No. 11/2005
A THEORY OF CIVIL CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY IN RENTIER STATES
Silje Aslaksen
Ragnar Torvik
Abstract:
The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been
studied in two main types
of models. The first tradition employs models of conflict, and studies
how resource rents
affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition
employs political
economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium
because the costs and
benefits of buying votes change. Although providing much insight, a primary
disadvantage of
these two model traditions is that they have little to say about when
democracy emerges, and
about when conflict emerges. This question is simply determined by the
type of model one chooses to study. Yet an important empirical
literature suggests that a main effect of resource rents may be
exactly that it affects the political choice between democracy and civil
conflict.
In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest
the simplest possible
framework we can think of to study this choice. The institutional outcome
in our theory is
consequently endogenous. We show how factors such as resource rents,
the extent of electoral
competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria,
and discuss how our
approach, mechanisms and results differ from the earlier theories.
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