Beyond the Curse
Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources

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CHAPTER 13

The Political Economy of Reform in Resource-Rich Countries

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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1950s and until recently, economists have argued that countries with a comparative advantage in production based on their natural resources would suffer from declining terms of trade. The price of raw materials relative to industrial goods would decline over time, according to the argument, making specialization in natural-resource-based production unattractive. Paradoxically, recently economists have argued that specialization in natural resources is unattractive for exactly the opposite reason: such specialization is so economically beneficial that in fact it may turn into a curse. Led by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), many have argued that on average, resource-abundant countries have slower growth than resource-poor countries. But asking what the average effect of oil is in Norway and Nigeria, or the average effect of diamonds in Botswana and Sierra Leone, might not be the most interesting or most relevant question. Rather than the average, it is more important to understand the variation. Why has oil induced prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others? In this chapter, I argue that the main reason for this is that different political incentives map into different political outcomes.

Economic institutions and economic reform are the main drivers of economic and political development after the discovery of valuable natural resources. At least two questions arise: How do countries reform when they receive resource rents? and How should countries reform when they receive resource rents? In the next section, I provide a short discussion of the first question.

The second question is more difficult, being normative rather than positive. Nevertheless, to shed at least some light on that question I start out in the

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subsequent section by comparing the economic responses to resource abundance between two kinds of countries: those where institutions allow new income opportunities to benefit a broad segment of the population and those where this does not occur. As will be seen, the economic response to resource abundance can be either more pessimistic or more optimistic than standard economic theories suggest. In turn, in the fourth section I describe in more detail the kinds of differences in institutional design that can be decisive. In the fifth section I move further into details, comparing the political incentives built into petroleum funds and the differences in performance they have led to. The last section offers conclusions.

HOW DO COUNTRIES REFORM WHEN THEY RECEIVE RESOURCE RENTS?

During development, most countries undertake reforms that substantially change the private and political incentives built into the system. Current reforms are initiated by those with current political power. And since reform is likely to change incentives—indeed this is often the main reason for reform—those who decide to initiate reform will face different incentives after the reform than they did before it. In turn, this may influence the type of reform that is undertaken.

When countries get new economic opportunities, such as the discovery of valuable natural resources or an increase in the price of resources already known to exist, they may reform in very different directions. If the current political system ensures that the interests of the population at large are well represented, resource abundance may generate reform that ensures that the resource wealth is managed in a way that benefits broad segments of society. On the other hand, if the current political system is not checked in such a way that it represents the interests of the general population, reform may be undertaken with the aim of preserving and strengthening old privileges. In this way, new economic opportunities may generate types of reforms that vary greatly across countries. In turn, as we will see below, the type of reforms will decide to what extent the new opportunities increase or decrease welfare.

There are many examples in which institutions have been reformed in a direction that allows the broad population to take advantage of new economic opportunities, and they range from the 1862 Homestead Act in the United States to allocate frontier land to a broad segment of the population, to the 1990 establishment of the Norwegian Petroleum Fund to manage the resource wealth of the country. However, there are also many examples in which new economic opportunities have led politicians to reform in a direction that limits the possibilities for the population to take advantage of the opportunities.

Ross (2001a) shows that in countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the existence of timber from the rainforests and increased timber prices contributed to the deliberate dismantling of state institutions by politicians. The rainforests provided the basis for opportunities to pocket large sums of money through exploiting of the forest, thus providing large incentives for politicians to reform in ways that would diminish the institutional framework that ensured the benefits of the resource windfall could be distributed to broad segments of society. As such, they were able to undermine the political institutions and economic incentives that would have ensured that the windfall benefited a broad segment of the population. This led to an increase in political instability and economic dysfunction, with large economic rents being captured by a small elite, leading to widespread poverty and inequality.

established to counteract abuses and overexploitation had to be undermined. Politicians had incentives for dismantling institutions rather than building them—and the reason was the abundance of valuable natural resources. Ross (2001a) also finds that countries with large oil deposits become less democratic. In such countries, democracy can represent a cost for politicians because it hinders them from using the large public income as they please. Large income from resources can therefore create political incentives for weakening democracy.

Collier and Hoeftler (2009) show how “checks and balances,” institutional rules that limit the political abuse of power and balance political power, enhance growth. However, they find that, particularly in countries where such rules are important—for example because the country has substantial public income from natural resources—the institutional rules are undermined by politicians.

Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik (2011) develop a model of equilibrium checks and balances. If checks and balances limit political rents, why would voters support their removal, as they have done for example in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela? The authors find that from the poor voters’ point of view, checks and balances are a double-edged sword. Although checks and balances limit political rents, they also make it cheaper for the rich electorate to influence politics through non-electoral means, such as bribing and lobbying. By dismantling checks and balances from the constitution, poor voters make the politicians more powerful and the elite less powerful. This is particularly advantageous for the poor when the rich are well organized, when income distribution is unequal, and when it is easy to tax. Thus, the typical characteristics of resource-abundant countries, in particular those where natural resources are stationary and therefore easily taxed, make it more likely that the equilibrium constitution does not contain checks and balances. Such countries end up with economic reform that strengthens the power of the political elite.

HOW SHOULD COUNTRIES REFORM WHEN THEY RECEIVE RESOURCE RENTS?

Most of the literature to date on the resource has been positive rather than normative, but this does not mean that the literature is without normative implications. Below I present an extremely simple positive theory to shed light on the different effects resource abundance may have. In turn, this has normative implications for economic and political reform.

A traditional argument would be that when a country accesses more natural resources, the income in the country increases, but it increases by less than the isolated value of the resources, since their exploitation is likely to draw resources out of alternative, less profitable activities in the economy. Recently, however, a theoretical and empirical literature has argued that this may either be a too optimistic or a too pessimistic prediction. Moreover, the prediction may depend
How More Can Become Less

Let us consider a country with a high crime rate, widespread corruption, poor quality in the public bureaucracy, and a political system where politicians do not face checks and balances. In such a society, it will be relatively attractive for entrepreneurs to engage in political rent seeking, destructive banditry, and corruption rather than to establish and operate productive enterprises. For such an economy, more natural resources may make such economic activities more profitable, which in turn will have unfavourable general equilibrium consequences for the rest of society. In fact, these negative general equilibrium effects may outweigh the initial effect of more natural resources. The theory presented in the following is a simplification based on Torvik (2002) and Robinson and Torvik (2010b).

It seems intuitive that the higher the number of entrepreneurs who choose to engage in productive activity, the higher the income of each entrepreneur will be. There are many reasons for this. More private entrepreneurs engaged in production means fewer entrepreneurs engaged in political rent seeking to transfer resources from the productive to the rent seeking part of the economy. Fewer transfers of income away from the productive entrepreneurs in turn increases the profitability for each entrepreneur. More entrepreneurs engaged in productive activity means fewer engaged in destructive activity, and thus less crime and corruption. In turn, a reduction in crime and corruption makes it more profitable to engage in productive economic activity. A higher number of entrepreneurs in productive activity also yields higher production and higher income, and thus creates greater demand. Greater demand in turn increases sales and profitability. A higher number of entrepreneurs in productive activity gives higher tax income, greater public income, and thus better public services and infrastructure. Good public services and infrastructure in turn increase the profitability of private industrial activity.

Figure 13.1 illustrates this relationship. We measure the number of entrepreneurs in productive activity along the horizontal axis and the income of each entrepreneur along the vertical axis. The rising curve shows that the income for each entrepreneur increases with the number of other entrepreneurs engaged in productive activity.

Figure 13.2 shows how the number of entrepreneurs who choose to engage in unproductive or destructive rent-seeking activity influences the income for each and every one of them. We measure the number of entrepreneurs in such activity from left to right, and the income for each of them on the vertical axis. An increase in the number of entrepreneurs in unproductive activity, that is, a movement from the right to the left in the figure, implies a lower income for each of the unproductive entrepreneurs. There are several reasons for this. A large number of rent seekers that aim to transfer income toward themselves means that there are fewer productive entrepreneurs to transfer income from and more competitors to share it with. In turn, this reduces the income for each rent seeker. A large number of criminal competitors means that more resources are used to protect oneself against other criminals, and less to obtain income. In turn, income is reduced for each single criminal.

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entrepreneurs in productive activity and in unproductive activity are equal, and no entrepreneur has an incentive to switch between productive and unproductive activities. If the distribution of entrepreneurs is not at the intersection in the figure but to the left of it, income from productive activity will be higher than income from unproductive activity. In that case, entrepreneurs will have an incentive to switch from unproductive to productive activity. The number of entrepreneurs in productive activity will then rise, and the number in unproductive activity will decline, until we are back at the intersection.

If we are in a situation to the right of the intersection, we will see the opposite movement. Here, the income of the unproductive entrepreneur is higher than the income of the productive one, and entrepreneurs will switch from productive to unproductive activity until we are back in the intersection, where the income of an entrepreneur is equal in unproductive and in productive activity. The intersection and the distribution of entrepreneurs between productive and unproductive activity implies, and therefore represents, a situation of stable equilibrium. In the continuation, we assume that the curve for rent seekers is steeper than the curve for productive entrepreneurs, implying that in equilibrium we have a positive number of both rent seekers and entrepreneurs. If the curve for rent seekers is less steep than the curve for productive entrepreneurs we have two stable equilibria; one where all entrepreneurs are rent seekers and one where no entrepreneurs are rent seekers.

The next question is how resource abundance influences the equilibrium. This is shown in Figure 13.4. Resource abundance represents improved income opportunities for those who are engaged in political rent seeking, destructive banditry, and corruption. When there are more natural resources up for grabs, and when the political system allows such grabbing, it becomes relatively more attractive to be a rent seeker. The curve that represents income opportunities in rent seeking thus shifts upward in the figure, as shown with the dotted curve in Figure 13.4. The conclusion is surprising: Better income opportunities for every entrepreneur cause the income of every entrepreneur to fall.

The intuition behind this result is as follows: More natural resources make it more profitable to be a rent seeker, and thus more people choose rent seeking and fewer choose productive activity. The combination of a greater number of rent seekers and a smaller number of productive entrepreneurs reduces the income of every productive entrepreneur. However, lower income from productive activity makes it relatively even more attractive to engage in rent seeking. This leads to a further fall in the number of productive entrepreneurs, a further fall in the income for those who are engaged in productive activity, an even greater reduction in the number of productive people and an increase in the number of rent seekers, and so on. Resource abundance thus initiates a multiplier process—but the bad news is that the multiplier is negative. The reason this process will not continue indefinitely is that the income of rent seekers, too, falls when there are more rent seekers and fewer productive agents.

In the new economic equilibrium, it must be the case that what at first seemed like a better income opportunity for private entrepreneurs is a disadvantage for each and every one of them: Political systems that do not prevent rent seekers from taking advantage of resource abundance make the income of every entrepreneur go down—not up, as one might believe at first glance.

How More Can Become Even More

Consider now the same situation as above, but with the difference that reform has been undertaken so as to limit abuse of political power and to combat rent seeking. In such a case, an increase in natural resources does not benefit the rent seekers; on the contrary resource abundance benefits the producers in the economy, who get access to more new economic opportunities than before. Thus, as represented in Figure 13.5, the curve for producers now shifts upward. As shown, in the new equilibrium income is higher than before. However, note that the increase in income is larger than the vertical shift in the curve, so the increase in income is larger than the value of the increased opportunities, which are measured by the vertical distance of the shift.
The intuition for this is that as in the earlier case, where reform has not been undertaken, resource abundance induces a multiplier effect, but now the multiplier is positive rather than negative. When production becomes more valuable entrepreneurs enter into productive activity. In turn, the lower number of entrepreneurs in unproductive activity and the higher number of entrepreneurs in productive activity mean that profit in productive activity increases further, inducing more entrepreneurs to flow into production, and so on. The end result of this process is that because of a more favorable allocation of talent, the increase in income is higher than the initial increase in resource abundance. Resource abundance then stimulates rather than retards productive economic activity.

Note that even though we have a full utilization of resources, fully flexible prices, and rational agents, we obtain a multiplier effect that resembles the one in the simplest Keynesian model. But the reason for the multiplier is different. It stems from channeling scarce factor inputs into more socially productive uses rather than from an increased utilization of factor inputs.

WHICH REFORMS?

The model above sheds some light on why we may observe huge variations in the way countries respond to resource abundance. However, due to the model’s reduced form nature, it is relatively silent on precisely which characteristics separate countries where resource abundance induces prosperity from those where resource abundance retards prosperity. Recent research has identified at least some dimensions that are decisive, and these are discussed next.

Democracy versus Autocracy

Among others, Bulte and Damania (2008) find that it is especially in countries with weak democracy that resource abundance tends to generate negative outcomes. In such countries the voters’ control of politicians is weaker, in turn leading politicians to choose policies that maximize their own interests but put the economy off its optimal growth path from the point of view of society.

Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism

Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) find the following: on average, resource abundance reduces growth in democratic countries with presidentialism, but not in democratic countries with parliamentarism. The result in Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) is a strong indication for a close connection between political incentives and the resource curse, although we still have a somewhat limited understanding of why presidential countries react less favorably to resource abundance than parliamentary ones. One hypothesis may be that the political checks in presidential countries are weaker than in parliamentary ones. With the exception of the U.S. presidential system, many presidential systems around the world feature strong presidential power that is checked by parliament only to a limited degree. Indeed, as argued by Robinson and Torvik (2010a), the growing incidence of

presidential rule in many developing countries has been associated with fewer and not more checks and balances. For instance, most African countries started off with a parliamentary system at independence. Today, nearly all these countries have since changed their constitutions to a presidential system. A challenge with these systems is to ensure that they do not concentrate power within an economic and political elite but instead allow greater economic opportunities to be utilized by a broad segment of society.

Institutional Quality

Several authors, such as Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) and Boschini, Petrsson, and Roine (2007), have shown that when economic and political institutions feature checks on politicians and secure property rights, then resource abundance stimulates growth. But with limited checks and balances and insecure property rights, resource abundance retards growth. In these latter cases, resource abundance stimulates grabber activity, in turn crowding out productive activity. Again we note the key role of incentives: the institutions matter because they affect the incentives that political and private agents face when a new income opportunity arises.

Type of Resources

Boschini, Petrsson, and Roine (2007) produced what is probably the most detailed study on how different types of natural resources affect growth and how this is linked to the quality of institutions. These authors use four different measures of resources and find that crucial for growth implications is the combination of institutional quality and the “lootability” of resources. The worst possible growth effect from natural resources stems from the combination of diamonds in countries with weak institutions.

Offshore versus Onshore Oil

There are some indications that countries with offshore oil fare better than countries with onshore oil. For instance, Lujala (2010) finds that onshore oil increases the risk of violent conflict in a country, but that offshore oil has no effect on the risk of conflict onset. This finding may reflect the fact that onshore oil represents different incentives and opportunities for rebel groups than offshore oil. Offshore oil installations are easier to protect, and the operations of an offshore oil field can be more or less independent from activities onshore. Onshore oil provides different actors with better possibilities for using violence and predation to grab part of the oil resources, which in turn may be socially destabilizing.

Early versus Late Industrialization

Entering the 1900s, Norway was (together with Ireland) one of poorest countries of Europe. Today Norway is one of the richest countries in the world. This remarkable
transition has been driven by the exploitation of natural resources. It started with fish, timber, and minerals, continued with hydroelectric power, and since the 1970s has developed oil and natural gas as key sectors. It is obvious that natural resources have been a blessing for Norway. Economic historians, in particular Gavin Wright (see e.g. David and Wright, 1997), have pointed out that looking back in time resource abundance has been a main driver of growth rather than being the opposite. For example, in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Australia, Canada, and the United States there is little doubt that resources have historically promoted growth and industrialization. Contrasting the literature in economic history with the literature on the resource curse, one is led to question whether the effect of resource abundance has changed over time—and if it has, then why?

One hypothesis is that an eventual change in the growth effect of natural resources has been found because countries with different degrees of institutional quality industrialized at different times. As shown by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) the countries that industrialized first were those with the best quality of institutions. Therefore, from this that industrialized early had an institutional apparatus in place that prevented the negative growth effects of resources, while those that first utilized their resources at a later stage did not have such institutions in place. Karl (1997) was an early proponent of the view that a resource discovery is worse for a country that has not yet developed its institutions.

Taking Stock

Most dimensions where the successful resource-abundant countries differ from the less successful resource-abundant countries can be linked to differences in economic and political incentives. Moreover, the design and reform of institutions to deal with resource incomes will themselves be shaped by the initial political incentives. This may create massive economic and political divergence. Countries with strong institutions reform those institutions further to take advantage of the new economic opportunities, while countries with weak institutions may reform in directions not conducive to prosperity.

But there are also interesting lessons to draw from within the group of countries that are resource-abundant and have strong institutions. A key element in economic reform here is the establishment of petroleum funds. These funds, however, have been set up in different ways within this group of countries. Such differences in design have created differences in political incentives, in turn explaining differences in performance. To shed light on this, below I compare the design of three petroleum funds where initial institutions were strong, and discuss how the different political incentives built into the funds explain their differences in performance.

THE DESIGN OF PETROLEUM FUNDS AND POLITICAL INCENTIVES

In general petroleum funds may or may not assist in the challenges that resource-abundant countries face. When institutions do not place strong checks on politicians, petroleum funds may simply make the problem worse, because the funds concentrate the resource income. In turn, such concentration may make it easier for the political elite to monopolize the property rights to the resource wealth.

When institutions do place strong checks on politicians, however, petroleum funds may contribute to a socially beneficial development. Petroleum funds may help ensure a sustainable use of the petroleum wealth and efficient management of that wealth, and that payments out of the fund are allocated to socially efficient projects. However, even in easy places the design of petroleum funds is difficult. This can be seen by comparing the experiences of three petroleum funds in Alberta, Alaska, and Norway.

The institutional design of a petroleum fund differs along three main dimensions:

- The inflow of resources into the fund
- The management of the fund, and
- The payments out of the fund.

In the next subsections, we describe and contrast the three petroleum funds with a special emphasis on these dimensions and discuss the political incentives and the political outcomes these designs have led to.

The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund

Alberta is the fourth largest of the Canadian provinces with a population of about 3 million. Two-thirds of the province is publicly owned land, and about 80 percent of the oil and natural gas extraction takes place on this public land. In connection with the OPEC-1 oil price shock in 1973, it became clear that the province would receive substantial incomes from its petroleum sector. As a response, in 1974 it was proposed to establish a savings fund. The Heritage Fund was established in 1976, with three main objectives:

- Save for the future
- Strengthen or diversify the economy, and
- Improve the quality of life of Albertans.

Up until 1983, 30 percent of the petroleum incomes were channelled into the fund. In the period 1984–87 this was reduced to 15 percent, before the payments into the fund went down to zero. Since then there have been no additional payments into the fund.

The Heritage Fund is managed within the provincial government bureaucracy by an investment committee with members from Alberta’s Legislative Assembly. Many of the investments made by the fund have been within the province, and to a large degree in publicly owned companies. This strategy has been debated. Munsey and Ostermann (1990) note that at the same time as politicians decide how much revenue is to be taken out from the companies, they also decide how much in subsidies should be allocated to the same companies. The result of the political investment and subsidy decisions has been that many of the investments were suboptimized.
unprofitable, and according to Mueyn and Ostermann (1990) the value of these firms estimated by the Heritage Fund has been 10 percent above their actual value. Moreover, the fund has provided preferential treatment loans to other provinces with interest rates below market rates.

There are no fixed rules for payments out of this fund. The payments are discretionary decisions made by the politicians. With the establishment of the fund, the intention was to use a maximum of 5 percent of the value of the fund each year. In the first years of the fund this intention was more than fulfilled, in that no payments at all were made out of the fund until 1983. During the 1980s, the politicians decided to spend more of the fund, and at the same time they did not take into account that the real value of the fund was eroded by using the nominal returns. Even though the payments into the fund dried up in 1987 and onwards, the politicians decided to continue spending approximately the nominal return from the fund. Until 1995, the fund invested in a variety of projects ranging from irrigation and education to facilities, art galleries, research, parks, hospitals, and theatres. During the first half of the 1990s the real value of the fund was reduced, while the nominal value of the fund was fairly stable. After 1995 the policy of using the nominal return from the fund was reversed.

In 1997, the fund was restructured with a gradual transition of the old portfolio to a portfolio where 35 to 65 percent would be placed in fixed-income securities and 35 to 65 percent in equities. The three primary objectives of the fund were changed to:

- Earn income to support the government’s fiscal budget
- Maximize long-term returns, and
- Improve the public’s understanding of the fund.

A new Legislative Standing Committee, operating at arm’s length from the government, was put in place to ensure that the objectives and goals of the fund were met. It seems clear that the restructuring of the fund was motivated by the experiences to date, although some claim that the restructuring has limited practical importance. For instance, Warrack and Keddie (2002, p. 9) report that

many Albertans question whether there is substantial change to the fund. Proponents argue that the Heritage Fund is nothing more than a political lever used to implement and reinforce public policy decisions. They allude to the fact that income is transferred directly into General Revenues, indicating that the direction of the fund is dependent on the desires of the government of the day.

Whatever position one may have on the 1997 restructuring of the Heritage Fund, it seems clear that there are important lessons to draw about how the political incentives built into the fund in the first two decades shaped policy. The objectives of the fund were unclear and may have been partly in contradiction. The objective of saving for the future can be measured by the development in the value of the fund, while the objective to improve the quality of life of Albertans is not very specific and is hard to measure. In addition, this second objective may to some degree be in conflict with the objective of saving for the future. The fund has a large degree of heterogeneity in its investments, which range from financial investments to recreation areas. The fund seems to have been much influenced by shifting political priorities, and it is hard to discriminate between those positions of the fund that should be thought of as investments and those that should be thought of as consumption spending. The 1997 restructuring of the fund was partly motivated by the need to improve the public’s understanding of it, which indicates that the initial institutional design of the fund had unclear objectives and that it was unclear how to measure its performance.

The history of the Alberta Heritage Fund shows the importance of political incentives when designing institutions. The decisions on payments into the fund, the management of the fund, and the payments out of the fund were all discretionary political decisions. The strength of this is that there is strong day-to-day democratic control of the fund. The obvious weakness is that, especially with unclear and unmeasurable objectives, the fund becomes too short-term and insufficiently transparent. The design includes those types of political incentives that may easily produce myopic behavior and inefficiency. The payments into the fund were reduced over time and eventually stopped. Political considerations replaced economic considerations in the fund’s investment decisions. The payments out of the fund were larger than the original objective. Warrack (2005, p. 17) is highly critical of the way the Alberta Heritage Fund developed and argues that the main problem was its institutional design: “Time has demonstrated that the governance system in place was faulty—it was not resilient to changing fiscal circumstances.” According to Cowper (2007, p. 224):

Over time it became clear that the AHFs (Alberta Heritage Fund) purpose was indistinguishable from the role of the Parliament. Not surprisingly, the ASF “invested” in social improvements and infrastructure normally paid for by the provincial government. Its investments to diversify the Alberta economy were politically inspired and most of them were conspicuous failings.

The Alaska Permanent Fund

Alaska is one of the U.S. states with the smallest populations, containing only about 600,000 people. As of 2010, about 90 percent of the state’s income stems from petroleum income. In 1969, Alaska auctioned 164 drilling rights on publicly owned land, resulting in an income large enough to fund eight years of the state’s budget. The income from the auctions was soon used for investments, in particular in infrastructure. According to Warrack and Keddie (2002, p. 11), “Soon public opinion was that a significant portion of the money has been wasted.” There were widespread arguments that all inhabitants of Alaska should have a part of the future petroleum income. The Alaska Permanent Fund was initially proposed by a state legislator and quickly attracted public support. In 1976, the citizens were asked whether to include the proposal “as a constitutional amendment, so as to ward off future legislative ‘raids’ on the fund” (Cowper 2007, p. 223). Almost two-thirds of the electorate approved the proposal, and The Alaska Permanent Fund Act (1976)
The main objectives of the fund became these: to achieve high real returns with low risk, to undertake cost-efficient management, and to offer transparency to increase accountability. The fund is made up by two parts. The "Principal" is the main body of the fund, and it is the payments into the Principal, the management of the Principal, and the payments out of the Principal that are contained in the constitutional amendment. The other body, the "Earnings Reserve," can be understood as an account where remaining money not allocated to the Principal is transferred. (The next section of this chapter, after a short description of the use of the Earnings Reserve, will concentrate on the Principal and refer to that as "the fund.")

Until 1980, 25 percent of the royalties from the petroleum sector were allocated to the Principal. (Note, however, that as pointed out by Hannesson (2001, p. 59), even if the constitution specifies that at least 25 percent of the royalties shall be allocated to the Principal, this amounts to about 10 to 15 percent of petroleum income, which also consists of various taxes). From 1980 onwards, it was decided that the share of royalties that goes into the fund would be 50 percent (a decision that is not part of the constitution). The use of the remaining money in the Earnings Reserve is politically decided, but the politicians traditionally have decided to transfer more of the royalties into the fund so as to keep the real value of the Principal. But again, this is a yearly discretionary decision that is not part of the constitution. The size of the fund as of October 2010 was US$37,188,100,000 (see http://www.apfc.org).

The fund is operated by a public corporation, the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation. This is a separate and independent body managed by a board of six individuals, a majority of four being elected members of the public with an expertise in finance and business management while the Commissioner of the Revenue and an appointee of the governor make up the other two. The investment composition of the fund is currently about 18 percent invested in U.S. bonds, 18 percent in U.S. stocks, 3 percent in foreign bonds, 32 percent in foreign stocks, 10 percent in real estate, and the remainder in various other financial instruments.

Payments out of the fund are specified in the constitution. The net return for the preceding five years is added up, and 21 percent of those returns can be spent (given that this amount does not exceed the sum of net income of the fund during the last year and what is left in the Earnings Reserve account). Normally, half of what is spent has been distributed as a lump sum transfer to the inhabitants of the state. Note that this is also a political decision and not part of the constitution. In 2010, the dividend paid out to each inhabitant was US$1,281.

Toward the end of the 1990s, the State of Alaska got into economic problems with the decrease in the oil price. It was debated whether the state should use the fund to cover its budget deficit. In 1999, voters debated such a proposal by a large majority.

In recent years, there has also been a debate about changing the rules in the constitution that determine the yearly spending out of the fund. In particular, three aspects have been criticized. First, it would have been better to link the payments out of the fund to the market value of the fund rather than to the five-year average return. Even the five-year return may display high volatility (and possibly be procyclical). Second, an active political decision has to be taken each year to transfer money into the fund to protect its real value. Third, the inflation-proofing of the fund has been undertaken only for the Principal and not for the Earnings Reserve.

Against this background, the board suggested in 2004 to change the rules that govern the fund. Such a change must be approved by a constitutional amendment. The proposal of the board was announced as "POMV" which stands for "five percent of the Fund's total market value." According to the proposal, the upper limit on how much could be spent from the fund should be changed from a limit based on returns to one based on 5 percent of the average market value of the fund over the last five years. This would contribute to more stable payments out of the fund, and with a predicted real rate of return of 5 percent protecting the fund's real value, it would become part of the constitution and would encompass the whole fund and not only the Principal.

In the public debate over this, there was concern that the proposal would have the effect of reducing the yearly dividend payments and that more of the spending from the fund would be used to cover the public deficit. Before the proposal could have been presented to the voters of Alaska, it would have needed approval of a two-thirds majority in the state legislature, but it did not receive sufficient support and thus was not presented to voters. The board of the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation is still of the opinion that the proposal should be implemented, and point out that "many Alaskans mistakenly believe that POMV will affect the dividend program." The constitution does not include rules about the dividends being paid to the inhabitants.

The Norwegian Petroleum Fund

Norway discovered petroleum in the 1960s and became an oil producer in 1973. The Norwegian Petroleum Fund—which is now officially renamed the "Government Pension Fund Global"—was established in 1990, and the first deposits into the fund where made in 1996. Compared with the funds of Alberta and Alaska, the Norwegian Petroleum Fund is better integrated into and coordinated with the country's overall macroeconomic policy.

A major shift in Norway's macroeconomic policy composition was undertaken in 2001 (see Norway, Ministry of Finance, 2001). Up until then the monetary policy had formally aimed to keep the exchange rate stable, while fiscal policy had aimed to dampen fluctuations in output and employment. As in other countries, the experience with countercyclical fiscal policy and the fixed exchange rate regime had been mixed. In addition, with the dependence on nonrenewable resource exports, it was seen to be crucial for Norway to adopt a more long-term view of fiscal policy. Thus monetary policy was given a more prominent role in short-term stabilization through the adoption of a flexible inflation target, while a new so-called rule (which is not a rule but an objective) stated that over the cycle the real
The payments into the fund consist of the return on the fund, government petroleum income, and net financial transactions in relation to petroleum activity. In Norway all government income from the petroleum sector is channelled into the fund.

The management of the fund has been delegated from the Ministry of Finance to a separate unit within the central bank, the Norges Bank Investment Management. All investments of the fund are in foreign assets, and over time the investment universe has been expanded to allow for such assets as private sector bonds and real estate. In 2006, the maximum share the petroleum fund could invest in one company was increased from 3 percent to 5 percent.

The amount that is paid out from the fund is a yearly decision made by Parliament. This amount covers the public sector deficit, excluding petroleum income. The objective is that the payments out of the fund shall equal the real return of the fund, which is expected to be 4 percent on an annual basis. In Norway, this is known as the “rule for the use of petroleum money,” although this is not a binding rule. There are no formal institutional designs that limit the spending out of the fund. How much to use is continuously debated, and some politicians argue that Norway should use more of the fund than it is now using. The actual use of petroleum revenues has exceeded the 4 percent objective.

The rule for the use of petroleum money also includes the possibility that in economic downturns one can pursue an active fiscal policy and use more than the 4 percent of the fund. Thus, even if monetary policy has been given a more prominent role in macroeconomic stabilization policy, fiscal policy still has some short-term, and not only long-term, considerations.

A summary of some main points in the design and management of the three petroleum funds just discussed is outlined in Table 13.1.

Comparing Experiences of the Petroleum Funds

We can now briefly compare how the different political incentives of the three funds just described have mapped into different experiences in their operation. There are major differences between the three funds when it comes to payments in, management, and payments out of the funds.

In Alberta and Alaska, a share of the public petroleum income is invested in the fund, while in Norway all government income from the petroleum sector is channelled into the fund. With the exception of Alberta, the payments into the funds have been in accordance with the stated intentions.

The management of the funds differs. In Alaska and Norway, the management has been delegated to bodies that are largely independent from politicians, while in Alberta politicians have had a hands-on approach. The management in Alaska and Norway must be considered successful, with acceptable rates of return and an investment policy in accordance with the intentions. The management in Alberta, on the other hand, must be characterized as not very successful. Unclar

and shifting political priorities have given low rates of return, uncertainty as to what is the value of the fund, and “investments” that must be at least partly considered as consumption.

The payments out of the fund are decided by rules in the constitution in Alaska, while they are subject to discretionary political decisions in Alberta and Norway. In Alberta and Norway there are guidelines for how much of the fund should be used, but the actual payments have exceeded these guidelines (to a larger extent in Alberta than in Norway).

There are interesting contrasts between the two petroleum funds in North America. While the value of the fund in Alberta has decreased due to politicians not following their own intentions, the Alaska fund has rules in the constitution that to a large extent decouple payments out of the fund from short-term political priorities. Warrack (2005, p. 17) concludes that

Without an arms-length mechanism resilient to/from ebbs and flows of fiscal demands, it seems impossible for a political system to manage energy revenues responsibly. That is a sad lesson for Alberta, the province being far less successful than Alaska.

Warrack (2005, p. 19) argues that the solution to this is to “establish arms-length governance by Trustees at the outset, preferably by constitution.” The failed policy of the Alberta fund can be mitigated by adopting rules so that short-term bias in the use of petroleum wealth becomes more difficult.

Although the experiences in Alaska have been favorable when it comes to management and payments out of the fund, they also make it clear that the institutional-design is not without potential for improvement. The rules that govern payments out of the fund make it resilient to short-termism, but at the same time they prevent what may seem as a more reasonable organization. The POMV proposal seems like a better rule for payments out of the fund than the current model, but the fact that the current system is part of the state constitution makes such a change difficult to establish. This illustrates how strict rules also come with costs because they reduce flexibility.

Moreover, one may argue that the relevant measure is not the fund itself but the country’s (or region’s) overall macroeconomic development; if the rules in the relevant

| TABLE 13.1 |
| Design of three petroleum funds |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Payments in | Management | Payments out |
| Alberta Heritage Fund | Discretionary: 30% → 15% → 0% | Political investment committee | Discretionary: Objective: Cannot exceed 5% |
| Alaska Permanent Fund | Rules in constitution: At least 25% of royalties | Independent company with a public majority on the board | Rules in constitution: 21% of net return of last five years |
| Norwegian Petroleum Fund | Guidelines: 100% | Separate unit under the central bank | Discretionary: Objective: Cannot exceed 4% |
sector deficit and borrowing, then although the development of the fund may look sustainable the accumulation of public debt outside the fund may not be. Thus, a potential drawback in linking only one part of the public balance to rules in the constitution may be that the petroleum wealth in essence is used to back public borrowing.

Although one may argue that a drawback of the Norwegian model when compared with the Alaskan one is that the payment out of the fund is a yearly discretionary policy decision, the Norwegian model also has some advantages. First, since the guidelines for using the Norwegian petroleum fund relate to its use in connection with the public sector deficit, they put emphasis on overall macroeconomic balance. The guidelines say that the public sector deficit (over the cycle) excluding petroleum shall not exceed 4 percent of the petroleum fund. Thus, the payments out of the fund are used to cover the public sector deficit, and adhering to the guidelines also ensures that macro balances are respected.

By contrast, in Alaska the public sector deficit is independent of the rules governing the petroleum fund. The fund is not well integrated with overall macroeconomic policy. One may ask what the rationale is for putting strict rules on part of the public budgets, while these rules in effect may be undermined by other parts of the budget. The political incentives created by the rule in Alaska do not cope well with the long-term fiscal balance in the public sector, while the political incentives in the Norwegian model do not cope well with the temptation to use more of the fund in the short term than intended.

Thus, it seems that we have yet to see a design of a petroleum fund that deals in a satisfactory way with the tendency for political decisions to have a short-term bias.

CONCLUSION

Political institutions shape political incentives. This in turn helps explain why there is such a large variation in the experiences of resource-abundant countries. Dependent on initial institutions as well as the incentives these create for further policy reform, resource abundance may lower welfare or may strongly increase welfare. However, even when initial institutions are strong, there may be a short-term bias in political decisions, and investments may be made for political rather than economic reasons. The political incentives built into petroleum funds are decisive for their success or failure. Transparency and strong macro institutions are necessary but not sufficient conditions for resource abundance to stimulate prosperity.

REFERENCES


