocks may increase or decrease, depending on the strength of the ecological and
15 economic parameters.

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18 **Keywords:** biological invasion, escaped farmed fish, invasive fish, ecological and economic
19 effects

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21 **JEL Classification:** Q22; Q26; Q51; Q57
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1 **1. INTRODUCTION**

2 During the last few decades, concerns have been increasing about the effects of invasive
3 species, especially invasive fish. Invasive species can be introduced intentionally into a new
4 environment for recreational or commercial purposes (Williams *et al.* 1995). In other cases,
5 human activities have allowed intruders to become established indirectly. For example, global
6 warming causes organisms to migrate to higher latitudes (Carlton 2000), and transportation
7 and shipping carries organisms across the oceans (Enserink 1999). Small scale events such as
8 wastewater discharges and farming activities may release organisms into the surrounding
9 environment. Regardless of its origins, an invasive species (including fish) potentially
10 generates risks to and effects on native species, local communities, and ecosystems (Mooney
11 and Hobbs 2000). The potential economic effects of invasive species consist of damages to
12 economic enterprises, food safety and human health, markets, particularly seafood markets,
13 and international trade (Lovell, Stone and Fernandez 2006; Olsen 2006). These economic
14 impacts can be severe. In addition to economic impacts, invasive species also generate
15 ecological impacts, including losses to biodiversity and changes in the structures and
16 functions of individual populations and ecosystems (Mooney and Hobbs 2000). Holmes (1998)
17 argued that invasive species are the second most important cause of biodiversity losses
18 worldwide, just after habitat degradation.

19 In this paper, we analyze another potential concern associated with invasive fish, namely, the
20 ecological and economic impacts on native fish of invasive fish from aquaculture facilities.
21 Farmed species are reared in confined facilities in locations that provide suitable conditions
22 for growth and are accessible to markets. Due to natural disasters, accidents, or human error,
23 farmed animals can escape from their facilities into the surrounding environment, potentially
24 creating ecological and economic impacts, especially when there are interactions with native
25 fish.

26
27 The escaped fish interact with native fish in a variety of ways. Ecologically, they may interact
28 through competition, predation, hybridization, colonization, or the spread of disease or
29 parasites. Ecological interactions may lead to both positive and negative effects on native fish.
30 If escaped cultured fish are able to survive in the natural environment, they become part of the
31 ecosystem, and they interact directly (and indirectly) with the native fish. For example,
32 escaped farmed salmon compete with native salmon, and escaped farmed cod and halibut
33 migrate to the open ocean to interact with native habitants, including their congeners.

1 Competition over natural habitat, food sources, and mates may result in changes in the
2 structure and productivity of a native stock (Naylor *et al.* 2005). In the case of escaped farmed
3 salmon, it has been reported that successful interbreeding between escaped farmed and native
4 salmon reduces fitness and productivity (McGinnity *et al.* 2003), dilutes genetic gene pools
5 (McGinnity *et al.* 2004; Roberge *et al.* 2008), and threatens the survival of native salmon
6 offspring (Hindar *et al.* 2006). Also, escaped farmed salmon may spread disease and parasites,
7 thereby increasing the mortality of native salmon (Bjørn and Finstad 2002; Gargan, Tully and
8 Poole 2002; Krkošek *et al.* 2006). If the number of escaped farmed fish is small, the effects
9 may be negligible; the effects increase in severity as the number of escaped farmed fish grows.
10 Some vulnerable native stocks potentially could go extinct with repeated invasions. Escaped
11 farmed fish also can create economic impacts in seafood markets. For example, depending on
12 the ecological impact, invasive farmed fish could change (increase or decrease) the overall
13 stock (native and escaped farmed) available for harvest.

14 In this paper, we develop a general bioeconomic model to capture both the ecological and
15 economic effects of invasive farmed fish on native stocks and harvests. The framework
16 discussed here is transferable to other situations where escaped fish mix with their native
17 counterparts, or where an ecosystem, for any reason, faces a yearly influx of invasive fish.
18 The increasing aquaculture production worldwide of both salmon and other species such as
19 cod and halibut highlights the importance of this issue.

20

21 The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of the literature on the
22 economics of invasive species with an emphasis on aquatic species invasions. In sections
23 three and four, we derive the mechanisms of ecological and economic impacts of invasive
24 farmed fish on native fish. We first introduce an ecological model of an invasive farmed fish.
25 In section four, the flow of service costs and benefits are taken into account. In section five,
26 we analyze the unified planning solution in equilibrium. In section six, we apply the
27 framework to Atlantic salmon in Norway to illustrate the ecological and economic effects of
28 escaped farmed salmon on native salmon stocks and fisheries under different scenarios. The
29 last section concludes the paper.

30

31 **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

32 The economic analysis of an invasion includes estimating the actual or potential damage costs
33 resulting from an invasion and the costs associated with management measures such as

1 prevention, control, and mitigation (Hoagland and Jin 2006). The economics of pest
2 management and disease control have been extensively studied in agriculture, forestry and
3 fisheries, but less attention has been directed to measuring the costs associated with invasions
4 (Perrings, Williamson, and Dalmazzone 2000). This limitation is due to a lack of data as well
5 as uncertainties and measurement problems. There is an extensive literature on multiple
6 species interactions, such as predator-prey and biological competition, however. For instance,
7 Hannesson (1983) has explored the optimal harvesting of a two-species predator-prey system,
8 Flaaten (1991) has investigated the sustainable harvesting of two competing species, and
9 Strobele and Wacker (1991) have explored the optimal harvesting of two species under
10 various types of interactions. A recent detailed review of integrated ecological-economic
11 models can be found in Tschirhart (2009).

12

13 A general conceptual bioeconomic model of the economic impacts of an invasion has been
14 developed by Knowler and Barbier (2000) and Barbier (2001). These authors specify two
15 principles that should be followed. First, the exact interaction between the invader and the
16 native species should be examined, and, second, the correct measure of the economic impacts
17 is to compare the *ex post* and *ex ante* economic values (i.e., profits) of invasion scenarios. The
18 first principle is the essential step. Their conceptual model includes both diffusion and
19 interspecies competition. The authors consider a situation in which the invader is a pest
20 without commercial value and the native fish is commercially harvested. Knowler and Barbier
21 (2000) illustrate a special case by focusing only on interspecies competition. They model the
22 predator-prey relationship between a native anchovy species and an invading comb-jellyfish
23 in the Black Sea. The anchovy is the prey for the comb-jelly fish, whose invasion leads to a
24 decline in the productivity of anchovy. The study concludes that the introduction of a comb-
25 jellyfish is destructive to the local fishing communities dependent on the anchovy fishery for
26 sustaining their livelihoods.

27

28 Knowler, Barbier and Strand (2002) and Knowler and Barbier (2005) apply the predator-prey
29 model to examine the interactions among nutrient enrichment, invasive comb-jelly fish, and
30 native anchovy in the Black Sea under different management strategies. The anchovy benefits
31 from the nutrient abatement, and suffers from competition and predation by comb-jellyfish.
32 They show that the outbreak of comb-jellyfish resulting from nutrient enrichment can dilute
33 the benefits raised by pollution abatement. Similarly, Settle and Shogren (2002) examine the
34 introduction of exotic lake trout into Yellowstone Lake based on predator-prey relationships

1 among lake trout, cutthroat trout, bears, birds, and human beings. The authors find that if the
2 invasive lake trout is unchecked, the native cutthroat trout population would dramatically
3 decline, even go extinct, which further affects the grizzly bear population. The bioeconomic
4 models in these studies are founded on predator-prey relationships between invasive and
5 native fish.

6
7 Viewed as a form of biological pollution, an invasion generates externalities on economic
8 activities such as commercial and recreational fishing. For example, McConnell and Strand
9 (1989) analyze the social returns to commercial fisheries when water quality influences the
10 demand and supply of commercial fish products under both open access and efficient
11 allocation. They show theoretically that water quality affects fish growth through
12 reproduction and carrying capacity and affects total fishing costs through changes in fish
13 stocks. Following this framework, Kataria (2007) applies a cost-benefit analysis to examine
14 the introduction of signal crayfish to a fresh watercourse where native noble crayfish resides.
15 The analysis suggests that the introduction of signal crayfish can generate positive net benefits
16 if the two species have different population growth parameters. With similar growth
17 parameters, on the other hand, the author shows that the introduction of signal crayfish would
18 wipe out native noble crayfish because the two species cannot coexist.

19
20 In the case of fisheries and aquaculture, however, the literature dealing with the economic
21 impacts of farmed fish on native fish is quite limited. Earlier work by Anderson (1985a and
22 1985b) addressed the interaction between native capture and ranched salmon in terms of
23 common property problems and competitive markets. Recent work by Olaussen and Skonhoft
24 (2008a) studies the economic impacts of escaped farmed Atlantic salmon on a recreational
25 salmon fishery. Expanding the models by Knowler and Barbier (2000) and McConnell and
26 Strand (1989), they incorporate both ecological and economic effects and specify four general
27 mechanisms that may affect economically valuable species (i.e., salmon) when exposed to
28 biological invasions, namely, *ecological level*, *ecological growth*, *economic quantity*, and
29 *economic quality*. Ecologically, escaped farmed salmon impose negative impacts on the
30 growth but lead to positive impacts on the stock of native salmon. Economically, escaped
31 farmed salmon lead to positive impacts on the supply (quantity) of and negative impacts on
32 the demand (quality) for native salmon.

1 Other studies have explored the economic impacts of aquaculture on native fish species in
2 general. For example, Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell (2003) analyze the effects of
3 aquaculture on native fish species through fish habitat and supply in the product market. They
4 assume the carrying capacity of a fish stock is a downward sloping linear function of the area
5 devoted to aquaculture, and the farmed product competes in the same market as native fish
6 products. The results suggest that the commercial fish stock declines because more space is
7 devoted to aquaculture. Under an open-access fishery, it is economically efficient for
8 aquaculture to displace the fishery completely. An ocean area could be allocated exclusively
9 for either aquaculture or fisheries at an economic optimum when aquaculture exerts a
10 significant negative impact on the fishery.

11
12 The ecological-economic model we develop in this paper differs from previous studies in
13 several ways. First, we explicitly model the effects of an invasive fish species on the growth
14 and stock size of a native fish species using a logistic growth model. We assume that both the
15 growth and stock effects on the native fish are negative, and we treat native and farmed fish
16 species as separate stocks with separate growth functions. This approach is in contrast to that
17 of Olausen and Skonhøft (2008a), who regard farmed salmon as a single exogenous flow into
18 the system. Given our simplified biological model, we do not capture explicitly genetic
19 interactions between native and escaped fish. Second, in contrast to Knowler, Barbier, and
20 Strand (2002) and Knowler and Barbier (2005), we consider the escaped farmed fish as a
21 potentially commercially valuable species. Additionally, farmed fish coexist with native fish,
22 unlike the crayfish case in which the native fish are displaced (Kataria 2007). A nonselective
23 harvesting strategy is applied to both escaped and native fish. Third, instead of using cultured
24 area or aquaculture production as dependent variable to alter the carrying capacity (Hoagland,
25 Jin, and Kite-Powell 2003), we hold the carrying capacity unchanged, and we use the biomass
26 of escaped farmed fish as a *deterministic* variable to translate the ecological risks and effects
27 into growth and stock variables for a native stock. Fourth, we assume that the growth of the
28 invasive fish depends upon both own and native fish biomass.

29

30 **3. BIOLOGICAL MODEL**

31 In absence of an invasive fish, the natural growth of a native fish population X , measured in
32 biomass, or number of fish, at time t (the time subscript is omitted) is given by $F(X)$. The
33 natural growth function may typically be a one-peaked value function and is specified as the
34 standard logistic one:

$$F(X) = rX(1 - X/K), \quad (1)$$

where r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the carrying capacity of a specific habitat, or population's natural equilibrium size. This growth model suggests that the population growth depends on the population size, or density, given a specific habitat, and basically combines two ecological processes: reproduction and competition. The intrinsic growth rate r represents reproduction, or reproductive abilities, while the population size per carrying capacity X/K represents competition since carrying capacity can be interpreted as the maximum number of fish the habitat can support.

As indicated above, once established in the natural environment, an escaped farmed fish becomes part of the ecosystem and interacts with a native fish. Hence, incorporating the escaped farmed fish, the growth function changes to $F(X, Y)$, where Y is the stock size of the escaped farmed fish, or an invasive fish stock in general, also measured in the number of fish (or in biomass). Typically, a larger escaped farmed fish stock means lower natural growth and productivity in the native population, i.e. $\partial F(X, Y)/\partial Y = F_Y < 0$.

This negative growth effect may work through different channels. Based on the logistic growth function, we consider two effects that are represented through the intrinsic growth rate and through the carrying capacity. First, we consider the *stock effect* where the classical Lotka-Volterra interspecific competition model is modified and employed. This model takes into account the effects of intraspecific competition between the two types of fish, i.e., native and escaped farmed fish. Here the competition of a escaped farmed fish with a native fish is added into the logistic growth model of native fish by the term βY , with β as the competition coefficient. The same principle is applied to the competition effects of native fish on escaped farmed fish, see equation (4) below. Our population growth models use the same carrying capacity for the two fish, however, which differs from the Lotka-Volterra interspecific competition model, where the carrying capacity for the different types of fish generally varies. The reason for using the same carrying capacity for the two fish here is that we consider the situation where the escaped farmed fish is quite similar to the native and hence makes the same use of the habitat as the native fish. This assumption fits well in the case when a domesticated fish escapes and competes with its native congeners but is of course less suitable if it competes with a quite different species. Technically these approaches work in a similar manner as the denominator diminishes when altering the carrying capacity while the

1 numerator increases in our model. Strictly speaking, both lead to increasing pressures on the
 2 survival of native fish due to competition for resources and space. Modifying Eq. (1), we then
 3 obtain:

$$4 \quad F(X, Y) = \tilde{r}X[1 - (X + \beta Y) / K] . \quad (2)$$

5 When $0 < \beta \leq 1$, the effect of the escaped farmed fish on the native stock is less than the
 6 effect of the native stock on itself. On the other hand, when $\beta > 1$, the effect of the escaped
 7 farmed fish on the native stock is greater than the effect of the native stock on itself.¹ The
 8 maximum native natural growth is now given by $\tilde{r}(K - \beta Y)^2 / 4$ when the stock size at the
 9 maximum growth (*MSY*) is reduced to $X = X^{msy} = (K - \beta Y) / 2$. In other words, both the
 10 maximum growth and the stock size that yields this peak growth are reduced (see Figure 1,
 11 dark dotted curve).

12

13 As mentioned above, escaped organisms may interbreed with native individuals, which may
 14 potentially deteriorate the genetic makeup and reduce the fitness of the native stock. We
 15 couple this reproductive effect into the intrinsic growth rate, referring to it as a *growth effect*.
 16 The intrinsic growth rate is redefined as $\tilde{r} = \tilde{r}(X, Y) = r(1 - e^{-\gamma X/Y})$, where $\gamma > 0$ is a scaling
 17 parameter representing the magnitude of effects of escaped fish on native fish. This formula
 18 indicates that the intrinsic growth rate declines with the increasing biomass of the escaped fish
 19 in a non-linear fashion with $\tilde{r} = \tilde{r}(X, 0) = r$ and $\tilde{r} = \tilde{r}(X, \infty) = 0$ for all $X > 0$. In addition, we
 20 have $\tilde{r} > 0$ for all $0 < Y < \infty$. It should be noted that especially in cases where the escaped
 21 and native fish interbreed, the interbreeding may induce accumulated genetic effects from
 22 generation to generation. Taking such effects into account would require a more complicated
 23 model that explicitly takes the gene flow into account, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
 24 One of the reasons for including a *growth effect*, however, is that the intrinsic growth rate may
 25 be reduced due to the influence of genes less suited for a life in the native fish. In fact, in the
 26 post invasion equilibrium (see Section 5), the intrinsic growth rate r is reduced due to the
 27 “hybrid wild” salmon affected by escaped fish. The degree of hybridization is determined by
 28 the parameter value of γ and the number of escaped farmed fish. However, we assume that
 29 the wild genotype still dominates this “hybrid” stock, thus, for simplicity we will keep

¹ In some cases, escaped fish may have positive effects on native fish when the native stock is so low that it cannot sustain its growth, and hence the presence of an escaped fish improves its growth (the ‘Allee effect’ in the ecological literature). In this case, the value of β is negative. This possible case is not considered here.

1 referring to this salmon stock as the wild or native stock, even if there will always be degrees
2 of wild and farmed fish in the post invasion case (except when $\gamma = 0$).

3

4 Now, incorporating both the *stock* and *growth* effects into the logistic growth function (1), we
5 obtain²:

$$6 \quad F(X, Y) = r(1 - e^{-\gamma X/Y})X[1 - (X + \beta Y)/K]. \quad (3)$$

7 Figure 1 demonstrates both the stock and growth effect on the native fish growth. Notice that
8 while the stock effect shifts the peak value to the left (dotted curve), the growth effect shifts it
9 to the right (dark solid curve). In both cases the maximum natural growth is reduced.
10 Certainly the magnitude of effects depends on the value of β , γ and Y . The larger β , γ and
11 Y , the stronger the effects.

12

13 *Insert Figure 1 here*

14

15 So far, we have assumed that invasive fish in general, and escaped fish in particular, have
16 negative ecological effects on native fish (but see footnote 1). However, in some instances the
17 effects may be positive. Japanese Seaweed, *Sargassum muticum*, for example, an invasive
18 seaweed species, can enhance local diversity and the ecosystem function. This is because this
19 species can provide an additional habitat for bottom species and food for some invertebrates
20 and native fish species (Sánchez, Fernández, and Arrontes 2005). Another example is invasive
21 zebra mussels which have mixed effects on the environment and native fauna. On the one
22 hand, they can improve the water quality and the richness of macro-invertebrates in lakes; on
23 the other hand, they foul the underwater structures and devices (Ricciardi 2003). Nevertheless,
24 most marine species selected for aquaculture are generally high-value such as salmon, sea
25 bass, halibut, and cod. These species are top predators situated at, or near, the top of the food
26 chain. Therefore, they rarely become the prey of other commercially exploited species. On the
27 other hand, escaped fish are also harvested, and since the escaped fish increase the stock
28 available for harvest *ceteris paribus*, they may also have a positive economic effect. Salmon

² Thus, as already indicated, for a fixed intrinsic growth rate, our model has the same structure as the basic Lotka-Volterra model where the competition loss of our native fish population increases linearly with the amount of the invasive fish. This is seen by rewriting the growth function (2) as

$F(X, Y) = \tilde{r}X(1 - X/K) - (\tilde{r}\beta/K)XY$. The invasive fish natural growth equation (4) has similar structure (see main text below).

1 enhancement in Norway, Canada, Japan and the U.S are good examples of this *ceteris paribus*
 2 positive economic effect (e.g., Anderson 1985a; see also section two above).

3
 4 Additionally, the growth of escaped farmed fish as a part of the ecosystem has to be
 5 considered as well. Like native fish, escaped fish growth is assumed to be density dependent.
 6 Moreover, we assume that there is also a feedback effect from the native fish on escaped fish
 7 similar to the effect of the escaped fish on native fish. Therefore, the growth of escaped fish
 8 follows a growth function similar to that of the native, specified as:
 9

$$10 \quad G(Y, X) = s(1 - e^{-aY/X})Y[1 - (Y + bX) / K] . \quad (4)$$

11
 12 s is the intrinsic growth rate of farmed species; the carrying capacity is assumed to be the
 13 same as that for the native fish, since they share the same habitat; a and b are equivalent to
 14 γ and β in the native fish growth function (Eq. 3), representing the scaling parameter and
 15 competition coefficient, respectively. In the same manner as for the wild fish discussed above,
 16 we assume that the farmed genotype controls this salmon stock, thus, we will refer to this
 17 population as the escaped (farmed) fish, even if there are degrees of hybridization for all
 18 $a > 0$.

19
 20 The stock dynamic models of the native and escaped fish are completed when harvest and the
 21 flow of newly escaped fish are introduced. If h_t and q_t denote the harvests of the native and
 22 farmed species at time t , respectively, and m_t is the *annual* stream of newly escaped fish, the
 23 stock dynamics of the native and escaped fish are written as:

$$24 \quad X_{t+1} - X_t = F(X_t, Y_t) - h_t \quad (5)$$

25 and

$$26 \quad Y_{t+1} - Y_t = G(Y_t, X_t) - q_t + m_t, \quad (6)$$

27 respectively³. In an ecological equilibrium, the natural growth of the native fish stock must
 28 exactly be balanced by its harvest, while the natural growth plus the flow of a newly escaped
 29 farmed fish should be equal to the harvest of the escaped fish. Thus, in equilibrium, we have
 30 $F(X, Y) = h$ and $G(Y, X) + m = q$. Here we study exploitation in ecological equilibrium only.

³ The inclusion of m_t hence means that we have an ecological system with (unintended) species introduction, cf. also section 2 above. Contrary to this, e.g., Rondeau (2001) considers a situation with intended species introduction, but where the population growth equation (he considers deer) is of the similar type as equation (6).

1 Note that this implies an assumption of a continuous and constant stream of invaders over
2 time. This means that the problem of whether the invasive fish should be eradicated at a
3 certain point in time or simply controlled at some equilibrium level is not a topic that we
4 address here.

5

6 **4. COSTS AND BENEFITS**

7 Native fish provide various values, including direct and indirect use values, and non-use
8 values such as option, existence, or intrinsic values. Here we consider only the values directly
9 related to the harvesting of native or escaped farmed fish. Thus, within our unified planner
10 framework, the objective of the planner is to maximize the net surplus of harvesting both
11 native and escaped fish. As already indicated, two types of harvesting activities are considered:
12 harvests by commercial fishermen and harvests by recreational anglers. The net benefit of
13 commercial harvest is determined by the meat value together with the fishing costs, while the
14 net benefit of recreational fishing is determined by the price of fishing permits and the number
15 of fishing permits sold, together with the cost of supplying fishing permits.

16

17 **4.1 Commercial fishing**

18 The harvest functions are assumed to be of the standard Schaefer type where $h_t = \theta E_t X_t$ and
19 $q_t = \psi E_t Y_t$ are the harvests of native and escaped fish, respectively, with θ as the (fixed)
20 catchability coefficient for native and ψ for escaped, and E_t as the effort measured in net
21 fishing days (fishing days times number of nets). Note that these specifications imply non-
22 selectivity in harvest. With identical catchability coefficients, $\theta = \psi$, the harvest will only
23 differ due to the different abundance of native and escaped fish, and the harvest ratio will
24 always be equal to the stock ratio; that is, $h_t / q_t = X_t / Y_t$.

25

26 With $p > 0$ and $v \geq 0$ as the harvest prices of the native and invasive fish, respectively, both
27 assumed fixed and independent of the amount fished, and c is the unit effort cost, also
28 assumed to be fixed, the current profit is:

$$29 \quad \pi_t = p\theta E_t X_t + v\psi E_t Y_t - cE_t. \quad (7)$$

30 As indicated by (7), the invasive fish also may be harvested for its economic value. In some
31 instances, however, this economic value may be absent due to less desire in the market. With
32 a low, or even zero, fish price, $v = 0$, the invasive fish is merely a pest, like the jellyfish case

1 in Knowler, Barbier, and Strand (2002) and Knowler and Barbier (2005). Fishing then occurs
2 mainly for pest control, but it takes place as a byproduct of fishing for native fish because of
3 non-selectivity in harvest. These different cases are analyzed in section 5.

5 **4.2 Recreational fishing**

6 Besides commercial fishing, there may also be recreational fishing. Indeed, in some instances,
7 the recreational fishery is more important. This is the case for the Norwegian Atlantic Salmon
8 fishery explored further in this paper (Section 6 below). While the commercial fishing of
9 salmon takes place in the fjords and inlets, salmon also is harvested in the rivers during their
10 upstream spawning migration in the summer and autumn. The fishing activity in Norwegian
11 rivers is almost exclusively recreational in nature, dominated by recreational anglers with
12 fishing rods. Each angler purchases a time-restricted fishing permit from a landowner/river
13 manager who is authorized by the state to sell fishing permits. A permit may be issued for as
14 little as a few hours or as long as a season. The most common permits are issued on a 24-hour
15 basis (Olaussen and Skonhøft 2008b).

16
17 Most rivers are managed by a single landowner, or a cooperation of landowners, acting as a
18 single principal. The willingness to pay for a recreational fishing permit typically decreases in
19 the number of permits (Anderson 1993). Assuming that the fishing permit price I_t also
20 depends on the stock sizes X_t or Y_t , an inverse demand function may be written as
21 $I_t = I(D_t, X_t, Y_t)$ and where D_t is the number of fishing permits, or number of fishing days⁴.
22 The overall surplus from recreational fishing in the rivers is made up of landowner profits
23 from selling fishing permits plus angler surpluses, defined as:

$$24 \quad U_t = \int_0^{D_t} I(\xi_t, X_t, Y_t) d\xi_t - zD_t \quad (8)$$

25 when the unit cost of providing fishing permits is fixed by z .
26

27 The permit price declines in the number of fishing permits, $I_D < 0$. It is assumed to increase
28 in the size of the native stock, $I_X > 0$, as a higher fish stock indicates a higher quality of the
29 river (see, e.g., Olaussen and Skonhøft 2008b). The permit price could either increase or

⁴ The implicit assumption here is that the recreational fishers know the current year's stocks. Due to stock assessments before the fishing season starts (which usually is in mid June) this assumption may not be far too unrealistic.

1 decrease in the abundance of escaped farmed fish. It is increasing, $I_Y > 0$, if the stock size
 2 available for harvest is all that matters; that is, if the anglers consider a fish as a fish. This may
 3 be due to preferences or simply to difficulties in distinguishing between escaped farmed and
 4 native fish. On the other hand, the permit price shifts down with the size of the escaped
 5 farmed stock if the abundance of escaped farmed salmon decreases the utility of the anglers.
 6 In this case, the anglers simply prefer to harvest pure natives. See also section 6.1 below.

7

8 **4.3 Economic effects of invasion**

9 As in Knowler and Barbier (2000) and Barbier (2001), the economic net effect of an invasion
 10 is determined by comparing pre- and post-invasion scenarios. That is, the economic effect is
 11 the difference between the net benefits yielded from harvesting a native fish *before* and a
 12 native and a farmed species *after* invasion. If $\pi_{0,t}$ is the net current value of pre-invasion
 13 fishing for the commercial fishery, and $U_{0,t}$ for the recreational fishing, the current invasive
 14 economic impact B_t may be expressed as:

$$15 \quad B_{C,t} = \pi_t - \pi_{0,t} = [p\theta E_t X_t + v\psi E_t Y_t - cE_t] - [p\theta E_{0,t} X_{0,t} - cE_{0,t}] \quad (9)$$

16 and

$$17 \quad B_{R,t} = U_t - U_{0,t} = \left[\int_0^{D_t} I(\xi_t, X_t, Y_t) d\xi_t - zD_t \right] - \left[\int_0^{D_{0,t}} I(\xi_{0,t}, X_{0,t}) d\xi_{0,t} - zD_{0,t} \right], \quad (10)$$

18 respectively.

19

20 **5. EXPLOITATION**

21 The management of the ecological system under consideration is analyzed in equilibrium⁵. A
 22 single planner aims to maximize net benefits. We first consider commercial harvest. When
 23 using the general natural growth functions and omitting the time subscript, the Lagrangian is:

$$24 \quad L = (p\theta EX + v\psi EY - cE) - \lambda[\theta EX - F(X, Y)] - \mu[\psi EY - (G(Y, X) + m)] \quad (11)$$

25 where $\lambda > 0$ and μ are the shadow prices of the native and farmed species, respectively.

26

27 In this problem, harvest effort E is the single control variable, and there are two stock
 28 variables, X and Y . The first order necessary conditions are:

⁵ Analyzing dynamic problems where the present value net benefit is maximized are hence left out in the present exposition. However, it is well known that the steady state of such problems coincide with the solution of the parallel equilibrium fishery problems except for the discount rate; that is, for zero discount rate these solutions are similar.

1
$$\partial L / \partial E = p\theta X + v\psi Y - c - (\lambda\theta X + \mu\psi Y) = 0 , \quad (12)$$

2
$$\partial L / \partial X = p\theta E - \lambda[\theta E - F_X(X, Y)] + \mu G_X(Y, X) = 0, \quad (13)$$

3 and

4
$$\partial L / \partial Y = v\psi E + \lambda F_Y(X, Y) - \mu[\psi E - G_Y(Y, X)] = 0 . \quad (14)$$

5 Sufficient conditions are discussed in the Appendix. Control condition (12) indicates that
 6 fishing effort should be increased up to the point where the marginal revenue is equal to the
 7 marginal costs, which are made up of the effort costs plus the costs of reduced stocks
 8 evaluated at their shadow prices. The native fish stock condition (13) states that the number of
 9 native fish should be maintained so that the value of one more fish on the margin should
 10 equalize its marginal cost minus the marginal value of an invasive fish, both measured at their
 11 respective shadow prices. Condition (14) has the same interpretation for the invasive fish. In
 12 this solution, the coexistence of both species is assumed. It is known that coexistence in a
 13 competing setting may require that the total value of biomass lost due to competition must not
 14 be too large (see, e.g., Hannesson 1983 for an economic analysis, and e.g., Maynard Smith
 15 1974 for a basic ecological discussion). In our model, this means, for example, that there must
 16 be certain restrictions on the parameters affecting the intensity of the habitat competition as
 17 well as the size of the annual stream of newly escaped fish (see also numerical section 6
 18 below).

19

20 Rewriting (13) as $\lambda = (p\theta E + \mu G_X) / (\theta E - F_X)$ it is seen that $\lambda > 0$ when the marginal
 21 harvest value dominates the invasive stock cost effect $p\theta E + \mu G_X > 0$ because the harvest
 22 function θEX has to intersect with the native fish natural growth function F from below to
 23 secure an interior maximum solution (see Appendix). Moreover, rewriting equation (14) as
 24 $\mu = (v\psi E + \lambda F_Y) / (\psi E - G_Y)$, it is first observed that $(\psi E - G_Y) > 0$ also must hold for the
 25 same reason. We then find that $\mu \geq 0$ if $v\psi E \geq -\lambda F_Y$. Therefore, the escaped fish shadow
 26 price is positive, suggesting that its harvest price v is ‘high’ together with a ‘small’ negative
 27 effect on the native fish growth; that is, F_Y is small in value. This is the ‘value’ case of the
 28 escaped fish. In the opposite case, we have a ‘pest’, or ‘nuisance’ situation with a negative
 29 shadow price, $\mu < 0$.⁶ Irrespective of whether escaped fish are pests or commercially valuable,
 30 it is always optimal to harvest escaped fish due to the non-selective nature of the fishery.

⁶ For a similar classification, see Schulz and Skonhøft (1996), Zivin, Hueth and Zilberman (2000) and Horan and Bulte (2004).

1

2 When the control condition (12) is rewritten as $(p - \lambda)\theta X + (v - \mu)\psi Y = c$, it is seen that
 3 $(p - \lambda) < 0$ holds when the difference between the market price and the shadow price of the
 4 invasive fish is ‘large’. Equation (13) written as $(p - \lambda)\theta E = -(\lambda F_X + \mu G_X)$ indicates that F_X
 5 is strictly positive in an optimal program if μG_X is ‘small’ in value. In this case, for a given
 6 optimal number of invasive fish, the optimal native stock size will be located to the left hand
 7 side of the peak value of the natural growth function, or X^{msy} (cf. also Figure 1). If the
 8 invasive harvesting price is ‘low’ and $\mu < 0$ together with ‘low’ fishing cost c , we have
 9 $F_X > 0$ for certain. As demonstrated below (section 6.2) this is the baseline result in the
 10 numerical simulations, contrasting it with the standard one-species, Gordon-Schaefer
 11 equilibrium harvesting model (Clark 1990). On the other hand, a ‘high’ c combined with a
 12 ‘low’ value of the native fish catchability coefficient θ , we typically end up with a ‘large’
 13 optimal native stock and a solution to the right hand side of X^{msy} . See the Appendix for
 14 further discussion.

15

16 Next, we consider the recreational fishery. Harvest is still defined through the Schaefer
 17 functions $h = \varphi DX$ and $q = \omega DY$ where effort is given in number of fishing days, or
 18 equivalently, number of licences (see above), with φ and ω as the recreational catchability
 19 coefficient for the native and invasive fish, respectively. Therefore, just as in the commercial
 20 case, with equal catchability coefficients, i.e., $\varphi = \omega$, we find that the harvest ratio is
 21 proportional to the fish abundance ratio. The Lagrangian function now reads:

$$22 \quad L = \int_0^D I(\xi, X, Y) d\xi - zD - \lambda[\varphi DX - F(X, Y)] - \mu[\omega DY - (G(Y, X) + m)]. \quad (15)$$

23 The first-order conditions with coexistence of both species $X > 0$, $Y > 0$, and $D > 0$ are:

$$24 \quad \partial L / \partial D = I(D, X, Y) - z - (\lambda\varphi X + \mu\omega Y) = 0, \quad (16)$$

$$25 \quad \partial L / \partial X = \int_0^D I_X(\xi, X, Y) d\xi + \lambda[F_X(X, Y) - \varphi D] + \mu G_X(Y, X) = 0 \quad (17)$$

26 and

$$27 \quad \partial L / \partial Y = \int_0^D I_Y(\xi, X, Y) d\xi + \lambda F_Y(X, Y) + \mu[G_Y(Y, X) - \omega D] = 0. \quad (18)$$

1 The interpretations of these conditions are analogous to the commercial equations (12), (13),
2 and (14) above and require no further comments. The important difference is that the
3 willingness to pay for fishing permits, and hence the fish price, depends on the stocks of the
4 native and invasive fish and the number of permits. Thus, in contrast to the commercial
5 fishery, the price is endogenous in the recreational case. The cost structure is also different as
6 there are no direct harvesting costs included in the recreational case. The landowner has a
7 fixed unit cost of providing permits, but even in the presence of this fixed cost, condition (16)
8 indicates that the landowner's profit generally is positive; at least when both shadow prices
9 are positive. It should also be noted that if there are no stock effects in the demand function
10 and both $\int_0^D I_X(\xi, X, Y) d\xi$ and $\int_0^D I_Y(\xi, X, Y) d\xi$ equal zero, conditions (17) and (18) indicate a
11 zero shadow price for the native as well as the invasive stock. As a consequence, condition
12 (16) then yields zero landowner profit. Just as in the commercial model, we may end up with
13 a native stock located to the right hand side as well as the left hand side of X^{msy} . Intuitively,
14 the first outcome can occur when the native demand stock value effect is substantial while the
15 second may occur if, say, the harvesting catchability coefficient is 'high' or the willingness to
16 pay for permits is 'high'.

17
18 The first order conditions (16) – (18) together with the equilibrium conditions
19 $F(X, Y) = \phi DX$ and $G(Y, X) + m = \omega DY$ yield five equations determining the size of the
20 two fish stocks, the effort, and the two shadow prices. In addition, the native fish harvest
21 follows as $h = \phi DX = F(X, Y)$ and the invasive harvest as $q = \omega DY = G(Y, X) + m$.
22 Combining these two equilibrium conditions yields $F(X, Y) / (G(Y, X) + m) = \phi X / \omega Y$.
23 Therefore, the effects of the yearly inflow of escaped fish m on the fish abundance are
24 channeled directly through this composite equilibrium condition. Differentiation now yields
25 $(1 / \phi X)[(F_X - F / X) - (\phi X / \omega Y)G_X]dX - (1 / \omega Y)\{[G_Y - (G + m) / Y] - (\omega Y / \phi X)F_Y\}dY = (1 / \omega Y)dm$
26 . $F(X, Y)$ is concave in X at the optimum $(F_X - F / X) < 0$, and the invasive stock function is
27 concave in Y as well, $[G_Y - (G + m) / Y] < 0$ (see Appendix). Therefore, if the optimal size of
28 the escaped fish stock increases with a higher inflow (see Section 6), we find that the native
29 stock may also increase when the negative ecological effect from the escaped to the native
30 stock F_Y is 'small' in value. On the other hand, the native stock size will, not surprisingly,
31 become lower in the new equilibrium with a higher inflow if this ecological effect is 'large' in

1 value and the negative ecological effect from the native to the invasive stock G_x is ‘small’ in
 2 value. Recall that the size of the ecological effects is contingent upon a growth effect and a
 3 stock effect, and each is affected by two separate parameters in the specific functional form
 4 (section 3 above). In the numerical section, we demonstrate that these parameters, and hence
 5 the magnitude of F_y , have strong effects on the economics of this fishery. Note also that we
 6 assume the same type of composite equilibrium condition in the commercial fishery (see also
 7 the Appendix).

8

9 A combined commercial and recreational fishery management may also be an option. The net

10 benefit of both fisheries together $(\pi + U) = (p\theta EX + v\psi EY - cE) + [\int_0^D I(\xi, X, Y)d\xi - zD]$ is

11 maximized subject to the ecological constraints. The first order control conditions of this
 12 problem are:

13
$$\partial L / \partial E = p\theta X + v\psi Y - c - (\lambda\theta X + \mu\psi Y) \leq 0; \quad E \geq 0 \quad (19)$$

14 and

15
$$\partial L / \partial D = I(D, X, Y) - z - (\lambda\phi X + \mu\omega Y) \leq 0; \quad D \geq 0 \quad (20)$$

16 while the stock conditions $\partial L / \partial X = 0$ and $\partial L / \partial Y = 0$ simply add up from the previous two
 17 separate harvest situations.

18

19 If the willingness to pay for recreational fishing is ‘high’ relatively to the commercial market
 20 fish price, we typically end up with a corner solution with recreational fishing only. That is,
 21 condition (20) holds as an equation while (19) holds as an inequality due to the Kuhn-Tucker
 22 theorem. This analysis of a combined fishery tacitly implies that recreational and commercial
 23 fishing take place simultaneously. In reality, however, there may be sequential fishing (cf. the
 24 Norwegian Atlantic salmon fishery considered further in the numerical section). Such a
 25 scheme complicates the analysis further, as the biological constraints have to be adjusted
 26 accordingly. In addition, since commercial salmon fishing in Norway is subsistent in nature,
 27 and the economic value from commercial harvest is almost negligible compared to the values
 28 from recreational fishing, we typically end up with a corner solution involving recreational
 29 angling only. Consequently, the sequential harvest model seems superfluous in this specific
 30 case. Moreover, the models we construct here are generic in the sense that they may be
 31 applicable to other cases, not only salmon. Thus, some fisheries may be for commercial
 32 harvest (typically sea fisheries) only and some may be for recreational fishing (some

1 freshwater fisheries) only. A sequential fishery is not pursued further in this paper (but see
2 Olausen and Skonhøft 2008a).

4 **6. AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO SALMON**

5 **6.1 Data and specific functional forms**

6 The methodological framework discussed above will be illustrated empirically using the case
7 of Atlantic salmon (*Salmo salar*) for a typical Norwegian salmon river. Atlantic salmon has
8 become one of the most successful farmed species, and salmon aquaculture is one of the
9 fastest growing food producing sectors in the world. In just over three decades from 1970 to
10 2008, farmed salmon production increased from 500 to over 1.5 million tons (FAO 2010).
11 Farmed salmon production has exceeded native production worldwide since 1998. In contrast,
12 native salmon stocks have declined in most areas, particularly in the North Atlantic. Some
13 argue that salmon aquaculture has contributed to this decline because it triggers a reduction in
14 the survival of native salmon (e.g., Ford and Myers 2008), the spread of diseases and parasites
15 (Bjørn and Finstad 2002; Gargan, Tully, and Poole 2002; Krkošek *et al.* 2006), and
16 interbreeding (e.g., Naylor *et al.* 2005; Hindar *et al.* 2006). Norway has been the world's
17 number one farmed salmon producer since its beginning. Today, escaped farmed salmon is
18 one of the most severe challenges facing the salmon aquaculture industry and native salmon
19 stocks (e.g., Esmark, Stensland, and Lilleeng 2005).

21 Atlantic salmon is an anadromous fish with a complex life cycle. Its spawning and juvenile
22 development takes place in freshwater, and it feeds and grows in the sea before returning to its
23 natal rivers to spawn. Native salmon is commonly harvested by two sectors: commercial
24 fishing and recreational fishing. Commercial fishermen harvest salmon in the fjords and inlets
25 as salmon migrate toward their spawning ground, and recreational anglers target salmon in the
26 rivers. Commercial harvests are conducted for meat value while recreational fishing is
27 conducted by individuals for sport and leisure with the possibility of personal consumption.
28 Escaped farmed salmon in the fjords and rivers also are caught by commercial fishermen and
29 recreational anglers.

31 The inverse demand function in the recreational fishery is specified as
32 $I = I(D, X, Y) = \alpha + \eta(1 - e^{-\kappa(\phi X + \omega Y)}) - \phi D$. Here $\alpha > 0$ and $\phi > 0$ are the standard choke and
33 slope parameters, respectively, while $\eta > 0$ and $\kappa > 0$ are parameters describing how the size

1 of the fish stock, or river quality, translates into demand and where κ indicates the strength of
2 this changing stock demand effect. The stock demand effect is approximated by total catch
3 per unit effort (or catch rate), i.e., $(h + q) / D = (\varphi DX + \omega DY) / D = (\varphi X + \omega Y)$, and where we
4 assume the same quality effect of both native and escaped salmon (see also section 4 above).
5 This demand specification implies that when fish abundance is ‘small’, the permit choke price
6 approaches α , and when the fish abundance is ‘high’, it approaches its maximum value
7 $(\alpha + \eta)$.

8
9 The baseline values for ecological and economic parameters are shown for a typical
10 Norwegian river in Table 1. As seen from this table, some of the parameter values are
11 calibrated based on general fishing and farming practice in Norway. These values may vary to
12 some degree dependent on environmental conditions and practice, and thus sensitivity
13 analyses are presented for the most important parameters. It should also be noted that the
14 ecological effects of the escaped on native salmon is assumed to be the same as the effects of
15 native on escaped salmon, thus, $\gamma = a$ and $\beta = b$. The catchability coefficient for native and
16 farmed salmon are assumed to be identical because there is no evidence that they are different,
17 hence $\theta = \psi$ and $\varphi = \omega$. Additionally, the baseline prices for farmed and native are also
18 assumed to be equal, $p = v$ although native salmon may command a higher price than
19 escaped farmed salmon if appropriately labeled and people are well informed (see results
20 section below). The intrinsic growth rates for native and escaped farmed salmon are different.
21 Experimental and field research show that farmed and hybrid salmon are competitively and
22 reproductively inferior, resulting in lower survival rates and reproductive success than native
23 fish, i.e., $r > s$ (Fleming *et al.* 1996 & 2000; McGinnity *et al.* 2003 & 2004). The annual
24 inflow of escaped farmed salmon m is directly related to the size of the farmed production in
25 the net-pens, farm management practice, and natural conditions, such as the frequency of
26 storms and so forth. For these and other reasons, m changes from year to year (see Olausen
27 and Skonhøft 2008 for some evidence). In our analysis, m is assumed constant and may hence
28 be interpreted to be an average over a period of years. Its baseline value is set at $m = 400$ fish.

29
30 *Insert Table 1 here*

31 32 **6.2 Results**

1 We first consider a commercial fishery in which the same price is assumed for escaped and
2 native salmon (Table 1). The results are shown in Table 2, which also reports the pre-
3 invasion results. For the baseline parameter values the native and farmed salmon coexist with
4 the native dominating the ecological system. Further, for the optimal size of the invasive stock,
5 the stock value representing the peak of the native stock growth function is about
6 $X^{msy} = 9593$. Hence, the optimal size of the native stock is located to the left hand side of this
7 peak. We find $\mu = -3$ (NOK/salmon) and therefore $(p - \mu) = 53$. The native salmon shadow
8 value $\lambda = 90$ (NOK/salmon) is quite high.⁷ This outcome typically implies a rather large gap
9 between the harvesting price of the invasive fish and its shadow value. On the other hand, as
10 expected, we find the optimal stock size to be above $X^{msy} = K / 2 = 12,500$ in the pre-invasive
11 case (see also Table 1). While the native stock intrinsic growth rate is 0.26 in the pre-invasive
12 situation, it reduces marginally to $\tilde{r} = \tilde{r}(X, Y) = 0.26 * (1 - e^{-5*7010/5813}) = 0.259$ in the post
13 invasive case (section 3 and Table 1). On the other hand, the stock effect given by the term,
14 $\beta Y = 1 * 5813 = 5813$ is about 83% of the optimal native salmon stock (5813/7010). Altogether
15 these two effects combined mean that the optimal native stock becomes significantly lower
16 than in the pre-invasion case. As a consequence, the native salmon fishery profit declines due
17 to the invasive escaped farmed salmon, dropping from NOK 77 (thousand) pre-invasion to
18 NOK 40 (thousand). Nevertheless, the total profit remains quite stable with NOK 73
19 (thousand). Therefore, any native salmon profit loss is mostly compensated for by the profits
20 attained from harvesting escaped farmed salmon.

21

22 *Insert Table 2 here*

23

24 We have looked also at the situation where the escaped salmon harvest price is zero, $v = 0$.
25 With all the other parameter values unchanged, escaped farmed salmon then has a negative
26 shadow price $\mu = -53$ and is harvested just as a pest by-product due to the non-selectivity of
27 the fishery, and for the benefit of the native salmon stock (section 5 above). The total profit
28 now declines significantly from NOK 77 (thousand) to NOK 40 (thousand) in this post-
29 invasion pest case. Therefore, the escaped harvest price gives small and negligible quantum
30 effects and the profit reduction is basically related to the missing invasive harvesting value.

31

⁷ 1 NOK = 0.168 US\$.

1 We turn next to the recreational fishing case. For the baseline parameter values, the native
2 stock as well as the invasive stock becomes higher than in the commercial case. Like the
3 commercial baseline case, the optimal native stock size is located at the left hand side of X^{msy}
4 in the post invasion case. As discussed above (section 5), this may typically indicate a rather
5 ‘high’ permit demand, and/or a ‘high’ recreational fishery catchability coefficient. The results
6 reported in Table 3 show that the size of the native stock and its harvest decrease by more
7 than 50% after the invasion. However, the total harvest and surplus are kept relatively stable
8 as the total stock size just slightly changes. The relatively stable total stock size also leads to
9 small differences in permit prices and fishing days between pre- and post-invasion since the
10 native and escaped salmon are treated equally in the demand function.

11

12 *Insert Table 3 here*

13

14 For the given ecological parameter values and the fixed annual inflow of escaped farmed
15 salmon, the above results suggest that the ecological and economic effects of escaped farmed
16 salmon on native salmon are substantial, i.e., F_y is ‘large’ in value. As a consequence, the
17 harvest and profit of native salmon decline after escaped farmed salmon enter the
18 environment. Escaped farmed salmon yield supplementary harvests and profit and surplus to
19 fishermen and anglers, however. These supplements compensate in whole or in part the losses
20 of native salmon harvests. This highlights an important feature of escaped farmed salmon.
21 Since it contributes to the stock available for harvest, the incentives among fishermen, anglers
22 and landowners to reduce escaped farmed fish may be weak. For these reasons, the potential
23 long term negative impacts through ecological mechanisms could be neglected by the various
24 stakeholders.

25

26 Salmon is at present harvested by both commercial and recreational fishing sectors in Norway.
27 Due to the high total surplus generated by the recreational fishery, however, our results yield a
28 corner solution where the whole stock is destined for recreational fishing, i.e., $E = 0$ and $D > 0$
29 as the optimal solution. See conditions (19) and (20) (Section 5). Thus, the mixed fishing case
30 is not considered here.

31

32 **6.3 Sensitivity analysis**

1 The robustness of the results due to changes in some key ecological and economic parameters
2 are tested. Since recreational fishing generates higher economic surplus, this seems to be the
3 more interesting fishery, and we hence use this fishery to demonstrate these effects. We start
4 to look at changes in the annual inflow of escaped salmon, m , where we used 400 salmon in
5 the baseline scenario, see Figure 2. Such changes may be related to various reasons (see
6 section 6.1 above). We find that the equilibrium native and farmed stocks and harvests change
7 dramatically with a shifting annual inflow of escaped farmed salmon (upper panel). When
8 $m = 0$, the native stock becomes dominant because of its higher intrinsic growth rate while
9 the escaped farmed fish disappear. On the other hand, with $m = 600$ the native stock goes
10 extinct, and only farmed salmon remains. Therefore, for that high value of inflow, the native
11 stock is simply outcompeted. See section 5 above, but also the last part of the Appendix
12 where the effect of m can be seen under simplified assumption. The angler surplus changes
13 slightly while the total profit virtually remains at the same level except a small decline when
14 $m = 600$ (lower panel). These results are related to the fairly steady permit price and the
15 number of fishing days

16

17 *Insert Figure 2 here*

18

19 We next study changes in the parameters β and b which steer the intensity of the habitat
20 competition between the native and escaped farmed salmon. A higher β indicates that
21 escaped farmed salmon has a stronger negative stock effect on native salmon, i.e. F_y increases
22 in value (see Section 3), while a higher value of b works in a similar manner on farmed
23 salmon. The results in Table 4 where both these parameters are shifted simultaneously show
24 that the biomass loss to competition increases, and the optimal native salmon stock declines
25 rapidly with increasing stock competition (cf. also section 5 above). When $\beta = 1.2$, the stocks
26 no longer coexist; the native salmon goes extinct and only the farmed salmon remains. This
27 occurs irrespective of the significant higher native salmon intrinsic growth rate, and is mainly
28 due to the annual inflow of escaped farmed salmon. The numbers of fishing days and the
29 permit price are strongly influenced as well. As a consequence, the total surplus and benefit
30 distribution change. For example, when changing β and b from the baseline value of 1 to 1.2,
31 the total surplus declines from NOK 2332 to NOK 2067 (thousand) while the landowner
32 profit increases from NOK 430 (thousand) to NOK 639 (thousand). The lower number of
33 permits sold by the landowners is more than outweighed by a higher permit price.

1

2 *Insert Table 4 here*

3

4 The effects of changing the intrinsic growth rates are also studied. Keeping the intrinsic
5 growth rate of native salmon constant, we change the intrinsic growth rate of farmed salmon.
6 When s becomes smaller, the stock size of native salmon increases while the stock size of
7 farmed salmon decreases. The total stock size also reduces with a lower value of s . As a
8 consequence, we find lower permit prices and more fishing days. Therefore, angler surplus
9 increases and landowner profit decreases whereas the total surplus decreases. If s gradually
10 increases, the stock size of native salmon decreases while the stock size of escaped farmed
11 salmon increases. When s approaches r , the escaped farmed salmon gradually replace native
12 salmon which disappears eventually, analogous to what has been observed for crayfish
13 (Kataria 2007).

14

15 Changes in the choke price α are also considered. Shifts here may be attributed to changing
16 income conditions of the anglers as well as changing preferences for recreational fishing.
17 Table 5 indicates that both the optimal size of native and escaped salmon stocks respond
18 rapidly to changing demand conditions while the total harvest and profit are enhanced as the
19 increasing reservation price implies a higher demand.

20

21 *Insert Table 5 here*

22

23 Finally we studied the effects of shifts in the recreational fishery catchability coefficients φ
24 and ω (not reported, but available upon request). Such shifts may be related to changes in
25 gear restrictions and gear use (fly fishing, fishing lure, spinning bait). When the catchability
26 coefficient increases from its baseline value to a higher value, we find, not surprisingly, lower
27 stock sizes both of the escaped farmed and the native salmon, and higher harvest and total
28 surplus. The fishing effort in number of fishing days changes slightly, and the combined
29 effects of smaller stocks and higher catchability coefficient yield a higher fishing price. As a
30 consequence, we find increased landowner profit while angler surplus remains almost
31 unchanged. The more or less unchanged value of the angler surplus is due to a two sided
32 effect (section 5 and 6.1 above). On the one hand, more efficient technology means smaller

1 stocks which shift the demand function inwards through the stock sizes in the demand
2 function. This effect is, however, neutralized through the catch per effort stock effect.

3
4 In sum, changes in the annual inflow of escaped farmed salmon, m , and changes in the habitat
5 competition parameters β and b yield the strongest effects on the stock sizes of native and
6 farmed species among the tested parameters. The effects of changing the intrinsic growth rate
7 of farmed salmon and of changing the choke price α are greater on farmed than on native
8 salmon. The shifts in the recreational fishery catchability coefficients φ and ω have similar
9 effect on both native and farmed species.

10 11 **7. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

12 We develop a general invasion impact model capturing both ecological and economic effects
13 of invasive fish on native fish. More specially, we model the effects of an escaped farmed fish
14 on native fish. Ecologically, two effects, namely growth and stock, are specified and
15 incorporated into the logistic growth functions of native and escaped fish. Both lower the
16 natural growth. Economically, the benefit associated with native and escaped fish are
17 explored. A native fish is exploited for commercial values, while an escaped farmed fish is
18 harvested either for commercial value or as a pest. Two different harvesting models are
19 developed, and where the theoretical underpinnings of the commercial fishery as well as the
20 recreational fishery are explored. Both fisheries take place with nonselective harvesting
21 technologies and are analyzed in equilibrium only. A case study of Atlantic salmon in Norway
22 illustrates the interaction between native and escaped farmed salmon. Sensitivity analyses are
23 conducted to test the robustness of the results to changes in some key parameters such as
24 yearly inflow of escapees, habitat competition coefficient, intrinsic growth rate, choke price
25 and catchability coefficient. Such parameter changes also indicate when coexistence of both
26 fish stocks no longer prevails.

27
28 As expected, the ecological results are quite dramatic with respect to the stock, growth and
29 harvest of native fish. On the other hand, economically it turns out that the total net benefits
30 received by fishermen and/or anglers and landowners decline only slightly. In some cases
31 they can even be better off from harvesting both native and farmed species than solely
32 catching native fish. Benefits are transferred from the salmon aquaculture industry to
33 fishermen, anglers and landowners. However, the value of such possible benefit transfer is

1 sensitive to the catch valuation of the escaped salmon. In our baseline numerical analysis, it is
2 assumed that there is no distinction between native and farmed salmon to anglers. A fish is
3 just a fish to them. This might not always be the case, and results from Olausson and Liu
4 (2009) indicate that anglers are willing to pay substantially more for fishing native than
5 farmed salmon. In reality, however, the permit price is still determined based on the total
6 stock in the rivers.

7
8 As indicated earlier (Section 3), there are some limitations to our analysis. In this paper,
9 lumped natural growth functions are used. Thus, the accumulated effects of interbreeding
10 between native and farmed species are not explicitly modeled. The preferred model to
11 incorporate such accumulated genetic effects would be an age-structured dynamic model like
12 the one developed by Hindar *et al.* (2006) which is studied through simulations. Such a
13 simulation model would require a large amount of parameters and associated values that are
14 unavailable in most cases. For a bioeconomic attempt to model the genetic effects of
15 interbreeding, see Guttormsen *et al.* (2008). Further, the economic analysis includes only the
16 market values from harvesting of both escaped and escaped fish. Other values such as the
17 native stock's intrinsic value have not been included here.

18 19 **LITERATURE**

20
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1 Table 1. Baseline values ecological and economic parameters.

Parameter	Description	Value	Reference
K	Carrying capacity	25,000 (# of salmon)	Assumed
r	Intrinsic growth rate, native salmon	0.26	Fishbase
s	Intrinsic growth rate, farmed salmon	0.12	Estimated*
β	Habitat competition coefficient, native	1	Calibrated
γ	Scaling factor growth effect, native	5	Calibrated
b	Habitat competition coefficient, farmed	1	Calibrated
a	Scaling factor growth effect, farmed	5	Calibrated
m	Yearly influx escaped farmed salmon	400 (# of salmon)	Calibrated
θ	Catchability coefficient, native, commercial	0.003 (1/day)	NOU
ψ	Catchability coefficient, farmed, commercial	0.003 (1/day)	Calibrated
ϕ	Catchability coefficient, native, recreational	0.000015(1/day)	OS
ω	Catchability coefficient, farmed, recreational	0.000015(1/day)	Calibrated
α	Choke price, recreational	500 (NOK/day)	OS
\emptyset	Slope effect recreational demand	0.12 (NOK/day ²)	OS
p	Price, native salmon, commercial	50 (NOK/salmon)	OS
v	Price, farmed salmon, commercial	50 (NOK/salmon)	OS
z	Marginal cost, recreational	50 (NOK/day)	OS
c	Unit cost, commercial	100 (NOK/day)	NOU
η	Recreational demand translation parameter	500 (NOK/day)	Calibrated
κ	Recreational quality effect parameter	3.33 (1/salmon)	Calibrated

2 Sources: Fishbase= www.fishbase.org, OS= Olausson and Skonhøft (2008a) and NOU=
3 NOU (1999). * The intrinsic growth rate for farmed salmon is estimated based on reproductive
4 traits such as fecundity, survive rate, and generation time (Fleming *et al.* 1996, 2000&2006;
5 McGinnity *et al.* 2003 & 2004).

6 Table note: Exchange rate: 1 Euro \approx 8.10 NOK (Winter 2010)

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1 Table 2. Commercial fishing. Baseline parameter values

2

	Pre-invasion	Post-invasion	Difference
Stock size native salmon, X	12833	7010	-5823 (45%)
Stock size farmed salmon, Y	-	5813	-
Harvest of native salmon, h	1624	886	-738 (45%)
Harvest of farmed salmon, q	-	734	-
Fishing effort, E	42	42	-
Profit of native salmon ('000 NOK)	77	40	-37 (48%)
Profit of farmed salmon ('000 NOK)	-	33	-

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12 Table 3. Recreational fishing. Baseline parameter values

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	Pre-invasion	Post-invasion	Difference
Stock size native salmon, X	17136	7870	-9266 (-54%)
Stock size farmed salmon, Y	-	9118	-
Harvest of native salmon, h	1401	647	-647(-54%)
Harvest of farmed salmon, q	-	750	-
Permit price, I (NOK/day)	133	128	-5 (4%)-
Fishing days, D	5452	5481	29 (0.5%)-
Angler surplus ('000 NOK)	1784	1802	18 (1%)-
Landowner profit ('000 NOK)	455	430	--25 (5%)
Total surplus, U ('000 NOK),	2239	2232	-7 (0.3%)

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1 Table 4. Recreational fishing. Effects of changed habitat competition coefficient β and b .
 2 Baseline values $\beta = b = 1$.


	$\beta = b = 0.5$	$\beta = b = 0.8$	$\beta = b = 1$	$\beta = b = 1.1$	$\beta = b = 1.2$
Stock size native salmon, X	11965	9750	7870	6387	0
Stock size farmed salmon, Y	9772	9067	9118	9208	15226
Harvest of native salmon, h	1012	807	647	546	0
Harvest of farmed salmon, q	826	751	750	787	1114
Permit price, I (NOK/day)	155	143	128	87	181
Fishing days, D	5638	5519	5481	5670	4879
Angler surplus ('000 NOK)	1907	1827	1802	1949	1428
Landowner profit ('000 NOK)	591	511	430	210	639
Total surplus, U ('000 NOK)	2498	2338	2232	2159	2067

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7 Table 5. Recreational fishing. Effects of changed choke price α . Baseline value $\alpha = 500$
 8 (NOK/day).

	$\alpha = 400$	$\alpha = 500$	$\alpha = 600$	$\alpha = 800$
Stock size native salmon, X	7348	7870	8013	7695
Stock size farmed salmon, Y	10390	9118	8127	6705
Harvest of native, h	539	647	733	846
Harvest of farmed, q	762	750	743	737
Permit price, I (NOK/day)	107	128	145	178
Fishing days, D	4889	5481	6099	7325
Angler surplus ('000 NOK)	1434	1802	2232	3220
Landowner profit ('000 NOK)	281	430	580	935
Total surplus U ('000 NOK)	1715	2232	2811	4154


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
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Figure 1. The growth and stock effects of escapees on the native stock growth.

Legend: light solid curve represents the growth without any effects; dark solid curve represents growth effect; dotted curve represents stock effect and dashed curve represents both stock and growth effects.



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Figure 2. Recreational fishing. Effects of different yearly influx of farmed escapees m . Upper panel: stocks of native and farmed salmon. Lower panel: landowner profit and angler surplus.

1 **APPENDIX**

2

3 *Sufficient conditions*

4 As indicated by Figure 1, we may have a potentially non-concavity problem in our
5 optimization as the native fish growth function $F(X,Y)$ is not concave for ‘small’ values of X .

6 This is due to the growth effect. We have also the same situation for $G(Y,X)$ when Y is ‘small’.

7 In this Appendix, we first look at the sufficient conditions for an interior maximum solution in

8 the commercial harvesting case. Similar results can be established for recreational fishing. We

9 now consider our problem as an unconstrained optimization problem. When substituting away

10 the effort use, the profit function in the commercial harvesting case can be written as:

11
$$\pi = \pi(X, Y) = p\theta EX + v\psi EY - cE = pF(x, y) + v[G(x, y) + m] - \frac{c}{\theta} \frac{F(x, y)}{x}$$
 . The Hessian

12 matrix is
$$H = \begin{pmatrix} \pi_{XX} & \pi_{XY} \\ \pi_{YX} & \pi_{YY} \end{pmatrix}$$
 with

13
$$\partial^2 \pi / \partial X^2 = \pi_{XX} = (p - c / \theta X) F_{XX} + vG_{XX} - (2c / \theta X^2)(F / X - F_X)$$
 ,

14
$$\pi_{YY} = vG_{YY} + (p - c / \theta X) F_{YY}$$
 and
$$\pi_{XY} = \pi_{YX} = (p - c / \theta X) F_{XY} + vG_{XY} + cF_Y / \theta X^2$$
 .

15

16 An interior maximum point requires $\pi_{XX} < 0$, $\pi_{YY} < 0$ and the determinant of the Hessian

17 positive, $\det H > 0$. $\pi_{XX} < 0$ for sure if the solution is found on the concave parts of the natural

18 growth functions and if vG_{XX} is negative, or small in value. π_{YY} is also negative for sure if

19 F_{YY} is negative or small in value. The signing of $\det H$ is messy. However, if we assume small,

20 and negligible harvesting costs, $c \approx 0$, it simplifies to

21
$$\det H = [p^2 F_{xx} F_{yy} + v^2 G_{xx} G_{yy} + vp(F_{xx} G_{yy} + F_{yy} G_{xx})] - (pF_{xy} + vG_{xy})^2$$
 which is for sure positive

22 on the concave parts of the natural growth functions and if the bracket term [...] dominates the

23 last term. Under these conditions the internal solution $\partial \pi / \partial X = 0$ and $\partial \pi / \partial Y = 0$ is a

24 maximum point. With somewhat limited success, we have hence been able to say something

25 about the sufficient conditions. However, in the numerical illustrations it is demonstrated that

26 the solution is found on the concave part of the natural growth functions, and that this solution

27 represents a maximum point (figures showing this is available upon request from the authors).

28

29 *An explicit solution*

1 The commercial fishery model may be solved explicitly under some certain simplifications,
2 and where we assume coexistence of both stocks. First, it is assumed that the intrinsic growth
3 rates are independent of the species composition and hence fixed, i.e., $\tilde{r} = r$ and $\tilde{s} = s$. These
4 assumptions are reasonable approximations if γ and a are ‘large’ (Equations 3 and 4). We
5 will have the same if they are ‘moderate’, but the optimal species values X and Y do not vary
6 too much. Next, the stock competition effect is assumed to be identical and equal to one,
7 $b = \beta = 1$. When also inserting for the catch functions, the growth equations (5) and (6) in
8 equilibrium then read $rX[1 - (X + Y)/K] = \theta EX$ and $sY[1 - (Y + X)/K] = \psi EY - m$,
9 respectively. With $X > 0$, we first find $(X + Y) = K(1 - \theta E/r)$ which substituted into the
10 escaped fish equilibrium equation yields $sY\theta E/r = \psi EY - m$. The size of the escaped stock
11 reads $Y = m/E(\psi - s\theta/r)$ while the native stock follows as
12 $X = K(1 - \theta E/r) - m/E(\psi - s\theta/r) = K(1 - \theta E/r) - Y$. When inserted into the profit function
13 (7), we find $\pi = p\theta E[K(1 - \theta E/r) - m/E(\psi - s\theta/r)] + \nu\psi E[m/E(\psi - s\theta/r)] - cE$.
14 Differentiating yields $d\pi/dE = p\theta K(1 - 2\theta E/r) - c = 0$ and $d^2\pi/dE^2 < 0$. Therefore, the
15 profit maximizing effort is fixed by $E = (r/2\theta)(1 - c/p\theta K)$. Notice that under these
16 simplified assumptions, the optimal effort use is independent of the escaped fish harvesting
17 price. In a next step, we find the number of fish as:

$$18 \quad (a1) \quad X = K(1/2 + c/2p\theta K) - 2\theta m / (1 - c/p\theta K)(r\psi - s\theta)$$

19 and

$$20 \quad (a2) \quad Y = 2\theta m / (1 - c/p\theta K)(r\psi - s\theta).$$

21 The total stock is therefore $X + Y = K(1/2 + c/2p\theta K)$. With costless harvesting $c = 0$, the
22 stocks simplify to $X = K/2 - 2\theta m / (r\psi - s\theta)$ and $Y = 2\theta m / (r\psi - s\theta)$. The total number of
23 fish is then simply $X + Y = K/2$.

24

25 Notice that the above solution is valid only for $X > 0$. Under this assumption, $m = 0$ hence
26 implies $Y = 0$. With $m = 0$, but both $X > 0$ and $Y > 0$, the stock equilibrium conditions write
27 $(X + Y) = K(1 - \theta E/r)$ and $(X + Y) = K(1 - \psi E/s)$. These equations only hold if $\theta/r = \psi/s$.
28 Therefore, both stocks can not coexist ($X > 0$ and $Y > 0$) when $m = 0$ under the given
29 assumptions ($b = \beta = 1$) and similar stock competition effects.

30

31 We then consider the recreational fishery. When inserting for the specified inverse demand
32 function (section 6.1), the total surplus function (8) may first be written as

1 $U = [\alpha + \eta(1 - e^{-\kappa(\phi X + \omega Y)}) - \phi D / 2]D - zD$. Under the same simplifying assumptions as above
2 and with $X > 0$, the equilibrium stock sizes read $Y = m / D(\omega - s\phi / r)$ and
3 $X = K(1 - \phi D / r) - m / D(\omega - s\phi / r)$. Combining yields then
4 $U = [\alpha + \eta(1 - e^{-\kappa[\phi K(1 - \phi D / r) - (\phi - \omega)m / D(\omega - s\phi / r)]}) - \phi D / 2]D - zD$. In this case, however, it is not
5 possible to find explicit expressions for the optimal effort use (number of fishing days) and
6 therefore neither the optimal stock sizes.